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As we write this foreword, the world is facing the worst economic crisis since the Great 
Depression, tied to the COVID-19 pandemic. The number of extremely poor and undernourished 
has increased dramatically. Millions of workers and small-scale entrepreneurs have lost their 
jobs and livelihoods, with women and youth hit particularly hard. Beyond triggering a recession, 
COVID-19 has shone a light on the deep vulnerabilities inherent in our global economic and 
food systems.
As countries worldwide plan for a post-pandemic recovery, we have an opportunity to design 
more equitable and inclusive systems. This will require concerted efforts from both public and 
private actors that are fully aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals in order to foster 
inclusive growth that is environmentally and socially sustainable.
Responsible investment in the agri-food sector holds strong potential to support realization 
of the SDGs. Such investment can help address some of the world’s most pressing challenges, 
including the achievement of sustainable food security, protection and regeneration of vital 
ecosystems, and the creation of decent work and livelihood opportunities for those who 
need them most. Mechanisms that promote responsible investment in agriculture and food 
systems are thus critical to addressing the systemic vulnerabilities and inefficiencies COVID-19 
has exposed. Such mechanisms include targeted, well-designed incentives for sustainable 
investment, with a particular focus on small-scale producers and small- and medium-scale 
enterprises.
This guide, which is a joint product of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations and the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, makes an important contribution 
in this regard. It provides policymakers and government technical staff with guidance on 
whether and, if so, how investment incentives can be used to enhance investment that is 
aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Committee on World Food Security 
Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems.
The guide contains analytical frameworks, recommendations and good practices that can 
inspire new approaches to investment incentives. It builds on the extensive experience and 
expertise of both organizations on the trends, impacts, multidimensional challenges, and 
opportunities of agricultural investment in developing and emerging economies.
We hope that this guide will be of use to policy makers and technical staff in promoting and 
supporting the responsible investment in agriculture and food systems that is critical for more 
inclusive and sustainable food systems and economies.
Foreword
Marcela Villarreal,  PhD Director
Partnerships and UN Collaboration Division 
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Executive summary
Increased investment in agriculture and food systems—from both the private and public 
sectors—is critical to enhance food security and nutrition, reduce poverty, and adapt to climate 
change. To generate sustainable benefits, this investment must be responsible.  
What role should investment incentives play in encouraging such investment? This guide 
helps to answer that question. Specifically, the guide provides policymakers and government 
technical staff with guidance on how investment incentives can be used (and how they should 
not be used) to enhance responsible investment in agriculture and food systems.  
The guide provides an overview of responsible investment in agriculture and food systems; 
examines common types of incentives; offers general considerations on how incentives can be 
used; and discusses how to plan for, design, monitor, and evaluate investment incentives for 
responsible investment in agriculture and food systems.  
Responsible investment in agriculture and food systems 
The Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (CFS RAI) provide a 
framework for understanding responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. Such an 
investment contributes to sustainable development, enhances food security and nutrition, and 
respects human rights. The achievement of these objectives is supported by the incorporation 
of responsible investment principles into law and policy design by governments. It is also 
contingent on the incorporation of responsible investment principles into investor practices. 
Inclusive and meaningful multi-stakeholder engagement should be incorporated, by both 
government and investors, at all relevant stages. 
Some of the principles within the CFS RAI reflect binding international human rights law, 
while others embody more aspirational development goals. Incentives are often not the 
most appropriate tool for ensuring that investments do not result in human rights abuses. By 
contrast, some important goals in the CFS RAI focus on achieving outcomes that are critical 
from a sustainability perspective, and which are aligned with but go beyond what is required by 
international law. In these instances, incentives are more likely to be an appropriate mechanism—
as one tool among many—to encourage investments that help advance such goals.  
Understanding Investment Incentives 
An “investment incentive” is a targeted measure provided by a government to or for the benefit 
of an investor (including small-scale producers) for a new or expanded investment with the goal 
of influencing the size, location, impact, behaviour, sector, or other character of such investment. 
Investment incentives can be broadly categorised into five groups: 
• Financial incentives: Non-tax-based financial supports. 
• Technical or business support incentives: Can include facilitation services, technological 
packages, research and development, and extension services.  
• Fiscal incentives (tax incentives): Tax-based measures.   
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• Regulatory incentives: Derogations from national or sub-national regulations or favourable 
regulatory terms offered to investors. 
• Other incentives: Measures that are categorised as incentives for the purposes of this guide 
but that do not fit into the existing established categories listed above. 
The guide examines common types of incentives used in the agricultural and food systems context 
that fall within those categories. It provides general guidance on those incentives that are inefficient 
or carry an excessive risk of negative externalities (red), those that have the potential to be good or 
bad policy tools depending on how they are used (amber), and those that may be more likely to have 
positive investment outcomes if used well, albeit still with risks of negative externalities (green).  
The types of incentives examined are:
Financial Fiscal Regulatory OtherTechnical and Business Support
Profit-based 
Reduced rates on 




income tax rates 
Cost-based 
Zero-ratings and VAT 
exemptions 
Investment tax credits 
Zero or reduced tariffs 
Tax deductions 
Loss carry forwards 
Investment allowances 
Export tax exemptions 
Accelerated depreciation 

































Overview of the guide
This  guide aims to provide policymakers and government technical staff with guidance on how 
investment incentives can be used (and how they should not be used) to enhance responsible 
investment in agriculture and food systems.  
The guide identifies key policy challenges associated with investment incentives, and offers 
guidance on how to design, implement, monitor, and evaluate investment incentives that are 
aligned with national development priorities and that contribute to the realisation of the 2030 
Sustainable Development Agenda. By focusing on the full ambit of investors—domestic and 
foreign, small-, mid- and large-scale—the guide provides a unique contribution regarding the 
use of incentives for responsible investment. 
The guide covers the following:  
• Part I explains what responsible investment in agriculture and food systems is and who the 
key stakeholders are, as a starting point for understanding how incentives may be used in 
this context.  
• Part II provides an overview of investment incentives and discusses some of the most 
common types of incentives used.  
• Part III offers general considerations on how incentives can be used—as well as how they 
should not be used—to improve the quality and quantity of responsible investment in 
agriculture and food systems.  
• Part IV discusses how to plan for, design, monitor, and evaluate investment incentives for 
responsible investment in agriculture and food systems.  
• Separate annexes offer more specific guidance:  
- Annex I provides more detail on theories of change and how they can be used for 
monitoring and evaluating incentives.  
- Annex II discusses specific challenges of tax incentives, as well as principles that should 
guide the design of tax incentives. 
- Annex III offers additional guidance on monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) in 
the context of incentives.  
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Part I – Responsible
investment in agriculture 
and food systems
The agricultural sector suffers and has suffered from serious underinvestment from both the 
private and public sectors. Increased investment in agriculture and food systems is critical to 
enhance food security and nutrition, reduce poverty, and adapt to climate change. In order to 
generate sustainable benefits, however, it is crucial to ensure not only that more investments 
are made, but that more responsible investments are made.  
Beyond the essential public investment that governments make in the agricultural sector, 
governments also play an important role in facilitating and supporting investment by small-
scale producers and other private sector investors in agriculture and food systems. Strategic 
policy interventions, such as targeted investment incentives, can help to steer investors to invest 
more and in a responsible manner, with a view to promoting sustainable development and 
achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, incentives may be ineffective, 
and even detrimental, if certain fundamentals are not in place. These fundamentals include 
factors such as strong institutions, reliable infrastructure, and laws that protect human rights 
and the environment.  
This guide discusses the circumstances in which different types of investment incentives can be 
used to help to stimulate private investments that are responsible and aligned with national 
development priorities.  
What is responsible investment in agriculture and food systems? 
Investment is the commitment of capital (whether financial, physical, intellectual, or other) 
to something with the expectation of accumulating additional income or benefits in the 
future.  
This guide focuses on investment made by the wide range of individuals and private sector 
enterprises that invest in agriculture (including livestock and pastoralism), fisheries and 
aquaculture, and forestry, including investments in primary agriculture as well as those in 
upstream or downstream activities. Investors include both domestic and foreign investors, 
ranging from small-scale producers and micro-enterprises to large-scale corporate investors.2 
Global consensus on what constitutes responsible investment in agriculture and food systems 
can be found in the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems 
(CFS RAI), which build on and incorporate other important guidance such as the Voluntary 
2 For the purposes of this guide, financial institutions are excluded from the scope of what is considered an “investor”.
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Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure.3 According to the CFS RAI, responsible 
investment in agriculture and food systems contributes to sustainable development, enhances 
food security and nutrition, and respects human rights. The achievement of these objectives 
is supported by the incorporation of responsible investment principles into law and policy 
design by governments. It is also contingent on the incorporation of responsible investment 
principles into investor practices. Inclusive and meaningful multi-stakeholder engagement 
should be incorporated, by both government and investors, at all relevant stages. 
The CFS RAI consist of 10 Principles and set out the roles and responsibilities of various 
stakeholders in achieving investments that are responsible and in line with the principles. 
Pursuant to the principles, responsible investment in agriculture and food systems achieves 
the following:
• Contributes to food security and nutrition (Principle 1). 
• Contributes to sustainable and inclusive economic development and the eradication of 
poverty (Principle 2). 
• Fosters gender equality and women’s empowerment (Principle 3). 
• Engages and empowers youth (Principle 4). 
• Respects tenure of land, fisheries, and forests, and access to water (Principle 5). 
• Conserves and sustainably manages natural resources, increases resilience, and reduces 
disaster risks (Principle 6). 
• Respects cultural heritage and traditional knowledge, and supports diversity and 
innovation (Principle 7). 
• Promotes safe and healthy agriculture and food systems (Principle 8). 
• Incorporates inclusive and transparent governance structures, processes, and grievance 
mechanisms (Principle 9). 
• Assesses and addresses impacts and promotes accountability (Principle 10).
These 10 principles can guide governments in their approach to investment in agriculture 
and food systems, and this approach should be incorporated into countries’ national 
development strategies and priorities.  
The CFS RAI, which were developed and negotiated using an inclusive multi-stakeholder 
process, take the form of a voluntary international instrument that does not, on its own, create 
legal obligations. Some of the principles within the CFS RAI reflect binding international 
3 Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT) 
(FAO, 2012b).
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human rights law,4 while others embody more aspirational development goals. Relevant 
aspects of international human rights law include the right to food, the right to a remedy, and 
free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). Human rights law creates binding legal obligations 
for governments, which must: respect such rights, protect rights from infringement by third 
parties such as investors, and fulfil rights by taking steps to progressively realise them. In 
light of these obligations, incentives are often not the most appropriate tool for ensuring 
that investments do not result in human rights abuses. 
By contrast, some important goals in the CFS RAI focus on achieving outcomes that are 
critical from a sustainability perspective, and which are aligned with, but go beyond, what is 
required by international law. These include, for example, youth empowerment, ecosystem 
services, and inclusive business approaches. In these instances, incentives are more likely to 
be an appropriate mechanism—as one tool among many—to encourage investments that 
help advance such goals. How incentives may do so is discussed in greater detail in Parts III 
and IV.
Who are the key stakeholders when it comes to responsible agricultural investment? 
There are three main groups of stakeholders who have critical roles with respect to 
responsible agricultural and food systems investments:5 
1. National and sub-national government actors – e.g. elected or politically appointed 
ministry officials; ministry technical staff; elected members of legislative bodies, as well 
as legislative committee/technical staff; local officials and technical staff.6 
2. Investors – e.g. domestic and foreign; small-, mid-, and large-scale; farmers and 
enterprises.7   
3. Community members affected by investments, and civil society. 
These groups may be involved in and/or affected by investment decisions and investment 
outcomes. Each group also has different investment-related interests and needs. These 
differences may be more acute at a sub-group and individual level. A participatory approach 
to investments and their governance—including in the design and use of incentives—can help 
to balance different needs, and ideally lead to outcomes that benefit all key stakeholders.
4 Similarly, aspects of the CFS RAI also align with, or even incorporate, key safeguards found in other international instruments that arguably 
have the status of soft law, such as those contained in the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries 
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT) (FAO, 2012b) and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, (2011).
5 Other relevant stakeholders include donors, which support incentives programmes and other government programmes focused on 
agricultural and food systems investment, as well as home country governments, which incentivise their outward investors in various ways. 
While both can play critical roles in shaping agricultural and food systems investment, including through the use of incentives, their roles are 
outside the scope of this guide.
6 For the purposes of this guide, certain public financial institutions are also considered to fall within the scope of “government.” For one 
example, see below case study on the Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending.
7 While private financial institutions are also investors in agriculture and food systems, they fall outside the scope of this guide.
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National and sub-national government actors  
Who has a general role vis-a-vis responsible agricultural investment?  
The promotion, facilitation and regulation of investment in agriculture and food systems 
involves a wide range of government authorities, from the national to the local level. While 
every country has its own specific approach to agricultural and food systems investment, and 
agricultural policy-making more generally, it is common for multiple ministries or agencies 
at the national level, as well as sub-national entities, to play a role in contributing to relevant 
policy, implementing investment approval processes, and/or otherwise influencing investment 
decision-making in this context.  
At the national level, for example, issues that influence investments in agriculture and food 
systems may potentially be covered by a number of governmental ministries and agencies. The 
following table provides generalised examples of government authorities’ potential roles and 
responsibilities; while the specifics will depend on the jurisdiction, the table gives an idea of 
how interrelated subjects may be parcelled out to different ministries or agencies:8
8 Adapted from FAO, 2015b.
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Blue shaded cells marked with a * indicate the areas where the relevant ministry or agency may have a role under mainstream 
practice (saying nothing of the nature or adequacy of the role).  
Orange shaded cells indicate where a ministry might usefully be involved but likely is not under mainstream practice. 
This table has been adapted from the table in FAO, (2015b), p. 27.
7
While the previous table is only an approximation, it shows how decisions that should relate 
to core governmental strategies and goals are commonly spread across different ministries, 
often with minimal coordination between them. Such a siloed approach to decision-making can 
undermine national objectives or a government’s ability to advance responsible agricultural 
and food systems investment.  
Further, in the context of investment incentives, a lack of coordination between ministries can result 
in overlapping or inconsistent incentives that may even function at cross-purposes (IMF et al., 2015). 
Recommendation: Seek strong coordination across relevant institutions on issues 
that influence investments in agriculture and food systems, and ensure that all 
relevant institutions are included as needed in incentives design and implementation.
BOX 1: THE ROLE OF INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCIES 
Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) are usually autonomous public agencies or governmental 
agencies working under a specific ministry that focus primarily on attracting inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) into a country or sub-national region (UNCTAD, 2001; OECD, 2018a). 
This focus on FDI attraction can pose risks: research has shown, for example, that increased FDI 
flows may simply displace local investment rather than increase total investment (Klemm and 
Van Parys, 2012). Some IPAs—along with economic development agencies—may also focus 
on promoting or attracting domestic investments, and/or on other related mandates such as 
innovation promotion or export promotion. 
In countries that seek to increase investment in agriculture and food systems, IPAs may have an 
explicit focus on promoting such investment, for example, through a dedicated department in 
the IPA. Alternatively, there may be specific Agricultural Investment Promotion Agencies linked 
to national or sub-national Ministries of Agriculture, with mandates that include attraction of 
inward investors as well as support to domestic investors. 
IPAs tend to have four main roles: “advocacy within government to seek necessary approvals 
or urge the removal of obstacles to investment; image-building to promote the country as 
an investment destination; investor servicing or facilitation to help solve problems faced by 
existing or potential investors; and targeting or investment generation by actively seeking out 
investors based on national development plans or other criteria” (OECD, 2001). 
The “one-stop shop” nature of IPAs can act as a stimulating factor for investment, but only as a 
complement to “critical factors such as the quality of the investment climate and the country’s 
market size.” In fact, it is plausible that “[i]n countries where the investment climate is poor, 
promotion can even be counterproductive” (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016). 
While IPAs are sometimes considered an investment incentive in and of themselves, for the 
purposes of this guide, they are viewed simply as a conduit.  
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Government goals for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems 
Most governments have national development strategies and priorities that may influence 
their approach to investment in agriculture and food systems, which in turn should be aligned 
with the CFS RAI. For example, a government that has prioritised youth empowerment, poverty 
reduction, and climate change adaptation may focus on how responsible investment in 
agriculture and food systems can support those outcomes. Articulating the government’s  goals 
for responsible investment is an essential step when considering whether to offer investment 
incentives, as doing so enables policymakers and technical staff to select the best type of 
incentive, or another policy lever if preferable, to achieve that goal.  
For foreign investment, governments often hope that investments will help to advance 
macroeconomic goals, such as increased revenues, job creation, technology transfer, or linkages 
that support additional economic growth. While these goals are sometimes achieved, they are 
not guaranteed. Governments and their citizens can be disappointed to realise, for example, 
that net livelihood loss can occur if smallholders are displaced from the land underpinning 
the investment (Cordes et al., 2016), that foreign corporations can use profit-shifting practices 
that drain anticipated revenues (Bolwijn et al., 2018; Jansky and Palansky, 2019), that foreign 
knowledge and technology may fail to “spill over” to domestic firms (Lipsey and Sjöholm, 
2004), or that earnings may not fully materialise because of project unprofitability (De Groot 
and Pérez Ludeña, 2014).  
When it comes to domestic investment in agriculture and food systems, governments often 
focus on the large proportion of citizens whose livelihoods depend on agriculture, the need to 
reduce poverty and improve food security in rural areas, and the potential for agriculture and 
small-scale agri-business to provide employment, including for youth or women. Governments 
thus may hope that opportunities to increase investment in agriculture and agribusiness can 
offer ways to improve rural livelihoods and well-being. 
In addition to those primary goals, governments generally have multiple additional goals for 
responsible agricultural and food systems investment. Common goals relate to issues such as:
• Supporting better health outcomes, including by improving food security at the household 
and country levels. 
• Achieving food self-sufficiency.  
• Improving environmental impacts, from reducing negative environmental impacts of 
farming to integrating regenerative practices that improve the soil and ecosystem health 
of existing farmland. 
• Increasing local processing and value addition.   
Recommendation: Make sure that goals for agricultural and food systems 
investments are grounded in national development strategies and aligned with 
the CFS RAI. 
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Agricultural and food systems investors 
Who invests in agriculture and food systems? 
Agricultural and food systems investment can come from the public sector, the private sector, 
international donors, community-based organisations, or non-governmental organisations. It 
can be domestic or foreign. It can involve investors who are small-scale individual producers 
or micro/small enterprises, medium-sized producers or enterprises, and large corporations or 
corporate groups. For example, investments in agricultural land can range from small plots 
that measure less than 0.5 hectares in size all the way up to tracts of land in the range of 
hundreds of thousands of hectares.  
Research analysing the relative investments made by different types of primary agricultural 
investors has found that “farmers are by far the largest investors in agriculture” (Lowder et al., 
2012). Data taken in 2012 from 76 low- and middle-income countries showed that farmers’ 
on-farm investments were over three times as large as all other sources of investment 
combined. Specifically, in the countries analysed, domestic private farmers were responsible 
for 77.5 percent of all agricultural investments, and governments for 19.5 percent (including 
investment in R&D), while FDI accounted for 1.5 percent and overseas development assistance 
was just shy of 1.5 percent.9 While it is possible that the relative proportions have shifted since 
that research was conducted, recent data does indicate a general downward trend in FDI in 
agriculture over the last five years, along with a likely outsized impact of COVID-19 on FDI 
numbers (UNCTAD, 2020). Importantly, small-scale producers, both farmers and post-harvest 
processers, account for a significant share of the global food consumed—up to 80 percent in 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (Nwanze, 2011). 
This guide focuses on private investors in agriculture and food systems, which can be broken 
down into roughly the following groups:  
• Domestic small-scale producers and micro and small enterprises (including, for example, 
farmers, fisherfolk, and small post-harvest processors). 
• Domestic mid- or large-scale producers and enterprises. 
• Foreign large-scale enterprises (often taking the form of a corporation). 
Given its breadth of scope, this guide does not define who is a small-, mid-, or large-scale investor (in 
terms of monetary value of the investment or size of a landholding), but simply notes that there are 
substantial differences between each group that need to be recognised in the policymaking context. 
Notably, even within those three overarching groups, investors can be very different. This 
has significant implications for policy design. For example, important distinctions within the 
9 Data analysed and percentages ascribed by guide authors from Lowder et al., (2012).
10 For example, one of the rare papers focusing on mid-scale agricultural investors found in a study of recent farm size distributions changes 
in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia that there were two main types of mid-scale farmer: (1) rural small-scale farmers who have expanded 
(the minority), and (2) investors who have acquired their land from traditional authorities (the majority). Both groups were found to be 
predominantly men, with the second group mostly middle aged and urban based with non-farm primary jobs (mostly civil service), and a 
smaller subsection of that group elite rural men who acquired large landholdings at the outset of their career (Jayne et al., 2016).
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oft-overlooked mid-scale investor group exist.10 Similarly important distinctions are found with 
respect to “smallholders”, a term frequently used to refer to a diverse range of small-scale 
producers. For policy purposes, smallholders should be broken into more distinct sub-groups, 
ranging from, at one end of the spectrum, relatively better-situated producers who can more 
easily access formal markets, capital, and infrastructure through to, at the other end of the 
spectrum, small-scale farm households approaching landlessness, who are often the most 
marginalised and least able to benefit from government programmes (Vorley et al., 2012). 
Small- and medium-scale producers’ interests and needs are also shaped by other factors, such 
as gender (Box 2) and age (Box 3).
BOX 2: WOMEN AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 
SYSTEMS 
Women play a vitally important role in food production and are critical for achieving food 
security. Women comprise around 43 percent of the agricultural labour force in low- and 
middle-income countries (FAO, 2011). They are generally responsible for food crops (for the 
household and sale of the excess), while men are responsible for cash crops (Villamor et al., 
2014). Because of this, women rarely benefit from land moving from food crops to cash crops. 
In spite of their centrality to food systems, women often confront exclusion and discrimination 
within food systems that leaves them with less access to and control over land and productive 
resources, lower incomes than men, and fewer opportunities to participate in decision-
making processes that affect them. These factors leave women more vulnerable to the risks 
of investments, less likely to benefit from investments or investment incentives, and more 
likely to be harmed by interventions that improve the enabling environment for investment in 
agriculture and food systems.     
Policymakers and technical staff designing incentives for responsible agricultural and food 
systems investments should: 
• Understand that women face specific barriers to investment and that women are also at 
higher risk of being harmed by other investments. 
• Seek to design incentives to avoid unintended negative consequences for women. 
• Make women central to incentive design processes and content in order to overcome 
these barriers and address these risks.  
Barriers to own investment and increased risks of others’ investment 
Women face specific barriers to investment. Worldwide, the productivity of women farmers is 
20-30 percent less than that of men; not because they are less capable, but because they face 
gender-specific obstacles. These include unequal access to productive resources, markets, and 
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services, as well as additional household responsibilities due to traditional gender dynamics 
(FAO, 2011). These obstacles compound and create vicious cycles. For example, obstacles to 
women’s ability to buy, sell, and inherit land may force them to harvest less profitably from 
communal lands, or result in their being denied access to credit.11  
Women are also at higher risk of being harmed by the investment of others. As compared to men, 
women’s more precarious access to land and productive resources, and their more frequent 
exclusion from decision-making processes, places them at a higher risk of being negatively 
affected by large-scale agricultural investments. The stronger and more secure a woman’s 
rights to the land she uses, however, the more likely she is to benefit from the investments.
Gendered risks of “successful” incentives 
Interventions—whether incentives, improvements to the enabling environment, or other 
policy measures—that seek to increase agricultural productivity and profitability run the risk 
of inadvertently harming women if care is not taken to mitigate such risks. This is because, 
when interventions result in agriculture becoming more profitable and thus more likely to 
yield cash at the household level, women often lose control of the land assets (to men) that 
they had previously been able to use under less profitable/productive approaches. This can 
occur, for example, when rural infrastructure is improved, when new extension services are 
offered, and when support is provided to switch to more profitable crops. These risks should 
be specifically considered and addressed when designing any incentives targeting small-scale 
producers. 
Women’s participation in design of incentives  
When planning an intervention that may take the form of an investment incentive, policymakers 
and technical staff should find ways to make women’s input central to the planning process, 
including regarding the form and content of the intervention.  
In terms of form and content, some objectives—such as eliminating discrimination in education 
and securing women’s land rights—may be better addressed by legal and regulatory change, 
or by other mechanisms that are not incentives. Other objectives—such as improving access 
to extension and financial services—may very well be an appropriate target for an incentive.  
To the extent that an incentive is deemed an appropriate intervention, the incentive design 
phase should include participatory processes that include women who are intended 
beneficiaries. Women’s participation can help identify the gendered risks that might arise from 
a potential incentive, and ways to mitigate those risks. Moreover, women’s participation may 
help in identifying opportunities to use incentives more proactively to remove obstacles that 
women face in agriculture and food systems. 
11 See Case Study: Senegal, Fonds de Garantie des Investissements Prioritaires, 34.
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BOX 3: YOUTH AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES FOR AGRICULTURE AND FOOD 
SYSTEMS12 
The value of youth in agriculture and food systems 
Agricultural production systems need to produce more with less, and supply chains need to 
become more resilient to systemic shocks, such as the COVID-19 induced market shock. Too 
many small-scale farmers and processers still operate at subsistence or quasi-subsistence 
levels, with many more facing lower incomes due to changing market situations. Youth can be 
agents of change in transforming food systems and enhancing value addition, thus supporting 
food security. By harnessing their innovative potential, using new technologies and techniques, 
and taking advantage of new opportunities in emerging value chains, young agri-entrepreneurs 
could create thriving businesses and enhance value addition of agricultural production.  
In some countries, attracting and retaining youth in agriculture may be key to reducing 
unemployment and distress migration. Youth are three times as likely to be unemployed as 
adults, with unemployment rates stubbornly stagnating at around 14 percent globally and 
reaching up to 30 percent in Northern Africa (ILO, 2020). Furthermore, youth are more likely to 
be in precarious and informal employment and to experience exploitative working conditions 
(UN, 2013). Burgeoning un- and underemployment in turn fuels rural-urban and international 
migration, as many rural youth leave their homes in search of a better future. Recent data 
suggest that 32 percent of international migrants are under the age of 30 (UN, 2015). Since 
the urban sector has only limited capacities to absorb rural youth migrating to cities in 
many of today’s low- and middle- countries and regions, the promotion of self-employment 
in agricultural value chains, both production and post-harvest activities, remains the most 
realistic employment promotion strategy governments have at their disposal, at least in the 
short term.
Barriers to investment
Yet, as a joint publication from FAO, CTA, and IFAD concludes, “very few young people see a 
future for themselves in agriculture” (FAO et al., 2014). As a result, current food systems are 
put under significant pressure by the agricultural “generation gap”—the aging on-farm labour 
force and non-rejuvenation of an entire sector. According to a recent study, the average age of 
an African farmer is about 60 (FAO, 2014b; Rapsomanikis, 2015). Youth face significant barriers 
that discourage or prevent them from engaging in agriculture and agribusiness. In many cases, 
market failures (discussed in Part III) are key impediments. In particular, the following are 
among the most frequently identified “disincentives” for youth investing in agriculture (Fiedler, 
2020; FAO, et al. 2014): 
12 This Box is adapted from: Fiedler, (2020).
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• Limited access to knowledge.  
• Lack of financial services. 
• Insecure land tenure.  
• Lack of access to markets.  
Other disincentives include low prices/margins and high risk due to price fluctuations, as 
well as cultural aspects whereby farming is not a prestigious or attractive occupation. These 
challenges are interdependent, as imperfect capital markets impede the acquisition of factors 
of production. Conversely, those young people who do stay in agriculture require urgent 
support to invest in technologies and techniques that will allow them to produce “more with 
less”—increasing productivity sustainably. 
Youth participation in design of incentives 
The best way for government officials to understand the specific barriers faced by young 
agri-entrepreneurs in investing in agriculture and food systems, and to develop incentives 
that effectively overcome these barriers, is youth participation in policy planning and design. 
Details on how and examples of participation are discussed further in Part IV.
The variation across investor groups and sub-groups results in significant differences in 
agricultural and food systems investors’ goals and needs, as well as their approaches to 
investment decision-making. While all sorts of investors have a role to play in advancing 
responsible agricultural and food systems investment, their specific contributions, and how 
they react to incentives and other policy measures, can differ dramatically. 
Recommendation: Aim to design policy that is sensitive to the significant 
differences that exist within investor groups, based on factors such as size, value, 
role/activities, and location. Gender and age require particular attention and 
sensitivity in design. 
What do investors want to achieve through investment?
In spite of the vast differences in the nature of the investor, at their core, most investors 
want to see the best possible returns on their investment. This is the case with the large-
scale corporation that owes a profit margin to its shareholders, with the domestic mid-scale 
agribusiness enterprise that seeks to thrive, with the young agri-entrepreneur who wants to 
make a viable income off the family’s land, and with the landless female labourer who wants 
decent remuneration for the time she puts into the plot she works. Larger-scale enterprises 
and foreign investors in particular might also want to achieve access to land to feed home 
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markets, the opportunity to sell low-cost products in high value markets (again, maximising 
profit margins), and good long-term relations with the community and government that can 
help with branding and public perception (Smaller, 2014; Syed and Miyazako, 2013). Some 
investors may also have concerns for the state of the environment, or for community and other 
social relations. For some small-scale producers, including many indigenous peoples, their 
relationship with the land goes much further, and their modes of production are an integral 
part of their culture and way of life.
Community members and civil society 
Depending on the nature of the investment, a potentially broad range of people can be affected 
and so become stakeholders in a given investment decision. The size and location of the land 
underpinning the investment, as well as other factors, such as environmental impact, often 
influence how many people fall into that category. For example, if an investment will affect a 
watercourse, people downstream are likely to be affected and so have an interest in deciding 
whether and on what terms the investment should go ahead.  
Individuals who stand to be affected by the agricultural and food systems investments of others 
are often small-scale producers themselves. In such cases, these individuals have multiple 
roles—for example, as an investor and as a community member or local land user affected by 
another individual or entity’s investment.  
Broadly speaking, those stakeholders who are most likely to be affected by agricultural and 
food systems investments can be grouped into the following (often overlapping) categories:  
• People who use or rely on land or waters where an investment is to occur (whether formal 
owners or legitimate tenure rights holders). 
• Local community members who own or use the land adjacent to where an investment 
will occur or whose livelihoods and well-being may otherwise be affected by investment 
activities. 
• Producers whose own activities might feed into, or are impacted by, a larger investment 
project. 
• Employees or waged workers. 
• Other stakeholders, in a broader sense, including citizens and consumers in the host state 
and beyond, as well as advocates and civil society who are working alongside affected 
stakeholders.  
These stakeholders can have many legitimate interests in an investment project, including 
ensuring that their rights are protected, jobs are created, the environment is not harmed, and 
access to markets is improved.  
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As with the other key stakeholder groups discussed above, this grouping comprises extremely 
diverse stakeholders with very different—and sometimes divergent—interests and needs. 
They have an important role to play in encouraging and supporting agricultural investment to 
be more responsible, from input into relevant policymaking, to participation in consultation 
and consent processes, through to monitoring investors or government actions. Governments 
that are able to create spaces for these stakeholders’ perspectives can benefit from those 
insights at multiple points: from the elaboration of relevant legal and policy frameworks, to 
the determination of priorities regarding agricultural investment, through to the design of 
investment incentives themselves. 
Recommendation: Recognise the important roles of community members, local 
landowners, and civil society in ensuring agricultural and food systems investments 
are responsible, and create opportunities for them to share their perspectives 
and influence decision-making.
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Part II - Understanding 
investment incentives  
Investment incentives are a tool that governments can use to try to influence the quality 
and quantity of investment. Incentives are not the only tool that governments have at their 
disposal to shape investment, and in many cases, they are the wrong tool for the job—actions 
such as strengthening the content or enforcement of laws, improving physical infrastructure, 
or imposing penalties might be more appropriate and effective for influencing behaviour. The 
main questions of this guide are when incentives may be useful and how they can be used, as 
one tool among many, to enhance responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. To 
understand the potential and limitations of incentives in this context, it is necessary to first 
understand investment incentives. 
What are investment incentives? 
An “investment incentive” is a targeted measure provided by a government to, or for the benefit 
of, an investor (including small-scale producers) for a new or expanded investment with the 
goal of influencing the size, location, impact, behaviour, sector, or other character of such 
investment.13 In other words, incentives are: 
• specific benefits (rather than general policies or measures that may influence a jurisdiction’s 
or sector’s “investment attractiveness”); 
• given or offered by a government (national, sub-national, or local)14 to (or for the benefit 
of)15 an investor (e.g. producers, individual investors, corporations; can be domestic or 
foreign); 
• in the hopes of influencing the investor to behave in a certain way that differs from how 
it would have behaved without the incentive (such as getting the investor to invest at all, 
more, in a different region, or in a different way). 
Investment incentives can be broadly categorised into five groups: 
1. Financial incentives – Non-tax-based financial supports (e.g. grants, subsidies, loans). 
2. Technical or business support incentives –  Can include facilitation services (e.g. assistance 
obtaining permits and licences), technological packages, research and development, and 
extension services.  
13 Adapted from Tavares-Lehmann et al., (2016), at 5; James, (2013), at 63. While there are multiple definitions of investment incentives that 
have been used, this guide uses a definition that aligns with common understandings of incentives (e.g., a targeted measure, a goal of shaping 
an investment outcome) and that is also broad enough to cover the range of relevant agricultural and food systems investors and investments 
that are key to the CFS RAI (e.g., allowing a focus on small-scale producers rather than focusing only on foreign direct investment).
14 Occasionally, investment incentives may be offered or managed by non-governmental entities; for example, if investment promotion 
agencies are private or joint public-private entities, or if a local economic development entity has been established that is not a part of 
government. This guide considers all investment incentives to be provided by government, even if on occasion that provision occurs indirectly.
15 While the definition of “investment incentives” in this guide does include incentives that are given “for the benefit of” investors, this guide 
focuses primarily on incentives that are offered by government directly to investors.
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3. Fiscal incentives –  Tax-based measures (e.g. tax holidays, reduced income tax rates, 
accelerated depreciation). For the purposes of this guide, these will be referred to as tax 
incentives.  
4. Regulatory incentives – Derogations from national or sub-national regulations (e.g. social, 
labour, or environmental) or favourable regulatory terms offered to investors. 
5. Other incentives – Measures that are categorised as incentives for the purposes of this 
guide but that do not fit into the existing established categories listed above (e.g. public 
procurement, and creation of new and targeted infrastructure). 
Although these categories and the definition above can help in identifying and understanding 
most investment incentives offered by governments, it is not always clear when a government 
measure should be considered an investment incentive. For example, through public 
procurement, a government may seek to purchase food (e.g. for school feeding programmes, 
food aid, public hospitals, etc.) from small-scale producers in order to create a stable market 
for them, even if this sometimes requires paying an above-market price. Is that public 
procurement policy an investment incentive? Maybe. The government is using its purchasing 
power and willingness to (potentially) pay a slightly higher price (targeted measure) to create 
a stable market (benefit) for small-scale producers (investors), which can encourage increased 
small-scale producer investment in the good being procured (influencing investor behaviour). 
Or maybe not. The government is simply purchasing necessary goods that, even if not fully 
cost competitive, provide the government value while also helping the government fulfil a 
secondary objective of supporting small-scale producers. Rather than worry too much about 
how to categorise those measures that could be interpreted either way, such gray areas provide 
important reminders that: first, governments have many tools at their disposal, of which 
incentives are only one, and, second, government measures, whether incentives or not, have 
both costs and benefits that should be weighed and considered in light of policy objectives and 
development goals. 
Indeed, although governments use incentives to try to influence investor behaviour, incentives 
are often not appropriate, not effective, or not worth their cost. For example, incentives are 
not an appropriate tool to prevent serious human rights abuses, such as forced labour, which 
should instead be prohibited by law. And incentives are not effective if they do not change 
investors’ behaviour; this includes redundant incentives, which are provided even when the 
investment would have been undertaken without the incentive.  
Recommendation: Use incentives as a targeted policy instrument to address 
specific needs, but only if they are effective, worth their cost, and not redundant. 
One way of targeting incentives is by offering sector-specific incentives (see Box 4). In addition, 
Part III provides more specific considerations for using incentives to enhance responsible 
investment in agriculture and food systems.
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BOX 4: SECTOR-SPECIFIC INCENTIVES 
Governments can choose to target investment incentives in different ways. For example, they 
may target by way of any or all of the following: 
• Investors of a particular status (e.g. first time / new entities). 
• Investment of a particular monetary value. 
• Investment in a particular sector. 
• Investment in a particular location. 
Sector-specific incentives may be more effective at achieving particular development outcomes 
than generic incentives that apply in the same way to any investor regardless of sector.16 To 
the extent that governments seek to use incentives to encourage both greater quantities of 
and more responsible agricultural and food systems investments, sector-specific incentives—
along with other careful targeting and use of conditions (see Parts III and IV)—may be more 
effective than broader incentives. 
While sector-specific incentives may be more effective for achieving development goals, they 
have their limitations. First, sector-specific incentives and policies can be heavily affected—
and sometimes neutralised—by economy-wide policies and other macroeconomic issues, 
including exchange rate policies and industrial protection (Schiff and Valdes, 1996). Second, 
sector-specific programmes have been reported to be “prone to become subject to political 
pressures aimed at having their resources applied beyond original mandates,” rendering the 
incentives ineffective (OECD, 2003). 
What are the legal and programmatic sources of incentives? 
Investment incentives are offered in many ways, but most commonly through:17  
• Government programmes that are not necessarily directly prescribed in law.  
• Domestic laws and regulations. 
• Contracts signed between the investor and a government entity. 
16 OECD, (2018b). (Noting that sector-specific incentives are on the rise in ASEAN countries as a means of achieving specific development 
objectives); Christian Gonzalez, Mike Kerlin, Rachel Schaff, and Sarah Tucker-Ray, “How State and Local Governments Win at Attracting 
Companies,” McKinsey &amp; Company Insights. September 13, 2019. (Noting, in the US context, that “anchoring incentives to specific sectors 
enables more thoughtful investments in related areas that can also boost economic growth ….”).
17 Another legal source of investment incentives is arguably international investment agreements. IIAs are outside the scope of this guide; see 
Box 5 for more information.
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Non-institutionalised programmes and initiatives 
Investment incentives—particularly those targeting small-scale producers or subgroups within 
them—are not always directly prescribed in law, and may instead be programme-based and 
dependent on donor funding. For example, in Uganda, the FAO-Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Industry and Fisheries Youth Inspiring Youth in Agriculture Initiative has identified youth 
champions to receive small grants for their businesses. This initiative, as many other similar 
programmes, depends on donor funding (Fiedler, 2020). While such initiatives do provide useful 
support to young agri-entrepreneurs, reliance on funding from international organisations or 
non-governmental organisations can have implications for a programme’s longevity. 
Domestic and international laws and policies 
Investment incentives relevant to agricultural and food systems investments can be scattered 
across a number of different laws and policies, such as those specific to investment, to tax, or 
to agriculture, as well as those establishing free trade zones or other special economic zones. 
To the extent feasible, embedding incentives that aim to support small-scale producers into 
domestic national or sub-national law can help to ensure the longevity of the programme. (See 
Part IV for more on timeframe and duration.) Embedding incentives in law can also enable 
more transparency, consistency, and accountability.  
Beyond domestic law, incentives may also be found in—or affected by—international investment 
treaties. Given that evidence demonstrates that the effect of investment treaties on decisions to 
invest is indeterminate or negligible, and in light of the distinct differences between investment 
treaty-making and the process of domestic investment incentives design and provision, this 
guide excludes investment treaties from its coverage of incentives. It is nevertheless important 
that governments understand the potential risks that investment treaties pose in the context 
of investment incentives offered at the domestic or project level, as discussed briefly in Box 5.
BOX 5: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND INCENTIVES 
International investment treaties, which include bilateral investment treaties and the 
investment chapters of free trade agreements, provide protections to foreign investors and 
corresponding obligations for state parties. These investor protections and benefits are usually 
enforced through the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, by which foreign 
investors (individuals and companies) can file an arbitration claim against a host country for 
measures that are alleged to have negatively affected their real or expected profitability. 
While proponents of investment treaties argue that the enforceable investor protections 
provided by such agreements lead to greater cross-border investment flows—thus serving as 
a form of investment incentive—a growing body of empirical research shows that investment 
treaties do not deliver on the promise to increase investment, and that the societal costs 
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associated with investment treaties may outweigh any purported benefits of new investments. 
Furthermore, not all investments positively shape a host country’s development, and some 
directly harm certain development objectives (Johnson et al., 2020; Johnson et al., 2018). For 
these reasons, this guide excludes investment treaties from its coverage of incentives.  
It is nevertheless important that governments understand the potential risks that investment 
treaties pose in the context of investment incentives offered at the domestic or project level. 
For example, decisions to modify or withdraw incentives from a covered investor, or offering 
incentives in a discriminatory manner, may result in costly ISDS claims from investors.18 
In addition, some investment agreements may limit or prohibit countries’ enforcement of 
performance requirements used by a host state to advance specific development objectives. 
While such risks should not prevent governments from taking the necessary policy steps to 
advance specific development objectives, understanding these risks can inform government 
approaches to incentives design and implementation. 
Investor-state contracts 
Contracts between the state (at the national or sub-national level) and a large-scale investor 
are also used in some contexts to provide project-specific incentives that are agreed upon by 
the parties. Investment incentive contracts generally give a package of incentives in exchange 
for certain investment commitments on the part of the investor, and are used by governments 
in the hopes of inducing the investor to locate in that national or sub-national jurisdiction. 
In addition to specific incentive contracts, some states also enter into broader investment 
contracts with investors, such as concession agreements, which also commonly include certain 
incentives.19 
Beyond the specific financial and tax incentives that investor-state contracts typically offer, 
such contracts may also offer regulatory incentives that enable derogations from law. This 
is sometimes done, for example, through a “stabilisation” provision, which aims to exempt 
investors from changes in the law that may have the effect of increasing their costs of doing 
business. Good practice suggests that stabilisation provisions should be avoided.   
More generally, the use of investment incentive contracts presents several problems, similar 
to the challenges that arise with discretionary legislated procedures discussed in Part IV. 
18 As an example, numerous ISDS claims have arisen from countries’ use of local content requirements and investment incentives to encourage 
investment in, and consumption of, renewable energy. Spain, Italy, and the Czech Republic were forced to scale back incentives favouring 
renewable energy after their unexpectedly large success led to dramatic energy market distortions. As a result of these modifications, Spain 
has faced nearly 40 arbitrations from renewable energy firms, which have contested that measures altering the existing incentives regime 
were in breach of investment treaties, violating their legitimate expectations and leading to the devaluation of their investments. Italy and the 
Czech Republic are involved in similar claims. See, for example, Eiser v. Spain; Isolux v. Spain; Novenergia v. Spain; Cosbev, (2017); Reynoso, 
(2019).
19 For examples of investor-state contracts that include investment incentives, see the range of contracts available at the Open Land Contracts 
website: OpenLandContracts.org. At the time of research, a search for investor-state contracts that include income tax exemptions turned up 
85 contracts from countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
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20 Although good practice suggests that incentives should not be offered via contract, for governments that plan to continue to conclude 
investor-state contracts as a vehicle for providing investment incentives, relevant resources on responsible contracts can help guide their 
negotiations. See e.g. UNIDROIT et al., (2020); Smaller, (2014).
Leaving incentive provisions to individual negotiators with excessive discretion increases the 
bargaining power of investors, results in complicated and costly administration and monitoring, 
and increases the scope for corruption. Using investor-state contracts to offer incentives 
also inherently favours large-scale investors over small-scale producers and other investors 
operating at a smaller scale.20   
Recommendation: Reduce or eliminate the discretion to offer incentives through 
contracts and, when possible, embed incentives in domestic national or sub-
national law.
Common types of investment incentives  
This section provides a brief overview of some of the most common types of investment 
incentives used in the agricultural and food systems context: financial, technical and business 
support, fiscal (tax), and regulatory. It also looks at incentives that fall into the category of 
“Other” under the definition of this guide.  
Each sub-category of incentives is presented below in tabular form, with descriptions of 
what the incentive is and how it works, potential pros, and potential cons. The information is 
presented in a “traffic light” system, where incentives that are inefficient or carry an excessive 
risk of negative externalities are coded red, incentives that have the potential to be good or 
bad policy tools depending on how they are used are coded amber, and incentives that, if 
designed well, may be more likely to have positive investment outcomes (albeit still with risks 
of negative externalities) are coded green:
Inefficient or excessive risk of negative externalities
Good or bad depending how used 
More likely positive investment outcomes
Thinking about cons and costs 
A number of cons and other considerations specific to each type of incentive have been set 
out in the “Potential cons” column of the tables below. Beyond those specific potential cons, 
however, there are a number of cross-cutting cons that may apply across the spectrum of 
incentives. These cons include: 
• The inherent risk that incentives may not achieve their policy objectives.  
• The risk that support may not be enjoyed equally by women and men, or that women 
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specifically may be negatively affected, if programme design lacks gender sensitivity (see 
Box 2). 
• The possibility that certain incentives could run afoul of international trade laws (see 
more Box 6). 
• The risk that incentives may not be worth their costs.
To understand this last risk, it is necessary to understand the costs associated with incentives. 
The costs of incentives include the more obvious costs, such as the actual financial outlay for 
the incentive itself. For example, in the case of a tax holiday (tax incentive), this is revenue 
foregone. For a grant (financial incentive), it would be the money that is being transferred to 
the investor. Other direct costs include administrative costs, such as the salaries of government 
officials whose time goes towards designing, administering, monitoring, and evaluating 
the incentive. There are additional “hidden costs,” which include, for example: opportunity 
costs (what the money might otherwise be used for), the costs of offering an incentive for an 
investment that would have been made irrespective of the incentive, capital that is invested 
inefficiently in order to capture the incentive, and local investment that is displaced by other 
(typically foreign) investors attracted by the incentive (Thomas, 2007).
BOX 6: INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES 
While the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not “currently feature a credible set of 
disciplines on the distortive effects of investment incentives” (Sauve and Soprana, 2016), 
it is possible that certain agricultural investment incentives may be in breach of existing 
international trade rules, such as, for example:21  
• export-linked incentives;  
• market price support; and 
• input subsidies.  
In addition to the actual incentives, it is possible that certain conditions attached to incentives 
(discussed in Part III), such as local content requirements, could also breach WTO rules (FAO, 
2013a; Sauve and Soprana, 2016; FAO et al., 2010).  
Depending on how they are designed, other incentives and conditions, such as decoupled (not 
linked to production) income support, income insurance and safety-net programmes, natural 
disaster relief, certain environmental payments, and assistance for agricultural and rural 
development, may not, however, be in breach of WTO rules (WTO, n.d.). 
21 For a discussion of the WTO law applying to financial incentives applied to attract agricultural investment see Johnson et al. (forthcoming). 
See also “Agriculture: Explanation – Domestic support.” World Trade Organization. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_
intro03_domestic_e.htm.
23
Recommendation: Analyse proposed investment incentives for potential 
international trade law breaches.
Financial incentives 
Financial incentives are direct financial advantages provided to investors. They may be either 
non-reimbursable or reimbursable, with or without interest or extra costs. Common types of 
financial incentives that are offered in the agricultural and food systems context and examined 
in Table 2 of this guide are: 
• Grants / cash / input subsidies 
• Loans / credit 
• Loan guarantees  
• Market price support 
• Income support 
• Concessional insurance 
Financial incentives are used for all sizes of investors. While the eligibility criteria and intended 
beneficiaries are specific to the incentive (and many may be intended only for investors of a 
certain size), financial incentives can offer critical support to small-scale producers, enabling 
them to invest more and invest better. Financial incentives can be especially important for 
those who face particular challenges in accessing financial services on the market, such as 
young agri-entrepreneurs and women.  
Although well-designed financial incentives can influence investment decision-making, one 
commonly cited risk factor is that they can create market distortions and have other unintended 
consequences. To the extent that such incentives are helping to address a market failure, 
however, the accompanying “distortions” are not necessarily a problem. Due to the nuance 
and complexity of this topic, market distortion is disregarded in the tables below. 
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Table 2: Financial incentives 
This table provides a brief overview of common financial investment incentives that may be offered to investors 
in agriculture and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21. 
Incentive type Potential pros Potential consWhat it is & how it works 











Direct financial transfers to investors for 
certain eligible expenses, or subsidised 
inputs.22 These can be provided for a 
number of different purposes, such as: 
• Inputs (e.g. for fertiliser, machinery, 
mechanisation). 
• Job training (these may support 
trainees, newly recruited employees, 
or existing staff). 
Grants and input subsidies are a 
potentially powerful tool – for good      
or bad, depending on what exactly is 
being subsidised and the conditions       
of the subsidy. 
Concessional loans are provided on 
more favourable terms than market 
rates (e.g. lower interest rates, longer 
grace periods). 
Non-concessional loans or credit are 
provided at market rates on the same 
conditions as those offered by 
commercial lenders. They are useful 
when credit is not widely available; for 
example, for small- and medium-scale 
producers who lack a sound capital 
structure or assets large enough to 
guarantee loans. 
Loan guarantees are a promise by 
government to assume the debt 
obligation of the farmer in the event      
of default. They can be considered a 
subsidy, and are useful in helping 
encourage lending from institutions    
that might not otherwise provide any    
or accessible loans. 
A form of subsidy that guarantees 
minimum prices to producers. 
Direct payments to farmers, e.g. on the 
basis of size of land holdings (European 
Commission, n.d.).  
Subsidised insurance. Effects may vary 
depending on type of insurance and 
targeting, e.g.: 
• supporting farmers producing specific 
crops;  
• addressing specific risks (e.g. crop   
yield risks, price risks, or climate- 
related risks); and/or 
• encouraging behavioural changes    
(e.g. insurance that mitigates risks of 
reduced harvests due to adoption of 
more environmentally friendly practices). 
Enable small-scale producers 
to enter the market. 
Enable small-scale producers 
to increase productivity or 
otherwise remain 
economically viable. 
Can be effective for achieving 
environmental benefits (e.g. 
payments for ecosystems 
services). 
Increased access to finance. 
Enable farmers to maximise 
productivity potential of their 
land.  
Broad reach.  
Enhance access to finance to 
small-scale producers who 
commonly lack access to 
commercial banks, such as 
young agri-entrepreneurs and 
women. 
Mobilise co-financing from 
external sources. 
Possible long-term debt 
finance for development.  
Enable farmers to maximise 
productivity potential of their 
land. 
Broad reach. 
Enhance access to finance to 
small-scale producers who 
commonly lack access to 
commercial banks, such as young 
agri-entrepreneurs and women. 
Helps farmers to not produce 
at a loss. 
Encourage more sustainable 
farming practices by providing 
cash required to make 
necessary investments. 
Encourage the production of 
more diverse and nutritious 
food over more basic, 
monocropped commodities.  
Mitigate price risks. 
Reduce impact on farmers of 
weather- and climate-related 
production risks. 
Encourage small-scale 
producers to increase 
production intensity. 
 
Potential limiting of benefits 
to those within government 
patronage networks. 
Input subsidies risk:  
• Environmental harm: e.g. 
fertiliser subsidies can 
encourage excessive use.  
• Corruption and cronyism 
that impact availability of 
high-quality inputs for others.  
• Unsustainable use of 
resources.  
Risk of creating excessive 
price subsidies that create 
unfair competition with a 
rising private sector. 
As they leverage existing 
(private) financial institutions, 
they only work when such 
institutions exist. 
Government (or other 
guarantor) is exposed to risk 
of principal loss.  
Risk breach of international 
trade rules (see Box 6). 
Environmental harm where it 
encourages unsustainable 
farming practices or use of 
resources. 
Consumers pay more for 
product. 
Reduce food industry’s 
competitiveness. 
Distort markets. 




practices if such practices may 
inadvertently lead to the loss   
of insurance benefits. 
Risk inflating value of 
farmland and farming 
practices, to the exclusion of 
new small-scale producers.  
23 Input subsidies can be provided in various ways. One common approach is through the use of vouchers; another is through the direct 
provision of the input. For these reasons, this guide has included input subsidies within this category of financial incentive. However, input 
subsidies may also take the form of a tax incentive or be offered in other ways.
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Incentive type Potential pros Potential consWhat it is & how it works 











Direct financial transfers to investors for 
certain eligible expenses, or subsidised 
inputs.22 These can be provided for a 
number of different purposes, such as: 
• Inputs (e.g. for fertiliser, machinery, 
mechanisation). 
• Job training (these may support 
trainees, newly recruited employees, 
or existing staff). 
Grants and input subsidies are a 
potentially powerful tool – for good      
or bad, depending on what exactly is 
being subsidised and the conditions       
of the subsidy. 
Concessional loans are provided on 
more favourable terms than market 
rates (e.g. lower interest rates, longer 
grace periods). 
Non-concessional loans or credit are 
provided at market rates on the same 
conditions as those offered by 
commercial lenders. They are useful 
when credit is not widely available; for 
example, for small- and medium-scale 
producers who lack a sound capital 
structure or assets large enough to 
guarantee loans. 
Loan guarantees are a promise by 
government to assume the debt 
obligation of the farmer in the event      
of default. They can be considered a 
subsidy, and are useful in helping 
encourage lending from institutions    
that might not otherwise provide any    
or accessible loans. 
A form of subsidy that guarantees 
minimum prices to producers. 
Direct payments to farmers, e.g. on the 
basis of size of land holdings (European 
Commission, n.d.).  
Subsidised insurance. Effects may vary 
depending on type of insurance and 
targeting, e.g.: 
• supporting farmers producing specific 
crops;  
• addressing specific risks (e.g. crop   
yield risks, price risks, or climate- 
related risks); and/or 
• encouraging behavioural changes    
(e.g. insurance that mitigates risks of 
reduced harvests due to adoption of 
more environmentally friendly practices). 
Enable small-scale producers 
to enter the market. 
Enable small-scale producers 
to increase productivity or 
otherwise remain 
economically viable. 
Can be effective for achieving 
environmental benefits (e.g. 
payments for ecosystems 
services). 
Increased access to finance. 
Enable farmers to maximise 
productivity potential of their 
land.  
Broad reach.  
Enhance access to finance to 
small-scale producers who 
commonly lack access to 
commercial banks, such as 
young agri-entrepreneurs and 
women. 
Mobilise co-financing from 
external sources. 
Possible long-term debt 
finance for development.  
Enable farmers to maximise 
productivity potential of their 
land. 
Broad reach. 
Enhance access to finance to 
small-scale producers who 
commonly lack access to 
commercial banks, such as young 
agri-entrepreneurs and women. 
Helps farmers to not produce 
at a loss. 
Encourage more sustainable 
farming practices by providing 
cash required to make 
necessary investments. 
Encourage the production of 
more diverse and nutritious 
food over more basic, 
monocropped commodities.  
Mitigate price risks. 
Reduce impact on farmers of 
weather- and climate-related 
production risks. 
Encourage small-scale 
producers to increase 
production intensity. 
 
Potential limiting of benefits 
to those within government 
patronage networks. 
Input subsidies risk:  
• Environmental harm: e.g. 
fertiliser subsidies can 
encourage excessive use.  
• Corruption and cronyism 
that impact availability of 
high-quality inputs for others.  
• Unsustainable use of 
resources.  
Risk of creating excessive 
price subsidies that create 
unfair competition with a 
rising private sector. 
As they leverage existing 
(private) financial institutions, 
they only work when such 
institutions exist. 
Government (or other 
guarantor) is exposed to risk 
of principal loss.  
Risk breach of international 
trade rules (see Box 6). 
Environmental harm where it 
encourages unsustainable 
farming practices or use of 
resources. 
Consumers pay more for 
product. 
Reduce food industry’s 
competitiveness. 
Distort markets. 




practices if such practices may 
inadvertently lead to the loss   
of insurance benefits. 
Risk inflating value of 
farmland and farming 
practices, to the exclusion of 
new small-scale producers.  
Sources relied upon in the above table: Tavares-Lehmann et al. (2016); Teye (2019); OECD (2020); Laborde et al. (2019); IISD 
(2019); Streck et al. (2012); OECD (2017); Fleckenstein et al. (2020); Riensche and Vir Jakhar (2019); Cordes et al. (2016); Vorley 
et al. (2012); Locke et al. (2019).
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The following two case studies illustrate ways in which financial incentives have been used in 
practice in Tunisia and Senegal.  
Case Study: Tunisian Land Loans Scheme23 
Like other incentives, financial incentives can be provided broadly or targeted to 
specific sectors and/or beneficiaries. For countries seeking to address the particular 
challenges confronting youth, financial incentives catered specifically to youth and 
young adults is one available tool. 
An example of a credit scheme that caters to young agri-entrepreneurs is the Tunisian 
land loans scheme (prêts fonciers). Designed to support young agri-entrepreneurs 
to acquire and develop land, the land loans (prêts fonciers) are a specific instrument 
under the Tunisian investment code and are accessible to all youth under the age 
of 40 who have graduated from university (in agriculture and related technical 
fields) or have a certificate of professional competence. The land itself must have 
a potential which is currently not being fully exploited. The total volume for each 
loan can reach up to DT 250 000 (approx. USD 85 000), with an interest rate of 3 
percent, a grace period of 7 years, and 5 percent self-financing requirement for land 
acquisition, and 10 percent for land development (including electrification).  
Young agri-entrepreneurs who have benefitted from the land loans are also eligible 
for other, non-youth-specific investment subsidies (grants complementing private 
investments), such as those that cover parts of expenses related to investments in 
water-saving technologies. While the operational modalities (including eligibility 
criteria) of the land loans have varied over time, this credit scheme is quite well 
established, with data on the total amount of loans provided dating back to 1985. 
The total volume of new prêts fonciers has increased continuously over recent years. 
23 This case study is adapted from: Fiedler (2020), Box 2, 22. Citing: APIA (n.d.); FAO, (2013b); FAO and INRAT, (2020).
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Case Study: Senegal, Fonds de Garantie des Investissements Prioritaires 
(FONGIP)24 
Where financial institutions are accessible in rural areas, loan guarantee funds 
can encourage those institutions to lend to clients who may be perceived as risky 
borrowers because they lack sufficient collateral. Small-scale producers, youth, and 
women often fall into this category. By supporting banks to lend to such clients, 
loan guarantee funds enable those clients to invest more, thus (indirectly) serving 
as investment incentives.     
In Senegal, the Fonds de Garantie des Investissements Prioritaires (FONGIP, in English: 
Guarantee Fund for Investments in Priority Sectors) provides loan guarantees with 
specific schemes targeting youth and women. One goal is to enable self-employment 
among youth (République du Sénégal, 2018). Guarantees can be provided both to 
individual applicants (with an official request signed by the finance institution) 
(Fongip n.d.), as well as to financial institutions for loan portfolios. Guarantees cover 
loans with a duration of up to five years, with a maximum ceiling of 70 percent 
of unpaid loans. FONGIP charges a commission fee of up to 1.5 percent for the 
provision of the guarantee (Fiedler, 2020). 
Technical and business support incentives  
Technical and business support incentives, which include the provision of technical services 
and helpful information, are relevant for a range of investors. To attract foreign investors, such 
incentives aim to provide information, business intelligence, and technical support services 
in order to overcome “information asymmetry arising from investors’ lack of familiarity with 
the host economy” (Hymer, 1976). Also known as the “costs of foreignness” (Hymer, 1976), this 
includes unfamiliarity with factors as disparate as the business culture and the legal system. 
For FDI generally (not necessarily in agriculture and food systems specifically), such incentives 
undoubtedly stimulate investment … and influence investment location patterns and related 
investor behaviors (Oxelheim and Ghauri, 2004; Spar, 1998). 
For domestic investors, including small-scale producers, technical and business support 
incentives can play an important role in encouraging viable investment. Technical and business 
support incentives can be particularly helpful when packaged with other types of incentives, 
rendering it more likely that recipients can use those other incentives more effectively. For 
instance, complementary capacity development, marketing (such as through access to fairs), 
and incubation services can be key to ensuring that young agri-entrepreneurs do not only have 
24 This case study is adapted from: Fiedler, (2020).
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access to financial services, but are empowered to improve the productivity and efficiency of 
their businesses (Fiedler, 2020). Ideally, such support services should be “provided along the 
entire value chain, delivering field-level interventions as part of more integrated programs.” 
Importantly, because small-scale producers are a heterogeneous group, such services should 
involve “a diverse portfolio of flexible farm-level interventions” (Gassner et al., 2019). 
Technical and business support incentives can be offered pre-investment, during the course of 
the investment, or after the investment has been implemented. Table 3 highlights the following 
technical and business support incentives used in the agricultural and food systems context: 
• Technological packages 
• Research and development, and extension and targeted support services 
• Facilitation services: work permits, immigration, residence, licence acquisition
Table 3: Technical and business support incentives  
This table provides a brief overview of common technical and business support incentives that may be offered to 
investors in agriculture and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21.
















Provision of technological packages 
such as disease-resistant or other 
quality seeds, composting equipment, 
and particular stock breeds. 
Combining provision of inputs with 
training. 
Support for investigations into 
agricultural good practices. 
Agricultural extension services may 
come in the form of technical advice, 
supply of inputs, information, or new 
ideas developed by agricultural 
research stations. These services may 
focus on a range of topics, including: 
improved crop varieties or livestock 
breeds; better water management; and 
improved control of weeds, pests, or 
plant disease (Oakley and Garforth 
1985). Examples of specific extension 
services include agricultural colleges, 
training, veterinary services, 
phytosanitary services and quality 
control, plant protection and health, 
and engineering services. Importantly, 
extension services need to be widely 
available for different types of crops. 
Targeted support services may include 
agri-incubators, coaching, and other 
advisory services.  
Investment facilitation simplifies 
administrative procedures by helping 
investors understand and meet 
regulatory requirements and get set up 
in a country, for example, through 
“one-stop shops.” This can include 
support in obtaining permits and 
licences from relevant government 
departments, addressing immigration 
issues for foreign workers, and 
permitting residence of foreign 
workers. 
Investment facilitation that supports 
responsible investment should also 
include measures to generate 
awareness among investors of 
applicable laws, regulations, and 
processes (such as impact assessment 
processes), and compliance with such 
rules and processes (see Box 7 below). 





investment, especially when 
accompanied by other 
carefully targeted incentives 
and measures. 
Improve technical efficiency. 
Make doing business easier. 
Valued by mid- and 
large-scale investors. 
Awareness generation 
functions may benefit 
small-scale producers as well. 
 
 
Limited benefits, or even 
harms, if inputs are not 
well-suited to farmer needs 
(e.g. if seeds cannot be saved 
or require expensive inputs, if 
livestock not well-suited for 
the climate, etc.).  
 
Where investment facilitation 
measures are solely focused 
on streamlining and 
expediting administrative 
requirements and procedures, 
this may undermine 
regulations and processes that 
are necessary for promoting 
investments that are 
responsible (see Box 7).  
Risk that permits and licenses 
are provided without 
sufficient screening of 
investment proposals, without 
sufficient due diligence on 
investors, or without sufficient 
engagement in investment 
assessment processes, and 
that preliminary permits or 
licenses may be viewed as a 
right to operate, even if full 
set of investment approval 
processes have not been 
completed. 
Hiring of expatriates, 
especially high numbers or 
unlimited, may disincentivise 
local hiring and career 
progression opportunities.25  
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Provision of technological packages 
such as disease-resistant or other 
quality seeds, composting equipment, 
and particular stock breeds. 
Combining provision of inputs with 
training. 
Support for investigations into 
agricultural good practices. 
Agricultural extension services may 
come in the form of technical advice, 
supply of inputs, information, or new 
ideas developed by agricultural 
research stations. These services may 
focus on a range of topics, including: 
improved crop varieties or livestock 
breeds; better water management; and 
improved control of weeds, pests, or 
plant disease (Oakley and Garforth 
1985). Examples of specific extension 
services include agricultural colleges, 
training, veterinary services, 
phytosanitary services and quality 
control, plant protection and health, 
and engineering services. Importantly, 
extension services need to be widely 
available for different types of crops. 
Targeted support services may include 
agri-incubators, coaching, and other 
advisory services.  
Investment facilitation simplifies 
administrative procedures by helping 
investors understand and meet 
regulatory requirements and get set up 
in a country, for example, through 
“one-stop shops.” This can include 
support in obtaining permits and 
licences from relevant government 
departments, addressing immigration 
issues for foreign workers, and 
permitting residence of foreign 
workers. 
Investment facilitation that supports 
responsible investment should also 
include measures to generate 
awareness among investors of 
applicable laws, regulations, and 
processes (such as impact assessment 
processes), and compliance with such 
rules and processes (see Box 7 below). 





investment, especially when 
accompanied by other 
carefully targeted incentives 
and measures. 
Improve technical efficiency. 
Make doing business easier. 
Valued by mid- and 
large-scale investors. 
Awareness generation 
functions may benefit 
small-scale producers as well. 
 
 
Limited benefits, or even 
harms, if inputs are not 
well-suited to farmer needs 
(e.g. if seeds cannot be saved 
or require expensive inputs, if 
livestock not well-suited for 
the climate, etc.).  
 
Where investment facilitation 
measures are solely focused 
on streamlining and 
expediting administrative 
requirements and procedures, 
this may undermine 
regulations and processes that 
are necessary for promoting 
investments that are 
responsible (see Box 7).  
Risk that permits and licenses 
are provided without 
sufficient screening of 
investment proposals, without 
sufficient due diligence on 
investors, or without sufficient 
engagement in investment 
assessment processes, and 
that preliminary permits or 
licenses may be viewed as a 
right to operate, even if full 
set of investment approval 
processes have not been 
completed. 
Hiring of expatriates, 
especially high numbers or 
unlimited, may disincentivise 
local hiring and career 
progression opportunities.25  
Sources relied upon in the above table: Fiedler, (2020); Baliño et al., (2019); Laborde et al., (2018); Lampach et al., (2018); Ayele 
et al., (2019). 
25 This can be addressed through hiring caps on expatriates or mandates that such workers provide training to local workforces in instances 
where there is not existing capacity to carry out required tasks.
BOX 7: INVESTMENT FACILITATION 
Investment facilitation efforts—often, but not always, oriented around facilitating FDI—can 
usefully remove undue barriers to investment, such as opaque, confusing, or burdensome 
regulatory requirements, complicated or delayed administrative procedures, corruption, or 
a lack of critical infrastructure or services. However, many of today’s investment facilitation 
initiatives are investor-centric—focusing on speeding up approvals, removing regulatory 
barriers, and stabilising the legal and regulatory environment for the benefit of investors—to 
the possible detriment of other social and environmental goals. It is critically important that 
facilitation initiatives not be considered in isolation from a host state’s broader development 
agenda. That is to say, while governments should support an enabling environment for investors 
and investments, critical factors such as environmental protection, local economic and social 
development, protection of legitimate tenure rights, industrial upgrading, employment and 
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skills training, health, climate, and other development priorities must be advanced alongside 
investor-oriented policies in order to ensure that investment enhances the benefits of 
development to society as a whole (Güven, 2020). Evidence also suggests that this kind of 
broader framing and approach ultimately benefits the investment project itself (Coleman et 
al., 2018).  
Investment facilitation for sustainable development is best understood as a combination 
of tools, policies, and processes, which will vary by context, that foster a regulatory and 
administrative framework to facilitate investment that maximises and does not undermine 
sustainable development objectives. When developing a plan to facilitate investment, a state 
should holistically consider its sustainable development goals and whether there are regulatory 
or technical hurdles unduly preventing it from achieving them. It should then determine the 
appropriate facilitation plan that can address undue burdens for investors while remaining 
aligned with broader development objectives (Güven, 2020).  
The following case study illustrates ways in which technical and business support incentives 
are being used in practice in Senegal. 
Case Study: Modèle d’insertion des jeunes dans l’agriculture (Senegal)26 
In Senegal, the Modèle d’insertion des jeunes dans l’agriculture (MIJA, in English: Model 
for Youth Integration into Agriculture) programme is managed by the government’s 
youth employment agency (ANPEJ) and funded by the government with support from 
FAO and the Spanish Agency for Development Cooperation. The six MIJA platforms 
offer comprehensive incubation services, including model farms. The programme 
has successfully supported young agri-entrepreneurs to organise themselves into 
the self-help association Réseau africain pour la promotion de l’entrepreneuriat 
agricole (RAPEA), which in turn provides technical support services to start-up agri-
entrepreneurs, fosters knowledge sharing, and facilitates collective action.
Tax (Fiscal) Incentives 
Tax incentives involve reductions or exemptions from ordinary taxation obligations and are 
accounted for as revenue forgone or deferred. Such incentives are often preferred in particular 
by lower-income countries that have fewer upfront resources for financial incentives and are 
often used in the context of efforts to attract FDI (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016). Yet studies 
indicate that they are often not worth their cost.  
26 This case study is adapted from: Fiedler, (2020).
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Serious doubt has been cast by various econometric and interview-based studies about 
the effectiveness of tax incentives as they are generally used.27 Essentially, tax incentives 
cost governments a great deal in terms of lost revenue, but have not been shown to yield 
commensurate benefits in terms of increased investment. This may especially be the case 
for some primary production large-scale agricultural investments that could be described as 
resource-seeking, such as “rubber, tobacco, sugar, bananas, pineapples, palm oil, coffee, and 
tea” (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016).  
Recent interview-based studies underscore the limited impact of tax incentives for commercial 
agriculture in certain countries. Looking at incentives and agribusiness investment in Ethiopia, 
one study found that “fiscal incentives, in particular, are non-consequential to business 
Investment” (Ayele et al., 2019), with the agribusinesses interviewed identifying availability 
of and access to land, infrastructure, concessional loans, and facilitation services as more 
important for supporting investment. In fact, “despite substantial incentives, investments often 
fail to start and meet the intended development objectives of the country” (Ayele et al., 2019). 
Another study looking at agricultural commercialisation in Ghana found that tax incentives can 
benefit farmers, but “they do not really stimulate investments in the agriculture sector” (Teye, 
2019). In particular, decisions about investment location are not particularly influenced by tax 
incentives, as poor infrastructure—which increases production costs—is a much more relevant 
factor (Teye, 2019). In addition, a 2020 study of agribusiness investment and incentives in Africa 
found additional evidence supporting this pattern,28 concluding that most tax incentives did 
not motivate investment (with an exception for import duty exemptions), and asserting that 
resources should be shifted away from tax incentives towards efforts to improve infrastructure 
and increase access to finance (Ayele et al., 2020).  
Tax incentives are less relevant for investors operating in the informal economy, such as many 
small-scale producers. And even where smaller local agribusiness investors can technically 
access tax incentives, they may not benefit from them due to their scale of operations (e.g. 
they do not import large quantities of capital goods or export their produce) or due to the 
administrative inaccessibility of such incentives (Ayele, 2019). 
An additional challenge of tax incentives is that, even if the incentives are set up to only apply to 
certain investors or investments, large-scale investors can often find ways to cheat the system 
to benefit from incentives not intended for them. For example, foreign firms may set up a local 
affiliate to capture incentives for domestic farmers, local firms may set up foreign entities 
to capture FDI-oriented incentives, existing firms may set up new corporations to capture 
benefits available only to new firms, or companies may shift taxable income to a related entity 
27 For a fuller discussion on the topic, see Annex II.
28 Among other evidence provided for this assertion, the 2020 study included the results of a survey of 14 medium and large- scale agribusiness 
investors (both foreign and domestic) in Ghana, Ethiopia, and Malawi, which found that only two of the 14 companies reported that fiscal 
incentives had influenced their investment decisions (Ayele et al., 2020). One exception was with respect to import duty exemptions: seven 
out of the nine companies who received these reported that theseexemptions “supported greater investment.” (Ayele et al., 2020). The study 
also referenced previous research, including a survey focused on Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda, which found that only 7.4 percent 
of investors surveyed said they would not have invested without fiscal incentives (Mwachinga, 2013).
Guide on incentives for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems 
32
to take advantage of certain incentives. In addition, tax incentives can also create burdensome 
administration costs (IMF et al., 2015), although some are more complicated to administer 
than others.    
Tax incentives can be profit-based incentives or cost-based incentives. Profit-based tax incentives 
reduce or eliminate the rates imposed on otherwise taxable income. Cost-based tax incentives, 
by contrast, focus on expenses related to the investment and provide allowances to reduce the 
cost of capital (IMF et al., 2015). To the extent that tax incentives are deemed worthwhile in a 
specific context, cost-based tax incentives have a greater chance of stimulating investment, 
while profit-based incentives are more likely to be redundant (see Annex II). Table 4 of this guide 
examines the use of both types of tax incentives in the agricultural and food systems context:29
Profit-Based Tax Incentives 
• Reduced rates on dividends and interest paid abroad 
• Tax holidays 
• Reduced corporate income tax rates 
Cost-Based Tax Incentives 
• Zero-ratings and VAT exemptions 
• Investment tax credits 
• Zero or reduced tariffs  
• Tax deductions 
• Loss carry forwards 
• Investment allowances 
• Export tax exemptions 
• Accelerated depreciation 
Table 4: Tax incentives 
29 See discussion at Tavares-Lehmann et al., (2016), 24–27.
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This table provides a brief overview of common tax investment incentives that may be offered to investors in 
agriculture and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21.
Incentive type Potential pros Potential consWhat it is & how it works 
Profit-Based Tax Incentives 





























Depreciation    
Reduces the taxes that investors, 
particularly those from countries with a 
worldwide taxation system, pay on 
dividends and interest abroad. 
Complete exemption from paying tax 
for a certain period. Frequently offered 
to newly established firms. Common 
practice in export-processing zones 
(EPZs) and special economic zones 
(SEZs). 
Lower corporate tax rates for qualifying 
investors. Extremely common. 
Granted for inputs to reduce costs in 
the agricultural process.  
Granted for produce for sales of 
agricultural commodities to keep the 
agricultural sector out of the value 
added tax (VAT). 
Permits a fixed percentage of certain 
investment expenditures to be deducted 
from the income tax liability. Often used 
to encourage investment in R&D and 
capital assets. Under a simple 
investment tax credit mechanism, credits 
may be earned based on a fixed 
percentage of qualifying investment 
expenditures for that year. Other 
mechanisms may be more complex, such 
as credits earned for expenditures above 
a certain threshold, or at different rates 
depending on the level of expenditures.   
Import tariffs or duties on investment 
project equipment or spare parts are 
eliminated or reduced. This is a 
common measure in export processing 
zones and are particularly common in 
Southeast Asia. 
Allows investor to claim an income tax 
deduction for certain investment 
expenditures. The deduction goes 
beyond what would normally be 
allowed under general income tax rules. 
This is a broader category that includes 
other more specific types of incentives, 
such as investment allowances and 
accelerated depreciation, discussed 
later in this table. 
Taxable losses are permitted to be 
carried forward or backward (to offset 
taxable income) within a certain 
timeframe. 
Allows investors to claim an upfront 
additional deduction for qualifying 
capital expenditures, over and above 
the depreciation allowed for the asset. 
As opposed to investment credits, these 
provide an income tax deduction, which 
offset taxable income, rather than a tax 
credit, which offsets tax payable.  
The amount of the deduction is 
generally set as a percentage of the 
qualifying expenditures. As the 
deduction reduces taxable income, 
their value to investors depends on the 
corporate tax rate applicable. 
Commonly directed at R&D investment.
Exemptions from export taxes or 
excises on investment-related produce.
Allows firms to claim depreciation 
deductions on capital assets at an 
accelerated rate when compared to 
the asset’s useful economic life. 
Incentives reflect a difference in when 
tax benefits (deductions) are realised 
by the firm – providing greater tax 
benefits in the early years of an asset’s 
useful economic life.     
Reduces or prevents double 
taxation for foreign investors. 
Easy to offer, both in terms of 
design and administration.  
 
Easy to offer, both in terms of 
design and administration. 
VAT zero-rating in agriculture 
aims to reduce the impact of 
VAT on the poor (as the 
consumer ultimately pays more 
for the product with 
consumption taxes) by 
lowering basic agricultural 
produce prices. 
VAT exemptions can be 
beneficial if administration of 
the tax is problematic. 
Increases financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Encourage investment in R&D. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin.
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Appeal to investors who expect 
losses in the first years (e.g. 
while penetrating markets or 
ramping up production). 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
There is no overall difference in 
tax revenue, if the time value of 
money is not taken into 
account. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin.  
Revenue forgone. 
Can be used by multinationals 
to avoid taxes by shifting profits. 
Creates an unlevel playing 
field between domestic and 
foreign investors. 
Revenue forgone. 
Very blunt instrument: 
• Do not encourage capital 
investment.  
• Do not reinject revenues into 
existing or new businesses. 
• Do not encourage domestic 
partnerships.  
• Risk of firms closing 
operations and reopening as 
“new” ventures to re-qualify 
for incentive (tax avoidance).  
• Risk of tax avoidance 
through transfer pricing. 
Revenue forgone. 
Revenue forgone. 
VAT paid on inputs are usually 
creditable against VAT 
charged on sales. Therefore, in 
many cases, an exemption for 
VAT on inputs may have little 
effect on the producer, 
because they would otherwise 
usually receive a full credit for 
the VAT.  
Revenue forgone. 




If tariffs are eliminated on 
inputs that are available 




Can be manipulated so that 
an investment project ends up 
tax-free for a significant 
portion of its implementation 
phase.   
Revenue forgone. 
Revenue forgone. 
Can be a waste when 
export-oriented activities end 
up having limited impacts on 
national economic output. 
Although there is no overall 
difference in tax revenue, by 
providing accelerated tax 
benefits to investors, states 
effectively defer the timing of 
revenue collection. 
Guide on incentives for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems 
34
Incentive type Potential pros Potential consWhat it is & how it works 
Profit-Based Tax Incentives 





























Depreciation    
Reduces the taxes that investors, 
particularly those from countries with a 
worldwide taxation system, pay on 
dividends and interest abroad. 
Complete exemption from paying tax 
for a certain period. Frequently offered 
to newly established firms. Common 
practice in export-processing zones 
(EPZs) and special economic zones 
(SEZs). 
Lower corporate tax rates for qualifying 
investors. Extremely common. 
Granted for inputs to reduce costs in 
the agricultural process.  
Granted for produce for sales of 
agricultural commodities to keep the 
agricultural sector out of the value 
added tax (VAT). 
Permits a fixed percentage of certain 
investment expenditures to be deducted 
from the income tax liability. Often used 
to encourage investment in R&D and 
capital assets. Under a simple 
investment tax credit mechanism, credits 
may be earned based on a fixed 
percentage of qualifying investment 
expenditures for that year. Other 
mechanisms may be more complex, such 
as credits earned for expenditures above 
a certain threshold, or at different rates 
depending on the level of expenditures.   
Import tariffs or duties on investment 
project equipment or spare parts are 
eliminated or reduced. This is a 
common measure in export processing 
zones and are particularly common in 
Southeast Asia. 
Allows investor to claim an income tax 
deduction for certain investment 
expenditures. The deduction goes 
beyond what would normally be 
allowed under general income tax rules. 
This is a broader category that includes 
other more specific types of incentives, 
such as investment allowances and 
accelerated depreciation, discussed 
later in this table. 
Taxable losses are permitted to be 
carried forward or backward (to offset 
taxable income) within a certain 
timeframe. 
Allows investors to claim an upfront 
additional deduction for qualifying 
capital expenditures, over and above 
the depreciation allowed for the asset. 
As opposed to investment credits, these 
provide an income tax deduction, which 
offset taxable income, rather than a tax 
credit, which offsets tax payable.  
The amount of the deduction is 
generally set as a percentage of the 
qualifying expenditures. As the 
deduction reduces taxable income, 
their value to investors depends on the 
corporate tax rate applicable. 
Commonly directed at R&D investment.
Exemptions from export taxes or 
excises on investment-related produce.
Allows firms to claim depreciation 
deductions on capital assets at an 
accelerated rate when compared to 
the asset’s useful economic life. 
Incentives reflect a difference in when 
tax benefits (deductions) are realised 
by the firm – providing greater tax 
benefits in the early years of an asset’s 
useful economic life.     
Reduces or prevents double 
taxation for foreign investors. 
Easy to offer, both in terms of 
design and administration.  
 
Easy to offer, both in terms of 
design and administration. 
VAT zero-rating in agriculture 
aims to reduce the impact of 
VAT on the poor (as the 
consumer ultimately pays more 
for the product with 
consumption taxes) by 
lowering basic agricultural 
produce prices. 
VAT exemptions can be 
beneficial if administration of 
the tax is problematic. 
Increases financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Encourage investment in R&D. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin.
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Appeal to investors who expect 
losses in the first years (e.g. 
while penetrating markets or 
ramping up production). 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
There is no overall difference in 
tax revenue, if the time value of 
money is not taken into 
account. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin.  
Revenue forgone. 
Can be used by multinationals 
to avoid taxes by shifting profits. 
Creates an unlevel playing 
field between domestic and 
foreign investors. 
Revenue forgone. 
Very blunt instrument: 
• Do not encourage capital 
investment.  
• Do not reinject revenues into 
existing or new businesses. 
• Do not encourage domestic 
partnerships.  
• Risk of firms closing 
operations and reopening as 
“new” ventures to re-qualify 
for incentive (tax avoidance).  
• Risk of tax avoidance 
through transfer pricing. 
Revenue forgone. 
Revenue forgone. 
VAT paid on inputs are usually 
creditable against VAT 
charged on sales. Therefore, in 
many cases, an exemption for 
VAT on inputs may have little 
effect on the producer, 
because they would otherwise 
usually receive a full credit for 
the VAT.  
Revenue forgone. 




If tariffs are eliminated on 
inputs that are available 




Can be manipulated so that 
an investment project ends up 
tax-free for a significant 
portion of its implementation 
phase.   
Revenue forgone. 
Revenue forgone. 
Can be a waste when 
export-oriented activities end 
up having limited impacts on 
national economic output. 
Although there is no overall 
difference in tax revenue, by 
providing accelerated tax 
benefits to investors, states 
effectively defer the timing of 
revenue collection. 
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Incentive type Potential pros Potential consWhat it is & how it works 
Profit-Based Tax Incentives 





























Depreciation    
Reduces the taxes that investors, 
particularly those from countries with a 
worldwide taxation system, pay on 
dividends and interest abroad. 
Complete exemption from paying tax 
for a certain period. Frequently offered 
to newly established firms. Common 
practice in export-processing zones 
(EPZs) and special economic zones 
(SEZs). 
Lower corporate tax rates for qualifying 
investors. Extremely common. 
Granted for inputs to reduce costs in 
the agricultural process.  
Granted for produce for sales of 
agricultural commodities to keep the 
agricultural sector out of the value 
added tax (VAT). 
Permits a fixed percentage of certain 
investment expenditures to be deducted 
from the income tax liability. Often used 
to encourage investment in R&D and 
capital assets. Under a simple 
investment tax credit mechanism, credits 
may be earned based on a fixed 
percentage of qualifying investment 
expenditures for that year. Other 
mechanisms may be more complex, such 
as credits earned for expenditures above 
a certain threshold, or at different rates 
depending on the level of expenditures.   
Import tariffs or duties on investment 
project equipment or spare parts are 
eliminated or reduced. This is a 
common measure in export processing 
zones and are particularly common in 
Southeast Asia. 
Allows investor to claim an income tax 
deduction for certain investment 
expenditures. The deduction goes 
beyond what would normally be 
allowed under general income tax rules. 
This is a broader category that includes 
other more specific types of incentives, 
such as investment allowances and 
accelerated depreciation, discussed 
later in this table. 
Taxable losses are permitted to be 
carried forward or backward (to offset 
taxable income) within a certain 
timeframe. 
Allows investors to claim an upfront 
additional deduction for qualifying 
capital expenditures, over and above 
the depreciation allowed for the asset. 
As opposed to investment credits, these 
provide an income tax deduction, which 
offset taxable income, rather than a tax 
credit, which offsets tax payable.  
The amount of the deduction is 
generally set as a percentage of the 
qualifying expenditures. As the 
deduction reduces taxable income, 
their value to investors depends on the 
corporate tax rate applicable. 
Commonly directed at R&D investment.
Exemptions from export taxes or 
excises on investment-related produce.
Allows firms to claim depreciation 
deductions on capital assets at an 
accelerated rate when compared to 
the asset’s useful economic life. 
Incentives reflect a difference in when 
tax benefits (deductions) are realised 
by the firm – providing greater tax 
benefits in the early years of an asset’s 
useful economic life.     
Reduces or prevents double 
taxation for foreign investors. 
Easy to offer, both in terms of 
design and administration.  
 
Easy to offer, both in terms of 
design and administration. 
VAT zero-rating in agriculture 
aims to reduce the impact of 
VAT on the poor (as the 
consumer ultimately pays more 
for the product with 
consumption taxes) by 
lowering basic agricultural 
produce prices. 
VAT exemptions can be 
beneficial if administration of 
the tax is problematic. 
Increases financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Encourage investment in R&D. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin.
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Appeal to investors who expect 
losses in the first years (e.g. 
while penetrating markets or 
ramping up production). 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin. 
There is no overall difference in 
tax revenue, if the time value of 
money is not taken into 
account. 
Increase financial viability of 
projects at the margin.  
Revenue forgone. 
Can be used by multinationals 
to avoid taxes by shifting profits. 
Creates an unlevel playing 
field between domestic and 
foreign investors. 
Revenue forgone. 
Very blunt instrument: 
• Do not encourage capital 
investment.  
• Do not reinject revenues into 
existing or new businesses. 
• Do not encourage domestic 
partnerships.  
• Risk of firms closing 
operations and reopening as 
“new” ventures to re-qualify 
for incentive (tax avoidance).  
• Risk of tax avoidance 
through transfer pricing. 
Revenue forgone. 
Revenue forgone. 
VAT paid on inputs are usually 
creditable against VAT 
charged on sales. Therefore, in 
many cases, an exemption for 
VAT on inputs may have little 
effect on the producer, 
because they would otherwise 
usually receive a full credit for 
the VAT.  
Revenue forgone. 




If tariffs are eliminated on 
inputs that are available 




Can be manipulated so that 
an investment project ends up 
tax-free for a significant 
portion of its implementation 
phase.   
Revenue forgone. 
Revenue forgone. 
Can be a waste when 
export-oriented activities end 
up having limited impacts on 
national economic output. 
Although there is no overall 
difference in tax revenue, by 
providing accelerated tax 
benefits to investors, states 
effectively defer the timing of 
revenue collection. 
Sources relied upon in the above table: Tavares-Lehman et al., (2016); IMF et al., (2015); Perera, (2012); FAO, (2013a).
Regulatory incentives 
Regulatory incentives are usually derogations from domestic laws and regulations, generally 
involving a weakening of environmental, labour, or other social standards. This type of 
incentive is incredibly problematic and may result in breach of international human rights law. 
Regulatory incentives can also arguably include more favourable rules or regulatory regimes 
that are designed to influence investor conduct, such as access to land coupled with clear land 
titling and demarcation. If not done carefully, these favourable rules can also raise human 
rights concerns.  
Table 5 of this guide examines the following regulatory incentives: 
• Derogations from domestic laws and regulations 
• Special land tenure protections for large-scale investors
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Table 5: Regulatory incentives 
This table provides a brief overview of regulatory investment incentives that may be offered to investors in 
agriculture and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21.










Derogations from domestic laws and 
regulations that tend to involve a weakening 
of environmental, labour, or other social 
standards. May be offered on a 
project-specific basis, through investment laws 
that give foreign investors special substantive 
or procedural rights, or in free trading zones or 
other special economic zones. 
Land tenure rules govern rights to use land and 
are a general factor in the enabling 
environment for agricultural and food systems 
investment. In countries with weak or 
transitioning land governance systems: tenure 
rights are often contested, legitimate tenure 
rights holders may not have formalised 
recognition of their rights, and government 
efforts to secure tenure rights for all can be an 
ongoing and lengthy process. In this context, 
governments may aim to incentivise large-scale 
investment by seeking to specifically protect 
land rights of investors beyond general efforts 
to strengthen tenure—for example, by 
prioritising investment-related property for 
titling and demarcation.30 
Land tenure rules are 
highly relevant to 
investors in the context 
of agricultural and food 
systems investments. 
(Only focusing on 
strengthening tenure 
rights for investors, 
however, holds 
significant risks – see 
Cons column.)   
Undermine human rights. 
Contradict CFS RAI goals. 
Little evidence of increasing 
investment.  
Prioritising tenure protections for 
large-scale investors creates risks 
that:  
• Legitimate tenure rights claims to 
the land may be ignored.  
• The tenure protections provided  
to the investor may be undermined 
if the rights are nevertheless 
contested    (if legitimate rights 
were ignored). This in turn, may 
lead to costly conflict with local 
communities, and/or costly 
disputes with the investor 
claiming protections under a 
relevant contract or treaty. 
Sources relied upon in the above table: Kelly et al., (2015); IISD, (2018); Cordes and Bulman, (2016); FAO, (2013a). 
Beyond special tenure protections for investors, governments sometimes take other land-related 
actions with the aim of supporting investment or investors. These include, for example:  
• using the power of compulsory acquisition (eminent domain) to acquire land so that it can 
be used for an investment or offered to an investor;  
• offering land through land banks, where the land is identified or acquired in advance of any 
specific investor, often despite extreme power differences between the government seeking 
the land and the legitimate tenure rights holders who have claims to it;31  
• providing large concessions with cheap rent, covering land that the government has 
qualified as public or state land, even if there are conflicting claims to the land, including by 
legitimate tenure rights holders whose families and communities have used and relied on 
the land for generations.  
Particularly in the context of weak or transitioning land governance systems, such actions are 
deeply concerning. They may be in contravention of a government’s human rights obligations, 
30 See e.g., Whitley et al., (2014) (noting that the Government of Zambia “provides incentives in the form of … land access via titling and 
demarcation for the expansion of farm blocks as a means of expanding commercial agricultural development.”)
31 Under land governance systems with strong land rights protections and less contestation around land rights, land banks may be more 
appropriate mechanisms, and can even be used to support increased access to land for small-scale producers, including youth.
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and can result in conflicts and severe negative outcomes. Whether such actions should be 
considered “investment incentives” is debatable; for the purposes of this guide, such actions are 
excluded from its scope.
Other incentives 
The four categories of incentives discussed above (financial, technical and business support, 
tax, and regulatory) are the most commonly recognised investment incentives. However, under 
the definition of “incentive” used in this guide and in the context of responsible investment in 
agriculture and food systems, there are at least two other relevant mechanisms that can be 
classified as incentives. The following “other” incentives are examined in Table 6:  
• Public procurement  
• New, targeted infrastructure 
Table 6: Other incentives 
This table provides a brief overview of other investment incentives that may be offered to investors in agriculture 
and food systems, employing the traffic light system explained on page 21.





Purchase food required for social 
programmes (e.g. for hospitals, 
food reserve authorities, food aid, 
and school feeding programmes) 
from small-scale producers, 
and/or from suppliers integrating 
particularly strong sustainability 
practices. As noted above, 
whether this is an incentive per 
se may be debatable.  
The creation of new, targeted 
infrastructure (e.g. quality rural 
and feeder roads, reliable 
electricity, harbours, storage 
facilities, or railways) counts as 
an investment incentive if it is 
related to a particular investor 
or set of investors rather than 
offered to all investors (even if it 
may be shared by other actors). 
Create stable markets for 
small-scale producers. 
Create stable markets for 
investors that integrate 
sustainability practices that 
go beyond what is required 
by law.
 
Unlock rural agricultural 
potential as it opens up areas 
via roads, water control, or 
markets and incentivises 
increased production.  
Generate on- and off-farm 
employment. 
Irrigation can have an 
outsized positive effect on 
women (who typically bear 
the burden of collecting 
water). 
Stimulate pro-poor growth 
and improve rural 
livelihoods. 
Improve market access. 
Enhance agribusiness 
investments. 
Might not be cost competitive. 
If targeting a specific investor, may divert 
siting of important infrastructure from places 
where new or improved infrastructure would 
benefit  a wider set of farmers or would 
support greater economic growth. 
Beneficiaries of infrastructure projects are 
often landowners. 
Infrastructure with a large physical footprint 
(such as roads) has potential negative 
impacts on biodiversity, and can be a source 
of environmental degradation, and, indirectly, 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
May negatively impact tenure rights holders 
who use or rely on the land needed for the 
new infrastructure. This may occur if the 
rights holders do not want their land to be 
used for infrastructure, or if they are 
displaced without sufficient due process or 
adequate compensation.  
Sources relied upon in the above table: Kelly et al., (2015); Tavares-Lehman et al. (2016); FAO, (2018b); Teye, (2019); IFPRI, 
(2020); Jouanjean, (2013); Byiers and Rampa, (2013).
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Part III - Using incentives 
to enhance responsible 
investment in agriculture 
and food systems: General 
considerations
This Part discusses general considerations on how incentives can be used—as well as how they 
should not be used—to enhance responsible agricultural and food systems investment. The 
Part discusses in detail the following important considerations: 
• Responsible agricultural and food systems investment is primarily determined by the 
enabling environment, not investment incentives. Governments seeking to encourage 
more investment should first focus on improving the enabling environment.  
• Incentives tend to be more effective when they are identified as the best mechanism to 
overcome a particular barrier to investment that an investor is facing, for example, to 
overcome specific market failures.  
• Incentives should be designed to support the outcomes encouraged by the CFS RAI, 
particularly to empower small-scale producers, especially young agri-entrepreneurs and 
women. 
• Incentives should not disproportionately benefit large-scale foreign investors to the 
detriment of other investors or other public goods towards which funds could be directed. 
• Regional coordination and governance should be pursued to curb a “race to the bottom” 
in offering incentives.  
• Incentives may work best when offered as part of a package and/or when coupled with 
other measures, such as regulatory reform or disincentives for undesirable behaviour.  
• Attaching a condition or conditions to the granting of an incentive can help guarantee that 
the government’s goal(s) for providing the incentive are met; this includes behavioural 
goals that would improve the sustainability outcomes of the investment.
Each point is discussed further below.  
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Responsible agricultural and food systems investment is primarily determined by 
the enabling environment 
Responsible investment in agriculture and food systems is heavily influenced, and primarily 
determined, by factors other than investment incentives. Simply put, “incentives do not work 
unless certain fundamentals are in place” (Tavares-Lehmann et al. 2016). 
In particular, the “enabling environment” within a country influences investment decision-
making by large-, medium-, and small-scale investors alike. The enabling environment is the 
set of factors, conditions, and safeguards that encourage investment generally, and responsible 
investment specifically. Governments seeking to encourage responsible investment should, 
first and foremost, focus on improving the enabling environment. This is relevant both for 
promoting more investment, and for ensuring that investment is responsible.  
The CFS RAI identify the following as the main elements of an enabling environment: 
• Legal, regulatory, and institutional alignment with the CFS RAI and national development 
strategies. 
• Policy coherence and consistency.  
• Effective coordination and implementation on the part of government institutions.  
• Transparency, inclusiveness, and meaningful participation in the development and 
implementation of relevant policies, strategies, and incentives, as well as in the context of 
specific investment decision-making.  
While investment incentives could be considered part of the enabling environment (CCSI and 
FAO, 2019)—and while the distinction between an “incentive” and an “enabling condition” is not 
always clear—they remain just one small and specific tool against a broader set of conditions 
and factors that influence whether investment occurs and whether it is responsible.   
These factors, inherent in the enabling environment that influence investors’ decisions about 
whether to invest at all, are sometimes referred to as the “investment climate.” Many of the 
factors commonly considered as comprising the investment climate (see Box 8) are more 
relevant for foreign investors and large-scale domestic investors, but some are equally relevant 
for small-scale producers making investment decisions. At their core, however, decisions about 
agricultural and food systems investments are very context-specific, depending on the nature 
of the investment itself. Investors big and small need the right environmental conditions, 
decent physical infrastructure, and/or other conditions that will allow them to produce or 
work profitably. Without those factors, the investment climate will be relatively unattractive 
for investors who have a choice of where to invest and will be a limiting factor in the success 
of small-scale producers who do not have such a choice.
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BOX 8: “INVESTMENT CLIMATE” FACTORS RELEVANT TO INVESTOR DECISION-
MAKING 
While investment climate factors tend to be a focus of “agribusiness”—whether domestic or 
foreign—some factors will matter more to foreign firms. Other factors are equally relevant for 
small-scale producers. 
Macro and enabling conditions 
• Political, economic, and social stability.  
• Absence of conflict.  
• A certain degree of institutional quality and effective coordination between government 
entities.  
• Decent governance. 
• Information on the suitability of land available for commercial farming. 
• The extent of corruption. 
• Protection from unfair international competition. 
More tangible investment determinants 
• Access to land or other desired location-bound (natural) resources.  
• Access to skilled labour.  
• Decent infrastructure, especially in rural areas (e.g. feeder roads, water, electrification, rail 
and port facilities, storage).  
• Access and distance to major markets.   
• Proximity of raw materials.  
• Size of the domestic market and opportunities to do business in it.   
• Access to finance with reasonable interest rates.   
• Distance to the target market.  
• Availability of agricultural R&D facilities. 
• Reasonable interest rates and access to finance.  
• The accessibility of international trade. 
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Environmental Factors 
• Water.  
• Climate. 
• Fertility and health of the soil. 
• Availability of crops needed. 
Laws and Institutions  
• Independent legal system. 
• A predictable regulatory environment (rule of law). 
• A transparent and predictable taxation regime. 
• Adequate property rights protection. 
• Secure land tenure systems, with no community conflict. 
• The existence and enforcement of contract laws. 
• Enabling socioeconomic conditions. 
When these elements are not present, they may act as barriers to investment. Some of these 
barriers can be overcome with incentives (e.g. access to markets); others require alternative 
mechanisms like legal or regulatory reform (e.g. security of land tenure); and yet others simply 
cannot be changed (e.g. whether a particular crop can grow in the local environment). The 
challenge for governments is in assessing which factors they can control and, of those factors, 
which would be best addressed with an investment incentive. 
The role of strong laws and regulation in ensuring investment is responsible 
A stable legal and policy framework, bolstered by strong institutional support, is not only 
important for encouraging investment (see Box 8), it can and should also be used to ensure 
that investments in agriculture and food systems are responsible.  
In addition to laws that regulate corporate conduct, social, labour, and environmental laws are 
particularly important. As discussed in Part I, at times, efforts to incentivise investors to act or 
refrain from acting in a certain way is not sufficient; laws and other regulatory requirements 
are necessary to prohibit certain actions. Box 9 lists some of the areas that should be governed 
by protections embedded in law rather than encouraged through investment incentives.
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BOX 9: IMPORTANT SOCIAL, LABOUR, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS  
Environmental laws  
• Laws and regulations that prohibit or limit certain negative environmental impacts (water 
pollution, air pollution, operations in high conservation value areas, etc.). 
• Screening for environmental impacts.  
• Legal requirements for ex ante and ex post environmental impact assessments for large-
scale projects, coupled with monitoring and enforcement (Cotula, 2016).  
Social and labour laws 
• Protection of tenure rights for legitimate tenure rights holders, even when land is legally 
considered to be held by the state. 
• Legal requirements for local consultation and free, prior, and informed consent. 
• Limitations on the use of eminent domain or compulsory acquisition in the context of 
agricultural and food systems investments, with clear and narrow definitions of what is 
deemed to be in the “public purpose,” as well as equitable compensation requirements for 
the limited situations in which land may be compulsorily acquired. 
• Laws and regulations that prohibit or limit specified negative social impacts. 
• Strong labour laws that protect workers’ rights, including on issues of remuneration and 
health and safety, and that prohibit child labour, forced labour, and other violations of 
fundamental labour rights.  
• Legal requirements for ex ante and ex post human rights impact assessments for large-
scale projects, coupled with monitoring and enforcement.
When does it make sense to use investment incentives or when is a different 
approach required?  
Circumstances where incentives can help 
The most obvious reason to offer an investment incentive is when it is the best mechanism 
to address a key barrier that is discouraging an investor from making an investment that the 
government hopes to encourage (for example, an investment that is aligned with the CFS RAI 
and national development priorities). 
In particular, incentives can be used to attempt to overcome market failures. For example: 
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• Credit market failures can affect all sizes of investors, and particularly small-scale 
producers—especially, youth and women—who commonly lack assets for collateral. 
While an optimal solution would be the much bigger project of fixing the credit market, 
governments can use financial incentives as a partial fix to overcome credit market failures, 
influencing who can receive a loan and for what activities (Johnson et al., forthcoming).  
• The market volatilities, weather fluctuations, and additional externalities characteristic of 
investments in agriculture and food systems that often lead to risk aversion that affects the 
investment decisions of large-, mid- and small-scale investors alike. In this case, incentives 
such as matching grants, equity participation, and subsidised loans can be used to offset the 
high risks which an investor is unable to insure against, encouraging investors to take on 
higher risk projects that nevertheless have promising potential (Johnson et al., forthcoming). 
• The failure of the market to value certain public goods and responsible business practices. The 
incentive can be used to encourage conduct providing positive externalities that are otherwise 
not presently valued or paid for by the market, such as environmental and social impact. 
• Foreign investors may experience information asymmetries/failures due to their lack of 
familiarity with a host country’s economy (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016); providing relevant 
information as a technical support incentive can help overcome related challenges and 
make investment in the jurisdiction more attractive. 
Where the incentive is not designed to overcome a market failure that is highly relevant to an 
investor, it is likely to feature low down in the list of factors upon which the investor will make 
its decision, if it is even considered at all.  
Beyond correcting specific market failures that might be preventing an investor from investing, 
certain types of incentives also can be useful in the following circumstances: 
• Supporting the development of public goods. 
• Providing targeted support during economic downturns. 
• Encouraging sustainable behaviours. 
• Supporting, in the context of investments in agriculture and food systems, responsible and 
viable investments by small-scale producers that align with the CFS RAI and the country’s 
national development priorities.
Circumstances where incentives do not make sense 
There are at least two critical circumstances in which incentives do not make sense for 
responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. 
First, an incentive should not be used when it is not the appropriate mechanism for achieving a 
stated goal. Often, a government measure other than an incentive—such as a law or change in 
the enabling environment—would be more effective or appropriate. For example, governments 
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sometimes seek to address regional disparities by conditioning agricultural and food systems 
investment incentives on investment occurring in areas that are not otherwise receiving it. 
However, studies have shown that a tax break for geographical conditions is not sufficient 
to stimulate investment when other more important factors, such as road infrastructure and 
access to markets, are not addressed (Teye, 2019).  
Recommendation: First understand the barrier that a given investor or group 
of investors is facing, and then investigate whether an incentive would actually 
help to overcome that barrier, or whether a different mechanism would be more 
appropriate.
Second, an incentive should not be used when it is appropriate in theory but is unlikely to be 
the right tool because it is poorly designed or not worth the cost. Design failure may render an 
incentive ineffective; this may include, for example, the choice of the wrong type of incentive, 
the failure to target it strategically, and/or the failure to condition it appropriately. An incentive 
may also not be an appropriate choice where the total costs outweigh the benefits. As discussed 
in Parts II and IV, this includes assessing the costs associated with incentives. 
Reasons for the unwarranted use of incentives 
In spite of the futility or wastefulness of offering specific investment incentives in particular 
circumstances, inefficient and redundant incentives continue to be offered. There are a number 
of reasons why governments may continue to offer inefficient or ineffective incentives: 
• Governments may think it is easier to offer tax incentives than to systematically improve 
a country’s legal and institutional systems, improve physical infrastructure, implement 
economic reforms, develop a skilled workforce, or provide a stable political environment—
even if those enabling environment conditions are much more important for attracting 
and supporting investment. 
• Businesses pressure governments into granting tax incentives, and vested interests in 
business and even government lobby to keep them (IMF et al., 2015). This is exacerbated 
by a different type of information asymmetry than that discussed above, whereby the 
investor holds all the playing cards regarding the relative importance of various factors to 
their decision-making and the government relies solely on the investor’s own claims that 
an incentive is crucial to their decision as to whether to invest or not—even if that is not 
actually the case.
• Politicians yield to political factors. For example, politicians may find it expedient to 
offer tax incentives to send out an image of proactivity in addressing weak economies 
or supporting particular regions, especially where proven interventions like upgrading 
physical infrastructure or educational facilities are more likely to take a while to show 
benefits (Rondinelli and Burpitt, 2000). They may provide certain incentives in spite of 
advice from international organisations to not offer—or to remove—those incentives (IMF 
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et al., 2015), or in direct disregard of expert recommendations based on specific evaluations 
of the incentives programme. 
• There is a lack of internal governmental coordination and communication, with ministries 
for agriculture, investment, finance, and development working in silos and at cross-
purposes, rather than uniting under a coherent strategy to achieve national goals. 
• The global and regional phenomenon of the “race to the bottom,” where countries compete 
against one another to lower taxes in a bid to win investments. This is a bigger challenge 
with locational incentives (those seeking to attract/keep investment capital) than those 
seeking to shape behaviour. This competition can negatively affect the welfare of other 
countries and result in an “inefficient global allocation of capital” and a “collective loss of 
output,” as all countries in a region end up lowering their tax rates but do not necessarily 
attract greater investment (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016; IMF et al., 2015).
Incentives should be designed to support the outcomes encouraged by the CFS RAI 
The CFS RAI specifically state that responsible investment “makes a significant contribution 
to enhancing sustainable livelihoods, in particular for small-scale producers, and members 
of marginalised and vulnerable groups, creating decent work for all agricultural and food 
workers, eradicating poverty, fostering social and gender equality, eliminating the worst forms 
of child labour, promoting social participation and inclusiveness, increasing economic growth, 
and therefore achieving sustainable development” (CFS, 2014). While large-scale corporate 
investments can be structured to help achieve these goals, there is no more direct avenue 
than ensuring that the world’s hundreds of millions of small-scale producer households 
(estimated to support some 2 billion people) are receiving the support they need to produce 
as economically, socially, and environmentally sustainably as possible (Nwanze, 2011). 
Recommendation: Prioritise the development of investment incentives that target 
small-scale producers, especially youth and women, as well as micro- and small-
scale enterprises upstream and downstream. 
Given the great diversity among small-scale producers (discussed in Part I), different incentives 
may be necessary to match differing needs. For instance, in the case of established—more 
commonly male—small-scale producers, there may be no need to attract them to agriculture, 
but rather to stimulate investments that allow them to conduct their activities sustainably and 
productively.  
Women face vastly different barriers to increased agricultural and food systems investment—
such as unequal access to education and information, and weaker individual and collective 
agency (see Box 2)—and are likely to benefit from targeted support that recognises these social 
and other barriers. For example, in the context of agricultural extension services, studies have 
shown that careful targeting of information, extension officers who are trained on gender, and 
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recruitment of female extension workers, among others, can all have positive effects (IFPRI, 
2019; Mudege et al., 2017; Mamun-Ur-Rashid et al., 2017).
Young agri-entrepreneurs may require incentives that make agriculture more appealing, for 
example by encouraging innovation and the employment of technologies and techniques that 
will allow them to produce more with less (see Box 3). In this instance, incentives such as 
incubation support for start-up businesses and technological packages might be appropriate. 
Recommendation: Select different incentives for different sub-groups, depending 
on their particular needs. 
In designing incentives that support small-scale producers in an attempt to enhance 
responsible agricultural and food systems investment, policymakers and technical staff must 
take care to ensure that the incentives do not inadvertently undermine other objectives, such as 
environmental sustainability or public health. For example, widespread provision of chemical 
inputs without sufficient training or safety gear may end up negatively affecting farmers’ health 
or the environment. Market price support may ultimately result in environmental harms by 
encouraging overproduction or intensive monocropping. 
Recommendation: Design incentives in recognition of the different dimensions of 
responsible agricultural and food systems investment, so as to not blindly pursue 
one dimension (e.g. food security) at the expense of others (e.g. biodiversity).   
Reconsidering and managing incentives oriented towards large-scale foreign 
investors  
Risks of excessive focus on large-scale foreign investors 
Incentives should not disproportionately benefit large-scale foreign investors to the detriment of 
other investors. As noted above, the majority of agricultural and food systems investment in low- 
and middle-income countries comes from domestic farmers, with FDI only providing a fraction 
of total investment in agriculture and food systems. Governments may find it to be a much better 
use of scarce resources to target incentives to address barriers faced by domestic farmers and 
SMEs operating upstream and downstream along the value chain (Syed and Miyazako, 2013). 
Although responsible foreign investment can bring multiple benefits and contribute to a 
country’s development goals, many negative impacts—including serious human rights abuses 
and severe environmental damage—have also arisen from large-scale foreign investments in 
agriculture and food systems. In light of the track record of such investments and their inherent 
risks, the consistency of large-scale foreign investments in agriculture and food systems with 
the principles espoused in the CFS RAI is not a given.   
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Recommendation: Avoid placing an outsized emphasis on using incentives to 
attract FDI, and limit barriers that favour certain sized investors over others (e.g. 
minimum investment size requirements).
Ways to ensure foreign large-scale investments are responsible 
This is not to say that large-scale investments in agriculture and food systems have no place in 
a country’s agricultural development plan. For example, certain types of crops—including cash 
crops like sugarcane and palm oil, as well as certain cereals—have agronomic characteristics 
that make large-scale production the more obvious choice (Chan, 2013). Yet even these crops 
do not necessarily require the allocation of large swathes of land; rather, large-scale investment 
using inclusive business approaches that permit smallholders to retain their land rights (such 
as through outgrower schemes) can also be an option.  
To the extent that a country continues to include the attraction of large-scale foreign 
investment into the agricultural and food sector as part of its national development plan, any 
use of incentives oriented towards such investors should include the following considerations. 
First, no investment must be allowed to contravene the CFS RAI to the detriment of human 
rights (e.g. violating local peoples’ legitimate land tenure rights), the environment (e.g. 
polluting waterways), and the host country’s sustainable development (e.g. tax evasion). This is 
true regardless of whether an incentive is offered.  
To prevent such contraventions, governments should ensure that its domestic law protects 
human rights and the environment from potential investment-related harms. Safeguards can 
also be embedded at the approval stage, for example, by ensuring adequate due diligence 
and screening of potential investments,32 and through the use of robust impact assessments. In 
addition, although investment contracts are not recommended (see Part II above), to the extent 
that investment contracts are used, they can explicitly incorporate additional safeguards that 
go beyond what is currently required by law, and can “mak[e] noncompliance a violation of 
legally binding contractual terms” (FAO, 2016). 
Second, any incentive provided to a large-scale investment should support that investment’s 
contributions to the goals contained in the CFS RAI. Such goals include increased food security 
and nutrition, sustainable and inclusive economic development and the eradication of poverty, 
women and youth empowerment, conservation and sustainable management of natural 
resources, and supporting diversity and innovation.  
Policymakers and technical staff can seek to do this through the conditions (discussed later 
in this Part) that are attached to the incentives. For example, investments will be permitted 
accelerated depreciation on project-related assets if training is provided through the project 
to upskill women. Or, for example, an incentive will be provided to investors that integrate 
32 It is valuable to research the social, labour, and environmental records of potential large-scale investors. One widely used tool to investigate 
companies for problematic behaviours is the Good Jobs First database, Violation Tracker: https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/violation-tracker.
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inclusive business approaches (demonstrated by meeting clear and objective criteria). When 
attaching conditions, the incentives should be granted only upon proof that conditions were 
met, and are revocable if the investment breaches the CFS RAI principles. This could take the 
form of a provision in the relevant law offering the incentive, declaring that incentives may 
be revoked if any attached conditions are not met, or if the investment breaches the CFS RAI 
principles and no effort is made to remedy that breach.  
Recommendation: Enshrine adequate safeguards in legislation to protect human 
rights and the environment in the context of investment. Use additional measures, 
such as due diligence and screening, to assess whether an investment is likely to 
contribute to, or undermine, the realisation of human rights and achievement of 
development priorities.   
Recommendation: Consider attaching conditions that support the achievement 
of CFS RAI goals to incentives offered to foreign large-scale investors, and make 
those incentives revocable in instances where conditions are not met.
Regional governance and coordination are important 
In the context of locational incentives, countries ideally would coordinate to not offer 
unnecessary incentives and would simply compete for FDI on the basis of competitive conditions 
like factor endowments, legal and institutional stability, adequate infrastructure, and political 
stability. In practice, however, countries’ ability to coordinate effectively has been stymied 
the absence of “an effective supranational monitoring framework and powerful institutions to 
enforce it” (IMF et al., 2015). Without such coordination, abstaining from unnecessary incentives 
is not easy, due to the pressure created when other countries offer incentives (particularly tax 
incentives).  
Even if countries do seek to coordinate on either tax incentives or broader tax policy, potential 
risks may arise. One risk is that agreeing to eliminate tax incentives could shift competition 
into general tax policies, such as a reduction in overall corporate income tax rates. The second 
is that if only a subset of the relevant countries agree to coordinate, those countries who do 
not cooperate might benefit at the cost of those who do (IMF et al., 2015).  
Regional efforts to coordinate on harmful tax competition have experienced varying degrees 
of success to date (IMF et al., 2015).33 Nonetheless, options for regional cooperation do exist. 
As noted by the IMF, World Bank, UNCTAD, and OECD, a non-binding option would be a code 
of conduct agreeing not to use certain tax incentives, like the Code of Conduct for business 
33 Example discussed: Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Finance and Investment and Guidelines for the 
application and treatment of tax incentives in the SADC region; East African Community (EAC) Code of Conduct; West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WEAMU); Committee of Ministers of Finance of Central America, Panama, and the Dominican Republic (COSEFIN) 
“Declaration of Good Practices” discussions.
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taxation in the European Union. A binding option could be a common legislative framework, 
like the state-aid rules in the European Union (IMF et al., 2015). A more modest option would 
be to focus on “a common framework for reporting tax incentives and information exchange 
to encourage mutual learning” with the goal of enhancing transparency and enabling ex post 
assessment of tax incentives (Teijeiro, 2015). 
In the interim, and to the extent that countries continue to offer investment incentives via 
contract (not recommended), publishing a list of available incentives on a regional website 
would provide greater transparency, with the goal of minimising pressure on government 
negotiators in contractual negotiations. By doing so, this disclosure could make it easier to 
avoid a regional race to the bottom, as government negotiators gain bargaining power by 
seeing what other countries offer, thus minimising companies’ ability to use opacity to their 
advantage (Charlton, 2003). There is a risk, however, that such transparency could function as 
a double-edged sword, if countries feel pressure to match other countries’ incentives based on 
what is published. This suggestion is made in conjunction with the recommendation that the 
optimal way to offer investment incentives is in national legislation (see discussion in Part II of 
this guide) and not at the individual contract level. 
Despite the challenges, it will be critically important for governments to find ways to cooperate 
in order to stem the race to the bottom that leads to redundant incentive use. Abstaining 
from unnecessary incentives in a coordinated way can help governments to ensure that the 
objectives behind the incentives they offer are linked to their national priorities, as well as to 
regional development priorities.34 
Recommendation: Participate in regional efforts to curb redundant incentive use 
and to combat the “race to the bottom.”
Attaching conditions to incentives can be essential for promoting responsible 
and sustainable practices beyond what is required by law 
Attaching conditions to incentives can be one way to use incentives to promote more 
responsible investment aligned with the CFS RAI. Using conditions, governments can 
encourage specific responsible and sustainable practices that go beyond what is required by 
law, while also ensuring that incentives are not provided when investments do not support 
responsible practices. For example, payments for ecosystem or environmental services are a 
popular mechanism for encouraging environmentally sensitive agricultural practices. They are 
essentially just a grant (or even a loan or loan guarantee) that is given to an investor provided 
the investor complies with an environmental condition or conditions:  
Incentive (type: grant) + Condition (type: environmental) 
34 Regional coordination can and should extend beyond coordination on incentives to other aspects of aligning investment with the CFS RAI. 
This is explicitly acknowledged in the Association of South East Asian Nations Responsible Investment in Agriculture (ASEAN RAI) Guidelines on 
Promoting Responsible Investment in Food, Agriculture and Forestry, which highlight the importance of “promoting intra-regional assistance, 
experience sharing, and capacity building on issues related to responsible investment in food, agriculture, and forestry to strengthen ASEAN 
Member States governments’ capacity on legal, policy and implementation issues.” Principle 10.
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Such payments can be particularly important for small-scale producers who tend to lack the 
capital to implement climate- and environmentally-sensitive changes into their practices, such 
as creating ponds for enhanced water storage (costs cover creation and any loss in agricultural 
production) (Smith et al., 2013; One Planet and UNEP, 2019).  
A condition may not be relevant in all instances of incentive use. Relevance depends on the goal 
the government is seeking to achieve. For example, if a government wants to encourage re-
investment in an existing large-scale plantation but only if more environmentally-sound farming 
practices are employed, the incentive that may be offered to the investor could be coupled with 
a condition that the benefit only be conferred upon proof of cover cropping, planting hedge 
rows, or some other relevant practice(s). In this context, conditions, when coupled with the right 
type of incentive, can help filter the types of investments governments wish to encourage and 
shape agricultural practices to better fit sustainable food system outcomes.  
In another scenario, however, a condition may not be necessary. For example, the government’s 
goal may be for smallholders’ incomes to increase through greater productivity, and so the 
government may offer a technological incentive in the form of a more environmentally 
appropriate plant or livestock variety. In this case, if the farmer takes advantage of that 
incentive and invests accordingly, the outcome will be achieved (assuming the government 
has selected the correct variety), and the farmer’s productivity should increase by virtue of 
farming with the improved variety; no condition would be needed. 
Importantly, conditions do not work if the incentive does not work, underscoring the need to 
offer incentives that will actually motivate investors in the manner intended.
Conditions are determined by the government’s goals for the targeted investments, which in turn 
should be grounded in national development priorities more generally. The conditions most 
likely to be relevant for responsible agricultural and food systems investments are therefore 
those linked to environmental, social, health, and nutritional issues, as well as locational or 
other behavioural conditions. As discussed above in Box 9, however, certain aspects of these 
issues should instead be addressed in law, rather than through incentives. 
For some incentives, particularly those targeting large-scale investors, performance-based 
approaches can be an effective way to ensure that incentives with conditions lead to desired 
outcomes. Under a performance-based approach, the incentive is contingent on demonstrated 
impact. This approach can be more likely to result in intended impact than when incentives 
are provided without a condition, or when they are provided based on an investor’s practice 
or activity (rather than based on the impact) (OECD, 2020). However, a performance-based 
approach is often not appropriate for small-scale producers, who may not have enough capital 
to take certain actions that result in impact without upfront support, or who may not be able to 
afford to wait for that impact to manifest. In such instances, it is more appropriate to provide 
an incentive once a practice is modified or an activity undertaken (UNDP, n.d.). 
Such nuances reinforce the need to ensure that incentive planning and design is participatory 
and needs driven, especially to identify the practical challenges confronted by the diverse 
range of small-scale producers who may be intended targets of the incentives.  
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Recommendation: Consider attaching environmental, social, health, behavioural, 
or other conditions to incentives in order to achieve desired investment-related 
impacts that align with national development priorities. 
Incentives may work best as part of a package  
Investment incentives are but one potential mechanism in a raft of measures necessary to 
achieve responsible investment in agriculture and food systems. Beyond selecting the right 
incentive, and potentially coupling that incentive with a condition, the effectiveness of an 
incentive may be enhanced by packaging it with other measures. This is because providing 
incentives as part of a package can better support the investor in using the incentive(s) more 
effectively (Fiedler, 2020). 
There are multiple ways that agricultural and food systems investment incentives can be 
packaged to enhance their effectiveness and their ability to support responsible investment. 
These include: 
• Packaging multiple complementary incentives together. For example, under such an 
approach, a concessional loan to small-scale producers could be combined with training, 
mentoring, and coaching; in such a package, the financial incentive may be put to more 
effective use when the recipient also receives the complementary technical support 
incentives. 
• Providing incentives against the backdrop of a sound regulatory regime that may also 
include disincentives, such as a taxes, fines, and prohibition of use. This, in essence, is 
strengthening the enabling environment alongside incentive provisions; but can also be 
viewed as combining the “stick” of disincentives (such as environmental laws that ban 
certain types of conduct or a land tax that discourages harmful practices) with the “carrot” 
of incentives.  
• Coupled with complementary government investments, such as research into sustainable 
productions systems (FAO, n.d.).  
Packaging may involve any one or more of the above. For example, price interventions and the 
provision of credit coupled with public investment in research and development and extension 
services, strong institutions, and investments in primary education and rural infrastructure 
(especially electrification and irrigation) have been shown to be successful in removing 
countries’ anti-agricultural biases (Laborde et al., 2019). Importantly, different incentives may 
be relevant at different stages and may seek to effect short- or long-term changes. 
When it comes to incentives for women, youth, or other historically marginalised groups, 
providing a package is generally preferable over stand-alone incentives in order to achieve the 
expected results. This is true even if it means that a smaller number of beneficiaries will profit 
from the intervention due to constrained budgets. Of particular importance is the element 
of skills developments through training and coaching. In order to actively and meaningfully 
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participate in policy design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation processes of new 
incentives, and then to take advantage of such an intervention, youth and women need the 
right skills. Their potentially limited advocacy, business, or technical skills can otherwise be 
significant constraints, preventing them from effectively defending their interests and from 
taking advantage of incentives available to help them develop and maintain a viable livelihood 
in agriculture. So, while access to a grant may be a precondition to enable youth and women 
to invest in agriculture and food systems, packaging that grant with additional services, like 
access to equipment or harvest facilities, access to business incubators, and ongoing training, 
coaching, and other advisory services, will empower them to develop, pilot, and implement 
projects that are economically viable and impactful (Fiedler, 2020). The following Nigerian 
and Mauritanian case studies provide practical examples of how incentives may be packaged.
Case Study: Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural 
Lending 
Owned by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and instituted in partnership with 
the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and Nigerian Bankers’ 
Committee in 2013, the Nigeria Incentive-Based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural 
Lending (NIRSAL Plc) aims to raise millions of Nigerian farmers above the poverty 
line by de-risking agricultural lending. Primarily, NIRSAL encourages financiers and 
investors to lend to the agribusiness sector by providing Credit Risk Guarantees, 
thereby sharing the risk and catalysing financial and investment flows into 
agricultural value chains, and increasing smallholder farmers’ access to credit.  
In addition to Credit Risk Guarantees, NIRSAL (NIRSAL, n.d.):  
• offers technical assistance to producers, so that loans received are used more 
effectively;  
• rates banks based on the effectiveness of their lending and social impact;  
• offers banks incentives for building their lending capabilities; and  
• facilitates the formation of new systems such as producer cooperatives and 
transportation systems that will cut costs for the transportation of produce.  
Before NIRSAL’s inception, 2 percent of bank lending in Nigeria was used for 
agricultural lending, as opposed to 6 percent in comparable developing countries 
like Kenya (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2012). Despite NIRSAL’s efforts over the last 
decade, however, lending institutions remain reluctant to finance certain areas 
of the agricultural value chains (Abdulhameed, 2016). To date, NIRSAL has seen 
USD 500.7 million loans, and 677 projects, guaranteed, and estimates 400,000 jobs 
created as a result. Their goal is to increase agricultural lending to 7 percent of total 
lending in Nigeria by 2026 (Abdulhameed, 2019).
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Case Study: Mauritania, Union Nationale des Mutuelles d’Investissement et 
de Crédit Oasien et des zones pluviales (UNMICO)35 
In Mauritania, a specific micro-finance institution—Union Nationale des Mutuelles 
d’Investissement et de Crédit Oasien et des zones pluviales (UNMICO)—provides 
loans to the agricultural sector. UNMICO has the merit of combining rural credit 
at low interest rates with capacity development support to ensure the economic 
viability of an investment, which is particularly important. 
UNMICO manages local caisses (funds with a specific cash desk) in partnership with 
local economic agents (cooperatives, producer organisations, farmers and others) 
who will become co-owners (“sociétaires”) of the caisse and should gradually 
increase their managerial and financial responsibilities. The main objective of the 
caisses is the provision of short-term micro-loans, which constitute 80 percent of 
the loan portfolio.  
Prior to setting up a caisse, UNMICO carries out feasibility studies and engages with 
local stakeholders to identify and prioritise key challenges, as well as their potential 
solutions based on a set of economic, technical, and sociocultural criteria.  
Subsequently, UNMICO provides training to sociétaires and beneficiaries on various 
issues, including financial literacy and management, accounting practices, or 
management and governance of a caisse and other organisations. UNMICO also 
ensures regular follow-up and monitoring with each caisse and the beneficiaries to 
contribute to the durability of each project (UNMICO. n.d.).
Combining incentives into “inclusive, integrated packages” maximises efficacy and can 
support greater uptake of sustainable practices (FAO, 2018b). Yet selecting the right incentive 
or package of incentives relies on careful planning and design, as addressed in Part IV of this 
guide. 
Recommendation: Consider how incentives may be packaged—whether by 
packaging multiple complementary incentives together, providing incentives 
against the backdrop of a sound regulatory regime that may also include 
disincentives, or coupling incentives with complementary government 
investments—in order to better support target investors’ effective use of 
incentives. 
35 This case study is adapted from: Fiedler, (2020).
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Part IV - Planning for, designing, 
implementing, monitoring, 
and evaluating incentives 
for responsible agricultural 
and food systems 
This section provides guidance for policymakers and technical staff on all stages of incentives: from 
planning for a possible intervention that might take the form of an incentive, through to evaluating 
incentives that have been provided and making decisions based on learnings from the evaluations. 
This guide suggests an adaptive approach to incentives. Such an approach can support informed 
decisions about the use and design of incentives; it also implies consistent efforts to monitor and 
evaluate incentives, and to adapt incentives based on learnings in order to increase the likelihood 
that incentives will support desired outcomes (FOS, 2017). This approach is strengthened through 
increased transparency and inclusive participatory processes. This section provides guidance for 
developing and managing incentives using the framework below (Webb et al., 2018).  
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Planning for an appropriate intervention  
Before any specific investment incentives are designed, careful planning can help to clarify 
whether investment incentives are an appropriate intervention. 
A starting point for this planning is to understand the government’s national development priorities 
and how they relate to the government’s long-term goals with respect to responsible investment in 
agriculture and food systems. This guide assumes that policymakers and technical staff considering 
the use of incentives already have some clarity regarding these priorities and goals, which may 
include, for example, goals to eradicate rural poverty, increase food security and nutrition among 
small-scale producers, and foster gender equality and empower youth in rural areas. 
With an understanding of those general national development priorities and impacts, the first 
steps in planning for an intervention—one that might take the form of an incentive—are to 
identify the needs of investors in agriculture and food systems, the barriers to responsible 
investment in agriculture and food systems, the problems that the government is trying to 
address, and what the government is hoping to achieve with the intervention. These crucial 
steps will enable policymakers and technical staff to ascertain whether incentives are the 
most appropriate mechanism and, if so, how to design them effectively.  
To support this assessment of whether an incentive is the right mechanism, governments can 
develop a theory of change. A theory of change is an “on-going process of discussion-based 
analysis and learning that produces powerful insights … [and is] communicated through diagrams 
and narratives which are updated at regular intervals” (Vogel, 2012). A theory of change is 
particularly useful when planning an intervention that seeks to address complex and multi-causal 
challenges. It can be developed during the planning phase, but can also support the design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of an incentive or other government measure. 
This section describes the steps that policymakers and technical staff can take during the 
planning stage of an intervention that might take the form of an incentive, and discusses how 
a theory of change can be developed and used to support the planning process. While these 
steps are presented sequentially, the process does not necessarily have to be followed in a 
linear fashion. Rather, these steps can be viewed as a set of good practices that support both 
the effective planning for policy interventions that may include incentives and the reform of 











• Overview of jurisdiction
• Identify target population
• Undertake causal analysis
• Stakeholder engagement
• Articulate desired impact
• Map pathway of change
• Identify assumptions
• Select appropiate intervention
• Select appropiate incentive type
• Review the theory of change
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1. Conduct a Context Analysis  
Policymakers and technical staff considering the use of an incentive can start with a context 
analysis that seeks to understand and identify the characteristics and conditions of the 
setting for which the incentive is contemplated. This should include, most critically, the 
needs of investors in agriculture and food systems, which connote the barriers or unmet 
problems they face, and the underlying causes of those needs, so that an appropriate 
intervention can be developed. As such, participatory processes that include intended 
beneficiaries, such as small-scale producers or other investors, can be critical during this 
planning stage (see Box 10).  
The methods employed to inform the context analysis will depend on the jurisdiction 
and on the availability of resources and capacity. Broadly speaking, they may include 
information and evidence gathered from: past policies; previous studies or social science 
theory (Stein, 2012); surveys, census data, or field visits; and, most critically, from investors 
themselves.  
Ideally, the following elements should feed into the context analysis: 
• Overview of jurisdiction or subsector: An overview provides a background on the 
events, practices, and policies that have shaped the current context in a jurisdiction 
or subsector. What are the leading economic, environmental, political, and social 
dynamics that have informed the current context? What issues, if any, have had a 
disproportionate impact on the context, e.g. natural disasters, economic crises, or 
political conflicts? What past measures have been implemented? Have interventions 
attempted to increase responsible investment in agriculture and food systems? What 
policies failed or succeeded, and why? (FAO, 2019b). 
• Identification of target population: In the context of responsible investment in 
agriculture and food systems, the investors that may benefit from an intervention, 
such as an incentive, should be identified. These could include, for example, small- 
and medium-scale producers and micro/small enterprises, young agri-entrepreneurs, 
women farmers, or other marginalised populations. Given the diversity of investors and 
the desire to leave no one behind, it is critical to consider the particular challenges of 
specific groups, such as women, youth, and small-scale producers, who have different 
needs and will be affected differently by an intervention. 
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BOX 10: INCLUSIVE AND EQUITABLE PARTICIPATION 
Using a participatory approach through which small-scale producers and other investors 
can actively participate in planning and decision-making processes fosters cooperation, 
facilitates consensus of results to be achieved, and provides more representative and 
meaningful insight to the given context (Maennling and Correa, 2020), which in turn 
increase the likelihood that outcomes will be defined realistically and achieved (Roberts 
and Khattri, 2012). In order to support equitable participation of marginalised groups, 
cultural norms and power dynamics should be taken into account (IIED, 2019). Based on 
this, specific efforts should be undertaken to enable the participation of women, youth, 
and indigenous communities, who often confront obstacles in effectively participating 
in decision-making processes relevant to investment or incentives due to factors such 
as power imbalances, institutional biases, and lack of access to relevant information.  
Participatory approaches may vary, depending on the resources available, the potential 
scope of intervention, and other factors. Good practice suggests that:  
• Governments should start with a well-informed plan (covering, for example, which 
investors to engage, which government agencies should be involved, the levels and 
methods of engagement; and time frame and resources required) (FAO, 2005). 
• Once engaged, investors and other stakeholders can be supported to assess the 
current situation and identify possible policy changes and interventions, using a 
range of tools and techniques (FAO, 2005).   
• Levels of engagement may range from consultations through to specific opportunities 
to collaborate on design. Formal institutionalised opportunities for policy dialogue—
including through multi-stakeholder platforms—may be a particularly useful method 
to enable participation in ongoing planning and policymaking processes (Fiedler, 2020).
• Causal Analysis: Understanding the causes of any identified problems or needs—as well 
as the drivers of those causes—is a critical part of developing a theory of change, and 
helps set the stage as the rationale for the intervention to be developed.36 To undertake 
a casual analysis, start by identifying the core problems faced by a target population 
(potentially narrowed by factors such as location and subsector). These can be broad 
problems, e.g. high poverty levels or widespread food insecurity; or more narrow 
problems, e.g. decline in crop productivity. Are the problems identified by women and 
by men different?  
36 Consider the following questions: What are the problems facing investors, and that block them from investing more, in a responsible 
manner? Who is affected by those problems? Who is particularly vulnerable? What are the consequences of the problem? What are the causes 
of the problem – individual capacities and/or relationships; financial resources; environmental changes; institutions; infrastructural systems; 
legal system? What are the barriers to change? What are the opportunities to overcome these barriers? Who else is working to address the 
problem(s)? What is not happening? (Noble, 2019).
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 Next, analyse the underlying causes of these problems. Ask “why” the problem exists, 
and keep asking until the possible reasons are exhausted (FAO, 2019b). Potential causes 
can range from structural factors, to economic, environmental, social, or political 
factors. In turn, identify the drivers of those causes. Are there problems that result from 
the gender-based division of labour or from inequitable access to resources? (FAO, 
2005).
 This analysis may also surface other factors, such as potential opportunities to help 
overcome some of the barriers identified, or potential constraints that may make 
overcoming some of the barriers challenging. 
• Stakeholder Engagement: During the context analysis, policymakers and technical 
staff should use a framework for identifying those entities and individuals37 that 
may affect or be affected by a potential intervention, including the impacts of any 
investments made because of the intervention. A strategy should be in place to engage 
these different groups, e.g. through a series of stakeholder workshops, in order to 
examine how the groups differ in their roles, interests, priorities and concerns, their 
knowledge and skillset, and how they can contribute to (or obstruct) the outcomes 
of an intervention. It is also helpful to analyse the power distribution among these 
groups, and to incorporate strategies to mitigate potential conflict or turn them into 
opportunities for collaboration (Caldwell, 2002). This stakeholder engagement should 
support participatory approaches to planning (see Box 10). 
2. Develop the Theory of Change  
Armed with the information collected during the context analysis, the theory of change 
itself can now be developed. The development of this theory of change should be done in 
partnership with the target population (and other key stakeholders, where appropriate), 
who bring specific knowledge and experience to help inform this effort. The resulting 
theory of change represents the group’s best understanding or hypothesis, at that 
particular point in time, of how changes are anticipated to happen so that activities (such 
as the provision of an incentive) would lead to desired impacts. 
At its core, developing a strong theory of change requires the three steps below. Once 
developed, a theory of change can be represented in a visual diagram and/or described 
in a narrative summary (See Annex I for a detailed example). 
• Articulate the long-term desired impact: Once the problems and needs have been 
identified, policymakers and technical staff can shift from focusing on the problems to 
focusing on the solutions (Hivos, 2015). This can be done by articulating in a statement: 
37 These may include national, sub-national and local governments, the private sector, financial institutions, target populations, legitimate 
tenure rights holders, the community at large, etc.
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- the long-term desired impact that a potential intervention intends to address 
(“what”); 
- the target population that will benefit from the intervention (“who”); and  
- the purpose for the desired change (“why”).  
• Map the pathway of change: Mapping a pathway of change is done by working 
backwards from the long-term desired impact, to the medium- and short-term 
outcomes, and to the outputs (or activities), asking at each level “what element is 
necessary and sufficient in order to achieve the change at the next level.” This can be 
organised in a chain of “if-then” statements, and should flow logically, e.g. if output 
X is achieved, then it is reasonably logical that outcome Y is attainable (Pringle and 
Thomas 2019). If one element does not logically link to the next, what else can be 
included? See Figure 1 for elements to consider when developing a theory of change. 
By clarifying the linkages, the theory of change provides a rationale for the choice of 
activities (intervention), a justification of resources (input), and a framework to support 
the development of indicators and targets for the monitoring, evaluation and learning 
stage (See Annex I for details on selecting proper indicators and targets for each result 
expected in the pathway of change).  
• Identify assumptions: The linkages between each level identified on a pathway of 
change are only valid if certain conditions are met or in place. What evidence is there 
that each element leads to the next? If there is weak or no evidence, the link is an 
assumption. It is important to identify the assumptions made at each causal linkage. 
These may include assumptions about the target population’s reactions to a changed 
situation, the internal and external conditions that need to be in place at each level, 
and the causality assumed in the pathway, including the expectations about how or why 
the activity proposed will bring about the change envisaged (Hivos, 2015).  Articulating 
these assumptions can improve the design of an incentive or other intervention, lead 
to more coordinated and focused action, enable adaptive planning, form a good basis 
for risk management, support more focused learning and evaluation, and increase 
credibility (Hivos, 2015). 
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Adapted from source: IIED, (2019), at 96.  
3. Select the intervention (and decide whether to offer an incentive) 
The theory of change can help policymakers and technical staff explore different 
options—including the use of incentives—to try to find the most appropriate intervention 
for the problems identified and the impact sought. For example, the theory of change 
may uncover multiple interventions that could help to achieve a desired impact, as well 
as their relative strengths, weaknesses, and accompanying assumptions. Based on this 
information, policymakers and technical staff can: 
• Select an appropriate intervention: Develop criteria to help select an intervention that 
could achieve the desired impact. Some common criteria include: the available budget; 
the desired impact and timescale to achieve the desired impact; sphere of control 
and influence (Hivos, 2015); social acceptability; community support; management, 
implementation and monitoring support and capacity; sustainability; technical feasibility; 
political sensitivity; level of risk (Caldwell, n.d.); and the potential to collaborate and 
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Figure 1 - Elements of a Theory of Change
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• Based on the criteria, select an appropriate intervention. As discussed above, incentives 
are just one option to be considered among many, and they are often not the most 
appropriate intervention. The theory of change, and criteria for selecting an intervention, 
however, can help in identifying when an incentive would be an appropriate mechanism 
for achieving the government’s desired impact. 
• Select the appropriate incentive type, if an incentive is selected: In cases where an 
investment incentive is identified as the most appropriate intervention, consideration 
should be given to the best type(s) of incentive(s) to provide—including whether to 
undertake complementary actions or to provide incentive packages (discussed above 
in Part III). The choice of incentive will depend on a number of factors, including: the 
desired impact of the incentive; the target beneficiaries of the incentive; the available 
budget; and the capacity available to administer and enforce it. 
• Review the theory of change: Once the incentive (or other intervention) is chosen, the 
theory of change can be revisited to interrogate this choice. Is the theory of change 
for this incentive logical? Are there missing steps? Does any step lead to unintended 
consequences, positive or negative? Are gender inequalities, dynamics, and needs 
taken to account? To what extent do the outcomes work out differently for women and 
men, as well as for youth and older farmers or more established entrepreneurs? (Hivos, 
2015).
4. If an incentive is chosen, allocate roles and responsibilities for designing and implementing 
the incentive  
If an incentive is chosen as the most appropriate intervention, the next step will be 
designing the incentive, as discussed in the section below. Prior to designing an incentive, 
it is critical to clearly allocate roles and responsibilities among relevant government 
entities. Each agency or authority anticipated to have a role should be identified, its role 
and responsibilities clarified, and sufficient resources allocated.  
Problems may arise if roles are not clearly allocated. For instance, monitoring the 
effectiveness of a tax incentive may be a matter for the Ministry of Finance. However, the 
information on forgone revenue due to the tax incentive may be with the tax administration, 
while information about the impact of the incentive, such as the number of jobs created, 
may be with the sector regulator, and its compliance with conditions set out in a contract, 
such as environmental standards, with the environmental agency. The Ministry of Finance 
must be confident that the tax administration, sector regulator, and environmental agency 
have the legal right to collect the data, and are in fact collecting the data, that it needs for 
its role in evaluating the incentives (United Nations, 2018). 
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Designing investment incentives  
When designing an investment incentive, government officials should ensure that each 
incentive: 
1. has a clear policy objective that aligns with national development priorities; 
2. is appropriately targeted and has clear eligibility criteria; 
3. can be easily and fairly administered; 
4. will be granted at the right stage of the investment;  
5. has a defined time frame; and  
6. is specifically budgeted for.  
Each of these elements is discussed in turn. Annex II provides additional notes on designing tax 
incentives for the limited contexts in which they are deemed appropriate. 
1. Ensure the incentive has a clear objective that aligns with national development priorities 
Each incentive should have a clear and strategic objective that aligns with national 
development priorities and sustainable development goals. The strategic objective may 
include a series of sub-objectives that will vary by jurisdiction depending on economic 
and political factors (Parilla and Liu, 2018). These objectives should take into account 
the needs identified during the planning phase, and should be supported by the theory of 
change developed at that time. This helps to ensure that the incentive is designed in a way 
that is logical.  
Participatory processes during the design phase can also enable government to account 
for investor and other stakeholder needs when designing new incentives.  
2. Decide on the appropriate level of targeting and use clear eligibility criteria   
• Incentives can be tailored narrowly or more broadly, depending on the objective of the 
incentive. For example, eligibility criteria might include: 
- type of activity (e.g. R&D, production, market facilitation); 
- size of investor or investment (e.g. small-, medium-, large-scale); 
- identity of target beneficiary (e.g. marginalised groups; domestic or foreign investors; 
etc.); 
- specific location in need of investment; and/or 
- compliance with specified conditions, with objective and quantifiable performance 
criteria (e.g. linked to local employment; inclusive business approaches; climate-
smart production practices; ecosystem services; etc.). 
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Targeting criteria should be selected carefully, keeping in mind the objectives, desired 
impact, and intended beneficiaries of the incentives. Targeting involves a deliberate 
balancing process. On the one hand, offering incentives too broadly may increase the 
likelihood of providing redundant incentives. On the other, narrowing criteria excessively 
may risk excluding investors whose investments could support the government’s goals. 
This underscores the importance of carefully assessing the potential impacts and costs of 
particular incentives. 
The eligibility criteria should be simple and clear. Carefully crafted criteria can help to 
ensure that targeted investors or investments are actually the ones who receive incentives. 
Clear criteria can also manage investor expectations. This, in turn, can help to avoid 
disputes with investors who expect to be eligible for a specific incentive based on broad 
or ambiguous language.  
3. Minimise discretion in the granting of incentives 
Incentives can be awarded automatically or through a discretionary process that requires 
an application and approval.  
Under an automatic process (sometimes referred to as rules-based process), an incentive 
provided for in the applicable law is automatically available to any potential beneficiary 
who meets the prescribed objective eligibility criteria. An automatic process should be 
used for any tax incentives offered. Automatic processes are also preferable when the 
incentive is targeted more broadly. The advantages of this method are its simplicity of 
administration, including the approval, implementation, and monitoring processes; savings 
on transaction costs; and the minimal discretion and increased transparency that reduce 
the potential for corruption (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016). 
A discretionary process requires that a potential beneficiary go through an approval 
process or allows an investor to negotiate on a case-by-case basis with the relevant agency 
or authority to obtain the incentive or incentive package. Discretionary processes may be 
more appropriate, for example, when an assessment of the potential beneficiary’s ability 
to use the incentive effectively is required. And for governments with strong administrative 
capacity, discretionary processes may be less likely to result in redundant incentives, 
thereby reducing overall spending on incentives. However, the discretionary method is 
more likely to enable corruption, especially with respect to how objectively and thoroughly 
merit is assessed by the relevant administrating agency. Given this greater potential for 
abuse, a discretionary process should still incorporate many non-discretionary elements, 
such as objective eligibility criteria, as well as criteria to determine set amounts/value 
of an incentive that an eligible investor can receive. Discretionary processes can also 
include several stages of approval, and should be subject to ongoing monitoring (Tavares-
Lehmann et al., 2016; Brennan and Ruane, 2016). 
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4. Select the right timing: ex ante vs. ex post 
Incentives may be granted before the investment is made (ex ante or front-loaded) or 
after the investment has met qualifying conditions or achieved expected results (ex post 
or back-loaded). Ex ante provisions are based on the expectation of future, unconfirmed 
performance by the beneficiary. While they are the preferred method by investors and 
producers, they can be undermined by investors who do not deliver the expected results 
or who invest only until the incentive ends. For domestic small-scale producers and 
especially for under-represented groups, such as women, youth, and so on, however, ex 
ante provision of incentives may be essential for investments to be made by them. 
Ex post provisions are based on the compliance of conditions by the beneficiary of the 
incentive. For large-scale investors, incentives should be tied to meeting qualifying 
conditions and offered on an ex post basis. Conditions may be defined in terms of 
export targets, employment targets, the establishment of certain activities like R&D, 
use of environmentally-friendly technology, or other conditions aimed at achieving the 
jurisdiction’s sustainable development goals. This performance-based approach helps 
governments to ensure that they only offer incentives to qualifying investors that meet 
any corresponding conditions and obligations; such an approach can be administratively 
easier for governments than attempting to use “claw-back” provisions when investors 
fail to meet their obligations tied to any incentives that were provided ex ante (Tavares-
Lehmann et al., 2016).
5. Establish a clear timeframe: continuity and duration  
An incentive can be offered as a one-time event, as in a matching grant or a training 
course, or continuously over a set number of years, as in a mentorship programme for 
youth in agriculture. For small-scale producers, continuous incentives can be attractive, 
although also risky: if they become overly reliant on non-institutionalised incentives, 
for example, they risk making decisions based on incentives that might be terminated 
prematurely.  
The time frame during which an incentive is offered, and its results measured, should 
be specified. This may help investors, small or large, make more informed decisions. 
Specified time frames can also reduce the risk that the incentives programme is kept alive 
due to administrative or political inertia or despite its ineffectiveness.38 For legislated 
tax incentives, for example, the inclusion of “sunset” clauses (where the legislation 
automatically expires after a specified number of years unless proactively extended) is 
considered good practice (see Annex II). 
While some stability and continuity of incentives can support informed investor decision-
making, governments should always retain appropriate flexibility to end incentives 
38 Tax incentives, such as tax holidays, tend to remain in the statute books well after the original period for which they were granted and 
well after any benefit for such a policy has been exhausted. This creates a financial burden on the State without any benefit (Johnson et al. 
forthcoming).
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39 For example, following tax expenditure calculations, the governments of Rwanda and Sierra Leone were on notice after those calculations 
revealed that more than a third of revenues were given up as incentives (James, 2013).
programmes if deemed ineffective or if the incentives are no longer in line with their 
development priorities. This is particularly important to signal around incentives that 
might be relied on by foreign large-scale investors, who may seek to resort to investor-
state dispute settlement proceedings when incentives are removed (see Box 5). In the 
case of incentives targeted at small-scale producers, however, provision should be made 
to ensure they are not excessively harmed by the revocation of such incentives. This 
may take, for example, the form of a staggered removal of the benefit incurred from the 
incentive, or adequate social protection to mitigate against harm.
6. Understand costs and disclose expenditure budget  
Incentives need to be designed with due regard to a jurisdiction’s available budget.  
Understanding the costs of a potential incentive is critical for assessing whether the 
incentive is worth its costs, whether it is a sensible use of public resources,39 and its 
implications for the government’s ability to pursue its sustainable development goals.  
When assessing the costs of an incentive, governments should also consider “hidden 
costs.” There are many hidden costs of incentives; examples include opportunity costs, 
the cost of offering a redundant incentive, and the costs of inefficient allocation of capital 
(Thomas, 2007).  
If a potential incentive is deemed worth its cost, the government must ensure that the 
associated budget includes sufficient funds for its implementation, administration, 
consistent monitoring, and evaluation, as well as funds for any anticipated services to 
be provided as part of the incentives package (e.g. training services that are offered 
alongside financial incentives). For incentives packages that might also be supported by 
entities outside the government, such as donors or philanthropic institutions, coordination 
between those actors to ensure secure and sufficient funding is vital (Fiedler, 2020). 
As incentives can become extremely costly, statutory limits on spending for a specific 
incentives programme can discourage overuse (Johnson et al., forthcoming). 
In addition, the expenditure budget for all incentives and the amount of revenue 
forgone for tax incentives should be made transparent and public. Doing so increases 
public discussion and scrutiny of the costs of incentives (James, 2013), which can help 
the government in identifying appropriate incentives policies and use, and ultimately 
improve incentives-related outcomes. 
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Implementing investment incentives  
After incentives have been designed, they are ready to be implemented. This includes:  
• offering the incentive (e.g. in legislation, via non-institutionalised programmes, or 
otherwise); 
• administering the incentive (including any required applications and approval processes, 
reviewing whether potential beneficiaries meet the eligibility criteria, and ensuring the 
incentive is provided to those deemed eligible); 
• operating any programmatic components (e.g. operating youth mentorship programmes 
or training programmes for women producers); 
• addressing grievances or disputes related to incentive implementation; and 
• assessing whether an incentive should be adjusted or withdrawn (either from a specific 
recipient because of non-compliance with conditions, or generally in light of evaluation 
and learning).
The implementation phase of incentives is extremely context-specific. Given the vast range of 
incentives and investors considered under this guide, it is not possible to provide a detailed 
discussion on implementation in practice. Rather, this section focuses on three key elements 
of successful implementation of incentives for responsible investment in agriculture and food 
systems:  
• Focusing on inter-institutional coordination and collaboration  
• Providing transparency and access to information 
• Addressing grievances 
Each element is discussed briefly. 
1. Ensure strong inter-institutional coordination and collaboration 
A clear allocation of responsibilities for implementing investment incentives, coupled 
with strong institutional coordination and collaboration as needed, can improve efficiency 
and effectiveness among the entities charged with the various stages of implementing 
incentives. Processes that facilitate coordination between government entities can help 
to foster information exchange, can support an appropriate allocation of capacity and 
resources, and can help to address disagreements that may arise between entities. 
2. Provide transparency and support access to information 
Public disclosure of information in accessible formats is fundamental to ensuring investors 
and other stakeholders are reliably informed in a timely manner regarding available 
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incentives, as well as regarding incentives that governments have already provided.40 
Access to this information allows investors to make more informed decisions and supports 
public oversight of the use of public resources. Together with meaningful participation, 
information disclosure contributes to credibility, legitimacy, and trust (FAO, 2014c).
i. Information on available incentives  
Timely and accurate information on available incentives and their objectives should be 
publicly accessible to all relevant stakeholders in an equitable and suitable manner, 
using appropriate communication channels. To make information available to small-
scale producers, for example, communication channels may include using rural radio 
and posters; when targeting youth, television and social media may increase access 
(Fiedler, 2020).41  
Clearly communicating information about available incentives has multiple benefits: 
• Intended beneficiaries are more likely to be aware of and access the incentives. 
• If done well, information disclosure and strong communications can help to reduce 
information asymmetries that would otherwise disadvantage certain intended 
beneficiaries (such as more disadvantaged youth in impoverished rural areas). 
• The overall investment climate is strengthened, as investors—from small-scale 
producers to large enterprises—generally prefer clarity and certainty, which enables 
more informed decision-making.
ii. Access to information about incentives already granted  
All incentives have associated costs. Disclosing these costs, and providing information 
about incentives that have been granted, can enable public scrutiny of whether 
incentives are aligned with jurisdictional goals and objectives.  
At a minimum, governments should disclose:  
• the costs of incentives programmes, and  
• the details of any specific incentives negotiated with large corporate investors.  
The costs of incentives include spending on specific programmes, as well as tax 
expenditures from tax incentives that reduce government revenue. Annex II discusses 
this further. Disclosing these costs helps policymakers, technical staff, and the general 
public better assess the effectiveness, impact, and value of the incentives. 
40 Public disclosure of information is one element of transparency, which also includes access, comprehension, and use of information. For a 
discussion of key elements of transparency, see Szoke-Burke, (2021).
41 CFS RAI, (2014) principle 9 stresses the need to share “information relevant to the investment, in accordance with applicable law, in an 
inclusive, equitable, accessible, and transparent manner at all stages of the investment cycle.”
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Many investment contracts between large-scale investors and governments have 
included negotiated investment incentives. This is not recommended: as discussed 
above in Part II, if a government plans to offer any incentives to large-scale investors, 
such incentives should be provided for in law. However, for those investment contracts 
that do incorporate incentives, public disclosure is imperative. Governments should 
disclose these contracts—along with other important information, such as associated 
impact assessments, due diligence reports, and performance reports—to the general 
public. This can be done by disclosing such documents online, either on a government-
hosted website or via the Open Land Contracts repository.42 Governments should also 
take steps to ensure access by local communities (and their civil society partners) that 
stand to be affected by the underlying investment. 
3. Be prepared to address disputes or grievances 
Governments should be prepared to deal with disputes or grievances raised by investors 
regarding investment incentives. Such disputes might arise, for example, if the eligibility 
criteria are unclear and the government and investor disagree on whether the investor 
is entitled to a certain incentive, or if the government withdraws an incentive for non-
compliance with conditions but the investor believes it was in compliance. While some 
grievances may be inevitable, careful design can help to minimise them, as discussed 
above.43  
During the implementation phase, there should be a clear process and allocation of 
roles and responsibilities for resolving disputes and addressing grievances. This includes 
processes for addressing eligibility disputes, as well as for responding to feedback from 
beneficiaries. 
For incentives that have a strong programmatic component (such as programmes that 
combine loans with training and mentoring services), governments should ensure there 
are adequate grievance mechanisms that allow beneficiaries to raise concerns. Good 
practice suggests that there should be:  
• adequate information about the grievance mechanism;  
• multiple ways to receive grievances (e.g. complaints box, call centre, grievance 
committees, etc.); 
• opportunities to raise grievances both via the programme as well as through independent 
channels (such as an ombudsman); and  
• sufficient and trained staff to address grievances that may be raised (Barca, 2016).
42 For instance, the governments of Liberia and Ethiopia have disclosed agricultural contracts and associated documents online. At the time 
of writing, OpenLandContracts.org hosts publicly available contracts from 25 countries. 
43 If governments are providing incentives to investors whose projects run a high risk of creating grievances on the part of third parties—such 
as a large-scale investment that might affect nearby communities—the government should require the investor to set up a project-level 
grievance mechanism. Such a mechanism should follow good practice: for example, it should be rights-compliant; ensure accessibility, safety, 
and privacy; address power imbalances; and complement but not preclude access to other judicial or non-judicial mechanisms. This guide 
takes the position, however, that investments with high risks of creating grievances are not good candidates for incentives.
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Monitoring, evaluation, and learning for investment incentives  
Monitoring and evaluating incentives are critical for tracking and assessing their progress and 
impact. Learnings based on those efforts can help governments determine whether to continue 
offering certain incentives, whether to adjust any incentives proffered, and/or how to improve 
future incentives. It is good practice to develop a Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) 
plan at the design phase of an investment incentive. 
More specifically, MEL should enable processes to assess whether incentives should be 
withdrawn or adjusted at two levels:  
• whether an incentive should be withdrawn from an investor that is not complying with 
requisite conditions; and  
• whether an incentive is moving toward achieving its intended objective given assessments 
of its effectiveness and costs, and if not, whether it should be adjusted or discontinued.   
While monitoring compliance with conditions should be fairly straightforward, assessing 
whether incentives are able to fulfil their intended objective(s) and remain worth their costs 
may be more complicated. To support such an assessment, governments can draw on the 
specific indicators, selected at the planning stage of the incentive, that point to the targets 
expected of each output and outcome identified. In cases where indicators to monitor progress 
towards specific goals were not initially defined, or a theory of change not clearly developed, 
these can be retrospectively generated for MEL purposes, based on the expectations at the 
design phase, in order to track progress (IIED, 2019). 
This section provides a very brief overview of MEL for incentives. Annex III provides more 
details on implementing a MEL plan; policymakers and technical staff tasked with designing, 
implementing, or monitoring and evaluating incentives can refer to Annex III for more specific 
guidance. 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
Monitoring is the continuous collection and tracking of data regarding ongoing incentives, 
which can be used to make informed decisions for policy management. Evaluation is an 
objective assessment of an ongoing or completed incentive programme to determine whether 
it is meeting or has met its goals. 
When governments offer incentives with conditions, there should be a process for monitoring 
and evaluating whether the investors who have received those incentives are complying with 
the conditions. What this looks like in practice will depend on the type of incentive offered, the 
condition(s) imposed, how the investor demonstrates compliance with the condition(s), and 
what monitoring is feasible on the part of government.  
In some cases, for example, the simplest approach may be to require that the investor certify 
that it has met the (objective and quantifiable) conditions, and to monitor using “spot checks” 
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and/or audits. To the extent that the government decides an investor is not in compliance, 
there should be a clear process for withdrawing the incentive (and, if needed, an effective 
mechanism to “claw back” the incentive already provided).  
Beyond monitoring and evaluating specific investor compliance with incentive conditions, 
governments should also monitor and evaluate incentives at the programme level. This can 
support understanding of what works and what does not, and to probe into the reasons for 
these results (IIED, 2019). For example, were the assumptions made in the theory of change 
invalid, was the incentive offered inappropriate for the target population, or was the eligibility 
criteria too broad (or too narrow)? This understanding, in turn, can help governments ultimately 
make more informed decisions about what incentives they offer.  
To do this, governments can develop a monitoring and evaluation plan linked to an incentives 
programme. The goal of monitoring is the collection of data that can be used for regular 
reporting, analysis, and assessment of the incentives at the evaluation phase. Broadly speaking, 
monitoring can seek to focus on whether incentives have been implemented as intended and/
or whether the incentives are leading to expected results. 
In developing the monitoring component of the plan, the following considerations (details of 
which are included in Annex III) should be kept in mind: 
• what data to collect; 
• entity (or entities) responsible for monitoring data; 
• data source(s) to be used; 
• data collection method(s) to be used; 
• disaggregated data collection; 
• frequency of data collection; and 
• data reporting. 
Evaluation is the assessment made based on the data collected during the monitoring 
phase. An effective evaluation can provide useful evidence that supports improvements or 
adjustments to incentives or that provides guidance for future incentives.  
Various approaches may be used in conducting an evaluation. An appropriate evaluation 
approach will depend on a number of elements, including the purpose and scope of the 
evaluation, the criteria to be addressed, and the type of evaluation to be conducted (IIED, 
2019). Annex III provides key issues to consider when determining the evaluation approach. 
Some governments may find it easiest to seek an external evaluation of certain incentives or 
incentives programmes. External evaluations and recommendations can help provide insight 
into the benefits and drawbacks of the government’s current approach, and can help to guide 
strategic decision-making about whether to continue, adjust, or withdraw incentives. 
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Applying Learnings  
Together, monitoring and evaluation drive learning, which is an ongoing process throughout 
the duration of each offered incentive. Learning can be used to make decisions about ongoing 
incentives; in particular, whether they need to be adjusted or discontinued. It allows for and 
encourages adjustments to be made to the design and implementation of an incentive in 
response to the information and knowledge generated through the monitoring and evaluation 
processes, as well as modifications in the design of an incentive in response to implementation 
challenges incurred. For example, adjustments can be made to the eligibility criteria of tax 
incentives or the conditions imposed if its redundancy ratio is greater than zero indicating a 
sizable loss of potential revenue, or if its social cost becomes much higher than its benefits.  
Learning can help assess whether these challenges were preventable, and how to avoid such 
challenges in a similar future situation (IIED, 2019). In this way, learning can also be used in the 
design of new incentives.  
However, if evaluations and the learnings from them suggest that an incentive is far from 
fulfilling its intended objective, is not worth its costs, and/or has become irrelevant, this might 
support a decision to discontinue the incentive. To the extent that governments decide to 
discontinue an incentive before the anticipated end date, they should seek to apply good 
practice, such as clearly communicating the planned phase-out and, potentially, providing 
parameters under which investors may continue to benefit from an incentive already granted 
to them. 
Learnings are, of course, only useful if relevant officials are willing to consider them, and to 
adapt their approaches to incentives accordingly. Political and other factors can influence 
how governments think about incentives, whether and what they will offer, and how they will 
condition them. Too often, governments persist in using incentives despite evidence that they 
may not be effective or worth their costs. Pressure from investors, from other states, from citizens 
and other stakeholders can colour a government’s calculations about what makes sense, while 
individual interests of decision-makers may also influence the shape that incentives take. It 
is not uncommon for evaluations of incentives to be omitted, or for government officials to 
overlook the recommendations made on the basis of evaluations and learnings.  
Yet, if governments are serious about using incentives to increase and enhance responsible 
investment in agriculture and food systems that supports their development priorities, it is 
critical that monitoring and evaluations are undertaken, and that learnings are applied 
seriously. Effective MEL can make the difference between incentives that work and those that 
do not. 
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Conclusion
This guide demonstrates that incentives can play a role in stimulating more responsible 
investment in agriculture and food systems, although they are not always the right tool for the 
job. Incentives are expensive, and should be used carefully. Incentives are not a substitute for 
improving the enabling environment, which is generally much more important for small- and 
large-scale investors alike.  
When offering incentives, governments should prioritise incentives that support small-scale 
producer households and micro- and small-scale enterprises upstream and downstream, 
particularly youth and women. Supporting these investors can make a meaningful contribution 
to achieving national development priorities and the goals of the CFS RAI.  
Incentives should be carefully planned for, with strong participatory processes and a view 
to gender and youth sensitivity in design. Through careful planning, governments can assess 
whether and, if so, how incentives should be used. Where incentives are deemed an appropriate 
policy response, design can be guided by clear objectives, with careful targeting, minimal 
discretion, appropriate timing and timeframe, and an adequate budget. Finally, the progress 
and impact of incentives should be tracked by monitoring and evaluating processes, while 
learnings based on those efforts can help to assess whether incentives should be withdrawn 
or adjusted. 
Incentives require deliberate consideration and design if they are to be an effective mechanism 
for encouraging more and better quality investment in agriculture and food systems. It is hoped 
that this guide will serve as a useful tool in achieving that aim. 
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Glossary
Agriculture and food systems: the range of activities required to produce, process, market, 
retail, consume, and dispose of agricultural goods. This includes not only food and non-
food products, forestry, livestock and fisheries, but also the goods needed and produced 
along each step of these processes. Food systems involve a wide range of stakeholders and 
institutions.1  
CFS RAI: (Committee on World Food Security Principles for Responsible Investment in 
Agriculture and Food Systems). A voluntary international instrument developed through an 
inclusive multi-stakeholder process that consists of 10 principles for achieving investments 
that are responsible, contribute to food security, and promote sustainable development. 
Community members: local stakeholders who own or use the land underlying or near an 
investment project, or whose livelihoods and well-being may otherwise be affected by 
investment activities. 
Downstream activities: the processing, marketing, retail, consumption, and disposal stages of 
production activities.  
Enabling environment: the set of factors, conditions, and safeguards that encourage 
investment generally, and responsible investment specifically.  
Foreign direct investment (FDI): an investment made by an individual or private sector 
enterprise from one (“home”) country into another (“host”) country.  
Investment:  the commitment of capital (whether financial, physical, intellectual, or other) to 
something with the expectation of accumulating additional income or benefits in the future. 
Investment climate: the conditions (financial, socio-political, and economic) that affect the 
favourability of a given jurisdiction to investors considering it as an investment location, or 
that affect the decision-making around investments more generally. Similar to the “enabling 
environment.”  
Investment incentive: a targeted measure provided by a government to or for the benefit 
of an investor (including small-scale producers) for a new or expanded investment with the 
goal of influencing the size, location, impact, behaviour, sector, or other character of such 
investment. They can broadly be categorized into five groups: 
• Financial incentives: non-tax-based financial supports. 
• Technical and business support incentives: can include facilitation services, technological 
packages, research and development, and extension services. 
• Tax (fiscal) incentives: tax-based measures.
1 Adapted from the CFS RAI.
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• Regulatory incentives: derogations from national or sub-national regulations or favourable 
regulatory terms offered to investors. 
• Other incentives: measures that are categorised as incentives for the purpose of this guide 
but do not fit into the existing established categories listed above.  
In addition to these categories of incentives types, investment incentives are sometimes 
described based on their underlying goal, in particular: 
• Behavioural investment incentives: targeted measures provided by the government to or 
for the benefit of an investor to influence investor behaviour.   
• Locational investment incentives: targeted measures provided by the government to or for 
the benefit of an investor to attract investment into a particular location.  
Investor: for the purposes of this guide, refers to the wide range of individuals and private 
sector enterprises that invest in agriculture (including livestock and pastoralism), fisheries 
and aquaculture, and forestry, including investments in primary agriculture as well as those 
in upstream or downstream activities. Investors include both domestic and foreign investors, 
ranging from small-scale producers and micro-enterprises to large-scale corporate investors. 
Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs): public agencies that focus primarily on attracting 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) into a country or sub-national region. Some IPAs may 
also focus on promoting or attracting domestic investments, and/or on other related mandates 
such as innovation promotion or export promotion. 
Micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSME): while difficult to define across countries, 
within a country, these may be defined by number of staff employed and asset base.  
Responsible investment in agriculture and food systems: a responsible investment in 
agriculture and food systems contributes to sustainable development, enhances food security 
and nutrition, and respects human rights.  
Small-scale producer: includes family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, women and youth 
producing food, indigenous peoples, and post-harvest processors. While what is considered 
“small-scale” is context-specific and varies across countries, scale is generally identified by 
physical size (e.g. size of land being farmed) and/or economic size. 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): seventeen goals adopted unanimously in 2015 by 
UN Member States as part of the Agenda 2030 for sustainable development that lay out an 
integrated blue print to achieve socially inclusive, environmentally sustainable economic 




Considerations regarding how incentives can be used 
Responsible agricultural and food systems investment is primarily determined by the enabling 
environment, not investment incentives. Governments seeking to encourage more responsible 
investment should, first and foremost, focus on improving the enabling environment. In 
addition, incentives are not appropriate tools for ensuring that investment does not result in 
human rights abuses or environmental harm; for that, governments must ensure that domestic 
law prevents such outcomes. 
In some circumstances, investment incentives may be appropriate, and may be the most 
effective mechanism for overcoming a particular barrier to investment that supports the 
government’s national development priorities. In such cases, incentives can be used as a 
targeted policy instrument to address specific needs, but should be effective, worth their 
cost, and ideally not offered to investors who would have undertaken the investment even 
without the incentive. 
When investment incentives are appropriate, the following recommendations can guide the 
approach of policymakers and technical staff:
Process recommendations 
• Seek strong coordination across relevant institutions on issues that influence investments 
in agriculture and food systems, and ensure that all relevant institutions are included as 
needed in incentives planning, design, and implementation. 
• Create opportunities for community members, civil society, and other stakeholders to 
share their perspectives and influence decision-making around investments and the 
planning and design of incentives. 
• Participate in regional efforts to curb redundant incentive use and to combat the “race 
to the bottom.” 
Substantive recommendations 
• To use incentives to enhance responsible investment aligned with national development 
priorities and the CFS RAI, prioritise the development of investment incentives that target 
small-scale producers, especially youth and women, as well as micro- and small-scale 
enterprises upstream and downstream. Avoid placing an outsized emphasis on using 
incentives to attract FDI. 
• Consider attaching environmental, social, health, behavioural, or other conditions to 
incentives in order to achieve desired investment-related impacts that align with national 
development priorities. 
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• Design incentives in recognition of the different dimensions of responsible agricultural 
and food systems investment, so as to not blindly pursue one dimension (e.g. food 
security) at the expense of others (e.g. biodiversity).    
• Consider how incentives may be packaged (including through the provision of multiple 
complementary incentives together, or alongside disincentives) in order to better support 
target investors’ effective use of incentives and the achievement of government’s goals. 
Technical recommendations 
• Reduce or eliminate the discretion to offer incentives through contracts and, when possible, 
embed incentives in domestic national or sub-national law. 
• Analyse proposed investment incentives for potential international trade law breaches.
Planning for, designing, monitoring, and evaluating investment incentives 
for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems  
Taking the above considerations and recommendations into account, this guide provides 
specific information on how to plan for, design, implement, monitor, and evaluate incentives 
for responsible agricultural and food systems investment. 
Planning 
Before any specific investment incentives are designed, careful planning can help to clarify 
whether investment incentives are an appropriate intervention. 
A starting point for this planning is to understand the government’s national development 
priorities and how they relate to the government’s long-term goals with respect to responsible 
investment in agriculture and food systems. With this understanding, the first steps in planning 
for an intervention—one that might take the form of an incentive—are to identify the needs of 
investors in agriculture and food systems, the barriers to responsible investment in agriculture 
and food systems, the problems that the government is trying to address, and what the 
government is hoping to achieve with the intervention. These steps will enable policymakers 
and technical staff to ascertain whether incentives are the most appropriate mechanism and, 
if so, how to design them effectively.  
To support this assessment, policymakers and technical staff can conduct a context analysis, 
articulate a long-term desired impact, and then use a theory of change to assess possible 
interventions, in order to ultimately determine whether to use an incentive. 
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Designing 
When designing an investment incentive, policymakers and technical staff can aim to: 
• Ensure the incentive has a clear objective that aligns with national development priorities. 
• Decide on the appropriate level of targeting and use clear eligibility criteria. 
• Minimise discretion in the granting of incentives. 
• Select the right timing: ex ante vs. ex post. 
• Establish a clear timeframe: continuity and duration. 
• Understand costs and disclose expenditure budget. 
Implementing 
Given that the implementation phase of incentives is extremely context specific, this guide 
focuses on three key elements of successful implementation.  
First, there should be strong inter-institutional coordination and collaboration to support 
effective implementation.  
Second, governments can support access to information, which allows investors to make 
more informed decisions and supports public oversight of the use of public resources. This 
includes clearly communicating information about available incentives, as well as disclosing 
information about incentives already granted (including their costs, and details of any specific 
incentives negotiated with large corporate investors).  
Third, governments should be prepared to address disputes or grievances raised by investors 
regarding investment incentives. This includes having a clear process and allocation of roles 
and responsibilities for resolving disputes and addressing grievances. 
Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning 
Finally, monitoring and evaluating incentives are critical for tracking and assessing their 
progress and impact. Learnings based on these efforts can help to assess whether incentives 
should be withdrawn or adjusted at two levels:  
• whether an incentive should be withdrawn from an investor that is not complying with 
requisite conditions; and  
• whether an incentive is moving toward achieving its intended objective given assessments 
of its effectiveness and costs, and if not, whether it should be adjusted or discontinued.  
Effective monitoring, evaluation, and learning can make the difference between incentives 
that work for responsible investment in agriculture and food systems, and those that do not.
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Annex I: Theory of change
Developing a theory of change 
Box 11, below, provides the basic elements to include in the development of a theory of change, 
followed by an example of a theory of change narrative and its associated diagram. 
BOX 11: ELEMENTS TO INCLUDE IN A THEORY OF CHANGE 
A theory of change includes a number of elements, their causal relationships, and assumptions 
and risks that may influence the success or failure of achieving the expected goal at each level: 
Impact is the long-term desired change to be achieved for a target population reasonably 
and causally attributed to the intervention. Positive impacts should be aligned with national 
development priorities. 
Proximate outcomes may be added, where relevant, if the desired impact cannot be measured 
directly. 
Outcomes are the short- and medium-term goals expected to be achieved as a result of the 
completion of the outputs. They describe changes in institutional and behavioural capacities 
or performance of beneficiaries due to the outputs.  
Outputs describe the changes in skills or abilities and capacities of beneficiaries, or the 
availability of new products and/or services that are achieved from the completion of activities 
within a specified time period. 
Activities define how the intervention will be carried out – the actions, processes, or strategies 
that will be implemented to produce the desired outputs. 
Inputs are the financial, human, technological, and information resources used to deliver 
activities. 
Assumptions are the necessary (internal or external) conditions that must be in place or events 
that must occur for goals to be achieved at each level of the theory of change.  
Risks are potential circumstances fully or partially beyond the control of the theory developed, 
such as social, political, or economic factors that may affect the ability to achieve expected 
goal(s) at any level of the model.
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Example of a theory of change narrative 
The problem, goals, and proposed incentives  
In a farming community, located in a climate change hotspot, the majority of the population is 
experiencing severe food insecurity. There is a significant gap between potential agricultural 
productivity and actual agricultural productivity, i.e. yield gap, which climate variability 
is likely to exacerbate. After a comprehensive context analysis, aided by local farmers and 
representatives from the community, a theory of change is developed. In order to close the 
yield gap (strategic objective) and contribute to improving food security (desired impact), and 
at the same time, avoid dangerous cropland expansion and negative environmental impacts, 
it is decided that a series of training courses (incentive) be offered and implemented, targeting 
local small-scale producers (target population). The training courses would focus on the 
adoption of climate-smart agricultural (CSA) practices, including the use of improved crop 
varieties, residue management, crop diversification, laser land leveling, and zero tillage with 
residue retention. The theory of change that was developed predicts that if the majority of local 
small-scale producers attend these training courses and acquire new skills and knowledge, they 
will apply these skills systematically and sustainably, which in turn will improve productivity 
and close the yield gap, and therefore contribute to an increase in food security.
Identifying missing steps  
During the participatory process, consideration is given to missing steps in the theory of 
change, from the potential intervention to the desired impact. One significant missing step is 
that the beneficiaries of the incentive, equipped with the relevant CSA knowledge and skills, 
must be able to purchase the related and necessary CSA technology in order to put those skills 
into practice. This may include the equipment needed to achieve laser land leveling, which 
enhances water use efficiency compared to unlevelled fields, and zero tillage with residue 
retention, which conserves soil moisture, reducing evaporative loss of moisture, thus requiring 
less water than conventionally tilled fields (Khatri-Chetri et al., 2016). Without the ability to 
pay for these initial capital requirements, the farmers’ application of CSA practices may not 
lead to the increased agricultural productivity that the incentive is intended to achieve. This 
realization may lead to a reconceptualization of the theory of change by, for instance, adding 
a crucial step at the start of the model whereby a financial incentive (through subsidies and/
or loans) is offered by public financial institutions to these farmers to help them purchase the 
necessary CSA technology.  
Applying a gender lens to the incentives  
Consideration should also be given to any unintended consequences of the theory developed. 
One such consequence that may arise from the implementation of the incentives is the danger 
of leaving behind women producers, who play a critical role in the production of food crops. 
To ensure that women producers benefit equally from the CSA training courses and have equal 
access to financial resources required to put their newly acquired skills into practice, gender-
sensitive measures need to be adopted that take into account the needs of, and constraints 
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faced by, women in the community. For example, the training courses may be taught by a set 
proportion of female trainers who are sensitive to gender differences in agricultural practices, 
crops traditionally grown by women, and illiterate farmers. In addition, the training courses 
may be taught during school hours or include the provision of childcare services to ensure 
the attendance of women producers. In terms of the financial support provided to farmers to 
purchase the CSA technology, the existence of discriminatory practices of financial institutions 
often means that women have poorer access to credit since loan agreements require collateral, 
like land or asset ownership, which are usually registered in men’s names (Vorley et al., 2012). 
To support women’s equal access to credit, the government may adopt policies that urge 
financial institutions to implement gender-sensitive loan mechanisms and procedures or to 
allocate a proportion of credit sources to women producers. 
Risk analysis 
In addition to the missing steps and unintended consequences, the assumptions made and any 
associated risks that they may carry are examined. In a case where an assumption is seen to 
represent a more substantial risk, policymakers and technical staff may adjust the intervention, 
re-design the incentives, develop a contingency plan, or establish a risk management plan to 
monitor and address conditions as needed (Roberts and Khattri , 2012). If, for instance, the 
jurisdiction is located in an area prone to frequent floods or drought, the training courses could 
include strengthening capacities of key stakeholders to mitigate and respond to disasters, 
environmental challenges, and climate crises (FAO, 2019a). See Figure 3.
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Figure 3 - Theory of change visual
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Using the theory of change developed to inform MEL 
The theory of change developed at the planning stage established the logic hierarchy (from 
inputs to impact) that an incentive is hypothesised to follow. Policymakers and technical staff 
designing an incentive should establish complementary detail to the logic developed to help 
track progress towards achieving the desired impact. The details, discussed below, will form 
the basis of the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) stage of an incentive. 
A first step is to work out the indicators and targets associated with each of the expected 
results anticipated in the theory of change. Indicators are quantitative or qualitative measures 
that enable one to assess the degree to which activities, outputs, outcomes and impacts have 
been achieved. Indicators define in measurable terms the performance required at each level 
of the theory of change in order to reach the next desired level. For instance, using the theory 
of change example above, several outcome indicators may be selected to measure the change 
in agricultural productivity over time, including measures of soil health, crop diversity, and/
or seed quality used. On the other hand, a single indicator may be sufficient to measure an 
expected result, like the number of small-scale producers that attend the training sessions (an 
output indicator).
Targets are the desired level of performance, or magnitude of change, expected at a specific 
point in time for each indicator (IIED, 2019). In other words, targeting is the act of putting 
numbers and dates on indicators.44 An outcome target using the example above could be: 
by 2025, emission intensity, in particular from agricultural activities, will be reduced by 50 
percent. Targets can be quantitative or qualitative, depending on the indicator, and should 
satisfy the SMART criterion (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, timely) to have the 
greatest potential for achieving the expected results at each level of the theory of change.  
In order to understand the rate of change over time of an indicator and the likelihood that a 
target will be met, benchmarks can be established. Benchmarks are the expected levels of 
achievement of an indicator at specified points in an incentive cycle. When such benchmarks 
are not met, policymakers and technical staff may wish to adjust the design or implementation 
of an incentive, the indicators and/or targets selected, or decide to withdraw or discontinue an 
incentive altogether. 
Finally, baseline data should be set for each indicator. Baseline data is the status of the 
indicator at the start of a project or incentive and serves as the reference point for comparison, 
i.e. to measure progress or achievements against the situation that prevailed before the 
implementation of an incentive. This data may be collected during the planning stage of the 
incentive as part of the context analysis.
44 CFS RAI Principle 10 recognises the need to “defin[e] baseline data and indicators for monitoring and to measure impacts.” In addition, “[s]
tates are encouraged, in consultation with all relevant stakeholders, especially the most vulnerable, and as appropriate with national human 
rights institutions, to establish monitoring, assessment, and reporting systems ...” See: FAO, (2016), 23.
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It is important to address and integrate issues and differences relating to gender and age into 
these elements in order for disaggregated data to be collected and reported for all expected 
results. This is especially critical when differentiated gender impacts might occur and be 
relevant. Other demographic data, where relevant, should also be disaggregated to understand 
the different way targeted groups benefit (or not) from the incentives offered.  
If resources—such as time, money, knowledge, and/ or skills—are limited, focus on a small 
core set of critical results, and then develop indicators for which data collection is realistic: 
available in a timely way and neither too burdensome nor too costly. It is also wise to establish: 
• how the data for the indicators and targets will be tracked and analysed;  
• how often the measurements will occur;  
• the source of data;  
• who will be responsible for the data collection;  
• how the data will be collected;  
• whether the data will be checked for quality; and  
• the financial resources to be used (IIED, 2019). 
Clarifying these elements at the planning stage and in conjunction with the theory of change 
can greatly facilitate the MEL stage. Policymakers and technical staff can gradually strengthen 
these tools as the incentives are implemented and monitored. 
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Annex II - Designing tax 
incentives
As noted in Part II of the guide, evidence suggests that tax incentives, as they are generally used, 
may not be worth their costs or even effective. Some of this research is highlighted below in Box 12. 
In light of this evidence, policymakers and technical staff should carefully consider whether it is 
necessary to offer tax incentives in the agricultural and food systems context. In many cases, it may 
not be. In the event that they are still offered, effective and efficient use of tax incentives requires 
that they be carefully designed, with a view to improving their transparency and governance, 
and systematically monitored and evaluated to facilitate informed decision-making (IMF et al., 
2015). This Annex provides guiding principles relevant to the design of tax incentives. 
BOX 12: DOUBTS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VALUE OF TAX INCENTIVES 
Investment incentives and their impacts are difficult to quantify, yet researchers have sought 
to measure the impact of various tax incentives through both econometric and qualitative 
studies. When assessing incentive impacts, one primary question is effectiveness– i.e., do they 
induce the desired investment or behavioural change. Even if some level of effectiveness is 
proven, another question is whether incentives “are worth the costs and trade-offs they imply,” 
as they may reduce governments’ ability to spend on important public goods and services 
(Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016). 
Econometric Studies 
Econometric studies have drawn varied conclusions regarding tax incentives. For example, an 
analysis by a World Bank economist (James, 2013) found that econometric studies of investment 
incentives (not specifically focused on agriculture and food systems) showed the following results: 
• “Investments are not strongly influenced by lower tax rates in countries with weak 
investment climate.” James, (2013).  
• “Investments in developed countries respond strongly to incentives.” de Mooij and 
Enderveen, (2003), Desai, Foley, and Hines, (2004). 
• “Investments have responded to incentives in some developing countries, but the elasticity 
was smaller than [in] developed countries.” Klemm and Van Parys, (2009). 
• “Export-oriented investments—especially mobile ones—are more sensitive to tax 
incentives.”45 Grubert and Mutti, (2004), Rolfe and White, (1992), Wells, (1986). 
• “Investment incentives create significant distortions by encouraging inefficient 
investments.” Hassett and Hubbard, (2002).  
45 One downside of this effectiveness vis-a-vis mobile firms is that such firms may be more likely move to other jurisdictions when offered 
more attractive incentives there. This can limit the benefits to the original jurisdiction, and also exacerbate a “race to the bottom” in offering 
incentives.
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• “Low inflation is the best investment incentive.” Hassett and Hubbard, (2002).  
• “Temporary incentives have bigger short-run impact than permanent ones.” Hassett and 
Hubbard, (2002). 
To add to those conclusions: 
• Increased FDI flows do not necessarily increase total investment as they can displace local 
investment. Klemm and Van Parys, (2012). 
• Even in the context of export-oriented investments, the ultimate impact on a country’s 
economic output can be limited in spite of all FDI incentives offered. FAO, (2013a).
Interview-Based Studies 
Qualitative studies based on firm-level information have helped to shed light on investment 
decision-making and the effect of tax incentives. The same World Bank study that reviewed 
econometric studies also reviewed qualitative studies available at the time, finding that studies 
show that redundancy levels (whereby incentives are provided even though investors would 
have invested without the incentives) “are quite high for investors in almost all the countries,” 
with the main exception being exporters, for whom “tax incentives are far more important.” The 
review also found that investment incentives “did not affect the level of investment for most 
investors” (James, 2013). In particular, the review of qualitative studies showed that tax incentives 
are “particularly redundant for investments oriented toward domestic markets and those based 
on natural resources … unique to a country” (James, 2013), which arguably can include certain 
large-scale agricultural plantations such as rubber and bananas (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2016). 
These conclusions align with the research results of other international institutions. According 
to the IMF, investment surveys reveal that “tax incentives usually do not top the list of investment 
factors in developing countries.” In addition, the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization 2010 business survey of 7,000 companies in 19 sub-Saharan African countries 
ranked incentives packages 11th out of 12 location factors, with this importance falling over time. 
By contrast, transparency of the legal framework ranked much higher and grew in importance, 
leading to the conclusion that investors “seem to care much more about deficient legislation 
and onerous regulations than about the availability of tax incentives” (IMF et al., 2015). 
Two agriculture-specific, interview-based studies that reach similar conclusions—finding 
that tax incentives have not stimulated agricultural/agribusiness investments in Ethiopia and 
Ghana—are discussed above in Part II.  
Profit- versus cost-based tax incentives 
To the extent that tax incentives are worth using, research has shown that cost-based tax 
incentives may have a greater chance of stimulating investment. By lowering the cost of 
capital, cost-based incentives “make a greater number of investment projects more profitable 
at the margin—that is, may generate investments that would not otherwise have been made.” 
By contrast, the effect of profit-based tax incentives may be to “forego government revenue in 
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order to make even more profitable investment projects that would be profitable, and hence 
undertaken, even without the incentive” (IMF et al., 2015). This is especially the case where 
there exist location-specific factors, including “natural resources, agglomerations, or local 
markets” (IMF et al., 2015; Mansour, 2019). However, as with any incentive, each particular 
type of tax incentive requires close examination in the context in which it would be offered to 
understand potential efficacy and to assess whether it is worth the costs.  
To the extent that tax incentives will be offered, governments are encouraged to adhere to 
the guiding principles enumerated below, in conjunction with the more general principles 
in this guide. Many of the below principles are adopted directly from the OECD’s Principles 
to Enhance Transparency and Governance of Tax Incentives for Investment in Developing 
Countries (OECD, 2013).
1. Tax incentives should aim to contribute to a country’s development goals, which should be 
aligned with the CFS RAI principles 
If governments decide to offer tax incentives for investment in agriculture and food 
systems, such incentives should be used narrowly to address specific market failures or 
obstacles to responsible investment. More generally, they should contribute to a country’s 
national development priorities, which should be aligned with the CFS RAI. As such, the 
benefits they generate should support sustainable development goals, and should also 
exceed their associated costs. 
To try to understand whether the tax incentives’ quantifiable benefits would outweigh the 
associated costs, governments can use a financial model, i.e. a cost benefit analysis (CBA). 
A well-designed CBA can help mitigate several potential problems associated with tax 
(and other) incentives:  
• by quantifying expected costs, a jurisdiction can avoid overcommitting its resources to 
investors;  
• the process of comparing costs with benefits over time gives the jurisdiction the 
opportunity to understand more specifically whether and how an investment is likely to 
improve or enhance sustainable development in that jurisdiction;  
• the CBA can be used to build support for high-quality, responsible investments and to 
steer the jurisdiction’s interest away from lower-quality opportunities; and  
• the expectations set as a result of the CBA can be used after the fact to monitor and 
evaluate the actual outcomes of the investments made under the incentive to determine 
whether net benefits were achieved (Harpel, 2016).
Despite these benefits, there are limits to what governments can accomplish with CBAs. 
Some governments do not have the technical tools to develop and run sophisticated 
models. Others do not have sufficient and adequate data. Even if the tools and the data 
are available, the analysis may be subpar: incorrect assumptions, incorrect use of the tools 
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or application of the data, or similar factors may limit its usefulness (UN and CIAT, 2018). 
Finally, CBA’s focus on quantifiable elements may obscure some of the likely impacts, 
benefits, and costs of incentives, despite their relevance for sustainable development goals. 
Nevertheless, it is important for governments planning to offer new tax incentives (as well 
as for those that are evaluating existing incentives) to seek to estimate the costs and the 
benefits of the intended or ongoing incentives. While specific guidance on how to conduct 
a good CBA is beyond the scope of this guide, additional guidance on the topic, including a 
prototype model, is available in a recent UN document on “Design and Assessment of Tax 
Incentives in Developing Countries” (UN and CIAT, 2018). 
2. Publicly disclose all tax incentives for investment in agriculture and food systems—as well 
as their objectives—within a governing framework 
A tax incentive should be granted only when its objective aligns with the development 
strategy of the jurisdiction. Governments should make explicit the policy objectives of the 
incentives; the justification for the use of each incentive (e.g. employment creation, R&D, 
technology transfer); and the expected costs and intended benefits of the incentives. This 
information should be made in a public statement that is regularly updated. The statement 
allows for the government to be held accountable for the incentives, as well as provide 
the basis for assessing the performance of the incentives, and identifying any overlap, 
duplication or inconsistency with other programmes. 
3. Tax incentives should be prescribed in the law and ratified through the law-making body 
Tax incentives, including their eligibility criteria, should be consolidated under the tax law. 
This reduces the likelihood of conflicting or overlapping provisions, increases transparency, 
and empowers the tax administration to administer them effectively with due respect to 
the public interest. It also ensures that the incentives have been subject to the legislative 
process, having passed appropriate parliamentary and public scrutiny (OECD, 2015). If 
provided, tax incentives should be simple to both apply for and to administer.  
4. The authority to enact tax incentives should be with the Ministry of Finance 
Tax incentives should be enacted and consolidated under the authority of the Ministry 
of Finance. By consolidating them under a single body, inconsistencies in policies can be 
avoided, transparency can be increased, and discretionary power can be limited. Where tax 
incentives are administered and enforced by a different agency (e.g. tax administration) or 
different levels of government, these entities should coordinate so that the efficiency and 
transparency of their efforts is maximised. 
5. Process for applying for tax incentives should be based on clearly defined and objective 
eligibility criteria  
Once enacted in the relevant tax laws and accompanying regulations, tax incentives 
should be provided to any investors who meet the eligibility criteria prescribed under 
the law, without the need to negotiate with the granting authority (IMF et al., 2015). This 
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helps promote transparency and accountability, and encourages investor certainty, so 
long as the eligibility criteria is clearly defined and objective (Johnson et al. forthcoming). 
Granting incentives in this way can then be largely automatic once the taxpayer satisfies 
the stipulated conditions of the criterion.  
The eligibility criteria should include minimum conditions to be met in order to be 
eligible for the tax incentive. These include basic steps an investor must take (such as the 
requirement to file a tax return, or to provide a statement detailing the duty or exemptions 
availed in the prescribed period) (OECD, 2013), as well as criteria used to target investors 
and investments that meet certain conditions inherent to the investment that the 
government is seeking to attract (such as the size of the project or investment made, type 
of activity conducted, home state of the investor, or location of the investment) (Tavares-
Lehmann et al., 2016). Given the potential of SMEs and small-scale producers to contribute 
to sustainable development and inclusive economic growth, and considering the risk of 
crowding out their investments, it may be preferable in many cases to avoid imposing 
conditions based on the size of the project.  
In addition, eligibility criteria can hinge on requirements that investors behave in ways 
that the host country considers particularly conducive to responsible investment. These 
types of conditions may target, for example, investors that: comply with environmental 
or labour standards that are above and beyond those required by the law; exclusively use 
climate-smart technology and practice; generate a certain number of permanent, well-
compensated jobs; or integrate an inclusive business model that sources produce from 
small-scale producers or involves them as shareholders in a joint venture. Providing tax 
incentives upon proof that such conditions have been met allows jurisdictions to target 
investors that invest responsibly, with the aim of achieving sustainable development goals. 
6. Cost-based vs. profit-based tax incentives 
When tax incentives are offered, cost-based tax incentives are more likely to serve 
government goals than profit-based ones. A profit-based incentive lowers the tax rate for 
any amount of profit earned by an investor. Thus, the value of the incentive is a direct 
function of the company’s profits, which results in the incentive favouring firms with high 
profits and therefore least in need of an incentive to invest (Andersen et al., 2017). A profit-
based incentive is also more likely to be redundant. A cost-based incentive is independent 
of the profit level of a company and instead focuses on lowering the cost of capital, which 
increases the chances that project is profitable; cost-based incentives thus are more likely 
to stimulate investment that would not have occurred without such incentives. Cost-based 
incentives are also encouraged because tax revenue loss is more predictable, and they are 
less likely to be abused (Andersen et al., 2017).
7. Ensure that certain safeguards are included to minimise the potential for abuse 
There are multiple ways that investors have sought to abuse tax incentives, in particular by 
engaging in various practices that make them appear eligible to receive incentives even 
though they should be excluded from eligibility. These practices include, for example, 
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transforming into new entities (when the incentive is not available for existing firms), 
“roundtripping” or restructuring as foreign entities (when the incentive is not available to 
domestic firms), and engaging in transfer pricing or similar practices that seek to inaccurately 
allocate profit to a tax exempt/privileged entity or activity (UN and CIAT, 2018). 
Understanding the likely ways in which specific tax incentives can be abused can help 
governments both in selecting the appropriate incentives that are least likely to be abused, as 
well as in including safeguards, when possible, to minimise such abuse (UN and CIAT, 2018).
8. Ensure tax incentives are time-bound 
The legislation that provides tax incentives should have a built-in sunset provision, which 
means that the legislation will expire at a certain time, unless proactively renewed by the 
legislature. By doing so, the government can seek to ensure that investment incentives 
neither outlive their usefulness nor become a line-item that is difficult to repeal because 
of entrenched interests.  
9. Monitor and evaluate performance, relevance and compliance 
Tax incentives are not always effective at meeting the government’s goals: they may 
have been designed poorly at the outset, or they may simply outlast their usefulness as 
economies evolve and a country’s needs and goals change. While sunset provisions provide 
one mechanism for ending inefficient or redundant incentives, there is also a need to build 
in mechanisms for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of ongoing incentives.  
The monitoring and evaluation of tax incentives should consider, for example, whether they 
are incentivising new investment, whether it is helping to meet the stated development 
goal(s), whether it continues to be relevant, and whether investors have complied with 
the conditions tied to the incentive. The results of such periodic reviews should inform 
decision-making on the continuation or withdrawal of the tax incentive. The review criteria 
and results should also be reported publicly.  
Separately, tax authorities should also periodically carry out audits of investments where 
tax incentives have been granted to ensure that they are not misused, e.g. tax avoidance 
or evasion, and impose penalties if misuse occurred. 
10. Collect data systematically to support the statement of tax expenditures and to monitor 
individual tax incentives 
While the periodic analysis of tax incentives is data- and resource- intensive, such analysis 
is necessary for providing transparent public statements, budgeting, calculating amount 
of revenue forgone, and tracking of behavioural responses by businesses. The analysis 
should include a record of the beneficiaries of tax incentives, their duration, individual 
taxpayer data, behavioural responses both good (e.g. employing local youth) and bad 
(e.g. aggressive tax planning), and the costs in forgone revenue. This kind of analysis may 
require the introduction of new mechanisms and tools in some countries, and sufficient 
funds should be allocated to ensure that adequate analyses can be done. 
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Annex III - Monitoring, 
evaluation and learning
Monitoring 
Monitoring is the routine and continuous collection and tracking of data to provide the relevant 
government agency, the management team, and key stakeholders of an ongoing incentive 
with indications of the extent of progress (or lack of) and achievement of expected results, 
and progress in the use of allocated funds. The goal of monitoring should be the collection 
of data, stored in an information system, that can be used for regular reporting, analysis, and 
assessment of the incentive at the evaluation phase.  
Broadly speaking, monitoring can focus on an assessment of the expected results at the 
outcome and impact levels, or whether incentives have been implemented as intended and 
are leading to expected outputs. The following considerations should be kept in mind when 
developing a monitoring plan.
1. What data to collect 
A fundamental first step is deciding what data needs to be collected. Data collection is the 
process of systematically gathering quantitative and/or qualitative data for the purposes of 
monitoring, evaluating, and learning. The indicators from the theory of change developed 
at the planning stage can be used for this purpose, or it may be necessary to develop 
sub-indicators that feed into the existing ones (IIED, 2019). The data collected for each 
indicator are monitored against baselines, on the one hand, and targets, on the other, at 
each stage of the theory of change developed. Baseline data, which is the situation before 
the incentive is implemented, must also be collected before the implementation of the 
incentive to measure change toward targets. Without the baseline data, it is difficult to 
measure the progress made as a result of an incentive.  
Consideration should be given to the time, effort, and resources required for data collection 
(University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture n.d.). Government ministries and agencies 
should be encouraged to share data among relevant sectors and key stakeholders for the 
promotion of widespread learning and transfer of knowledge (IIED, 2019).
2. Entity responsible for monitoring data 
Identify the entity or entities responsible for collecting, analysing, reporting, and 
communicating the data (IIED, 2019). Including key stakeholders beyond government 
authorities (e.g. beneficiaries of the incentives, and/or farming cooperatives and 
organisations) can strengthen monitoring efforts, as well as subsequent evaluation and 
learning efforts. 
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3. Identify the source of data 
The source of data that will be used for each indicator must also be identified. Data can be 
collected through an existing source (secondary data) or a new one (primary data). There 
are advantages and disadvantages to both. Secondary data sources include any relevant 
data already collected, government agencies and authorities, and/or academia. These 
sources can provide relevant information for MEL purposes, such as official statistics, 
national account data, national household surveys, or on external factors that may affect 
the implementation and progress of the incentives (USAID, 2019). Primary data sources 
are collected specifically for the purposes of the incentive (and therefore are more costly), 
such as recording the number of beneficiaries attending a training course (output data); or 
recording the proportion of small-scale farmers’ use of sustainable practices during site 
visits (outcome data). 
4. Identify the data collection method to be used 
The monitoring plan should also include the data collection method for each indicator, i.e. 
the procedure for how data are collected. This method can be quantitative or qualitative. 
When selecting a method for data collection, a number of factors need to be kept in mind, 
including the cost of the method chosen, the appropriateness of the method given local 
context and traditions, and the level of rigour necessary (USAID 2019). In addition, it may 
be necessary to adapt the data collection method for a particular indicator in the face of 
unforeseen challenges (IIED, 2019). 
Some commonly used quantitative methods include:  
• recording data through administrative actions, e.g. recording the number of farmers 
who purchased specified technology using the subsidies provided;  
• electronic data collection, e.g. beneficiaries record actions into a mobile app;  
• surveys, e.g. questions asked of beneficiaries regarding their knowledge after 
completion of the training courses; and  
• observations, e.g. trained observer recording total farmland coverage using new 
practices in a given jurisdiction (USAID, 2019).  
Some commonly used qualitative methods include:  
• interviews, e.g. an interviewer asks a beneficiary about her knowledge, experience 
and perception of certain practices;  
• focus group discussions, e.g. moderator leads a discussion among a group on their 
perception about the sustainability of certain practices; and  
• observations, e.g. trained observer attends training course to make observations 
informed by her interactions with beneficiaries during the activity (USAID, 2019). 
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5. Use of disaggregated data 
Data should be disaggregated for each indicator, where necessary, by demographics that 
will inform the decision-making process regarding the breadth of reach at each stage 
of the incentive. For example, if incentives are targeting youth farmers, it is important 
to monitor how the incentives are affecting farmers of different age categories; if the 
incentives are geared toward empowering small-scale farmers, it is critical to monitor 
how the incentives may be impacting women and men differently. Disaggregated data can 
improve understanding of the progress made toward the expected results by providing 
details of the experiences of a subset of the beneficiaries monitored by that indicator. 
Without such data, it is not possible to assess whether the incentives have been effective at 
benefiting the target beneficiaries, or to identify any potential unintended consequences 
on other groups (FAO, 2018a).
6. Frequency of data collection 
The frequency of data collection for each indicator will need to be considered. This will 
depend on the specific indicator being measured. Monitoring an output indicator, like 
attendance at a training course, will be a one-time recording of the number of attendees. 
However, monitoring an impact indicator, like a change in farmers’ income after the 
introduction of improved seed to increase productivity, might need to be collected 
annually, at the end of the farming season, and only after allowing time for its distribution, 
adoption, and improved yield. The frequency of data collection will also depend on the 
method being used. For instance, in-person observations or in-depth interviews by trained 
personnel are more resource- and time- intensive and therefore may occur once at the 
end of an incentive cycle, whereas electronic collection of data by beneficiaries could 
occur on a weekly basis (USAID, 2019).
7. Data reporting  
The regular reporting of data can help track the success (or failure) of incentives as it will 
feed into the analysis of the data at the evaluation phase. It will also help generate and 
share lessons learned across government levels and agencies. Without this final step, the 
resources devoted to data collection will largely be wasted. 
Evaluation 
Evaluation is the systematic and critical assessment of an ongoing or completed project, 
programme or policy, its design, implementation and/or results. It uses data collected through 
monitoring, as a starting point, to provide information about what works, what does not, and 
probes into the reasons for these results (IIED, 2019).  
There are many reasons why an evaluation may be conducted: to determine the efficiency of 
an incentive; to examine whether an incentive has fulfilled its intended objective(s); or to assess 
the sustainability of an incentive. An effective evaluation should also provide useful evidence 
to contribute to learning processes that can be used to improve an incentive or to provide 
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guidance for future interventions, and to strengthen accountability for development results. 
The following provides the main principles to consider when determining the evaluation 
approach to MEL, i.e. the methodology used to conduct an evaluation. It largely follows the 
approach adopted by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 
(2019), which has been adapted for the purposes of this guide.
1. The scope and purpose of the evaluation 
An evaluation uses the monitoring data generated to track the expected results of an 
intervention, like an incentive, or project. To perform a meaningful evaluation, the 
purpose of the evaluation has to be clearly defined, e.g. to assess performance, to support 
improvement, for accountability purposes, or for knowledge building, etc. (Better Evaluation 
n.d.). The scope of the evaluation provides more detail (e.g. timeframe, necessary resources, 
etc.) and clarifies what will and will not be included.  
2. Entity to conduct the evaluation 
Who should conduct the evaluation depends on multiple factors, including the objective 
of the evaluation, how complex it will be, and the level of independence required. 
Depending on these factors, either internal evaluators or external evaluators may be more 
appropriate.   
Internal evaluators may undertake, for example, a context analysis in a jurisdiction during 
the development of an intervention; a process evaluation to better understand how an 
incentive is operating on the ground; or a cost-benefit analysis to assess the revenue 
forgone of a tax incentive. While the use of internal evaluators is cost-effective, external 
evaluators have the advantage of being viewed as more impartial and independent. 
“Impartiality contributes to the credibility of evaluation and the avoidance of bias in 
findings, analyses and conclusions” (OECD DAC, 2010). For instance, external evaluators 
may be best positioned to conduct an impact evaluation at the end of an incentive cycle. 
3. Develop key evaluation questions with relevant stakeholders 
Key evaluation questions should be formulated early in the process to help clarify the 
specific objectives of the evaluation, and to inform the development of the methodology. 
Relevant stakeholders, whose interests or rights are (directly or indirectly) connected to 
the specific purpose of the evaluation, can be involved early on in the process and given 
the opportunity to identify issues to be addressed and evaluation questions to be answered 
(OECD DAC, 2010). 
  Some evaluation questions may require additional data to provide insight that can aid in 
learning new lessons about a situation. For example, while monitoring data may provide 
evidence of the number of women producers that have actively engaged in climate-smart 
agricultural practices supported through a training course, policymakers and technical staff 
may be interested to know what key factors led to this level of engagement, e.g. was it the 
training courses coupled with the grants provided to purchase the specified technology; 
was it the increase in work time afforded to women because of accessible childcare services 
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provided; was it the change in the land tenure system that allowed women to receive 
bigger grants to invest in agriculture; etc. This information can impact future allocation of 
resources to achieve more transformational or cost-effective outcomes (IIED, 2019). 
1. Identify the appropriate evaluation criteria 
Once the evaluation questions have been formulated, consideration should be given 
to the evaluation criteria to use as the basis of the assessment (IIED, 2019). The OECD 
Development Assistance Committee’s (DAC) evaluation criteria, revised and published 
in December 2019, provides one of the most commonly used sets of evaluation criteria, 
known as the DAC criteria (see Box 13). The application of these criteria—or any additional 
ones—depends on the evaluation questions and the objectives of the evaluation. 
BOX 13: DAC EVALUATION CRITERIA 
Relevance: The extent to which an incentive’s objectives and design respond to the 
intended beneficiaries’ or jurisdiction’s needs, the region’s, country’s or global priorities, 
and/or the priorities and policies of development partners and donors, and continue to 
do so if circumstances change. A relevant incentive will clearly demonstrate the theory of 
change logic developed and any causal relationships identified (IIED, 2019).  
Coherence: The extent of the compatibility of the incentive with other interventions in a 
country, sector or institution. A lack of coherence can lead to duplication or cancellation 
of efforts, which can undermine overall progress.  
Effectiveness: The extent to which the incentive achieved, or is expected to achieve, its 
objectives and results. It can also be used as an aggregate measure of (or judgment about) 
the merit or worth of an activity, i.e. the extent to which an incentive has attained, or is 
expected to attain, its strategic objective(s) efficiently, in a sustainable fashion, and with 
positive institutional development impact. 
Efficiency: The extent to which the incentive delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an 
economic and timely way. “Economic” is the conversion of inputs into outputs, outcomes 
and impacts, in the most cost-effective way possible. The goal is to achieve the desired 
results at each level in the least costly way possible. “Timely” delivery means delivery of 
results within the intended timeframe, or a timeframe reasonably adjusted to the demands 
of the evolving context.  
Impact: The extent to which the incentive has generated, or is expected to generate, significant 
positive or negative, intended or unintended, higher-level effects. Impact addresses the 
ultimate significance and potentially transformative effects of the incentive. It seeks to 
identify the social, environmental and economic effects of the incentive that are longer-
term or broader in scope than those already captured under the effectiveness criterion. 
Sustainability: The extent to which the net benefits of the incentive continue, or are likely to 
continue, after the incentive cycle. This includes an examination of the financial, economic, 
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social, environmental, and institutional capacities of the systems needed to sustain net 
benefits over time. It involves analyses of resilience, risks and potential trade-offs. 
Adapted from source: OECD DAC (2019) and OECD DAC (2010).
2. Evaluation types 
There are several types of evaluations that can be conducted, depending largely on the evaluation 
purpose, objective, and questions. Table 7 includes several common evaluation types.  
Table 7 – Common Evaluation Types

















Impact Evaluation  
During the development of a new 
incentive. 
When an existing incentive is 
being modified or is being used in 
a new setting or with a new 
population. 
As soon as incentive 
implementation begins. 
During operation of an existing 
incentive.  
After the incentive has made 
contact with at least one person or 
group in the target population.
At the beginning of an incentive. 
During the operation of an 
existing incentive.  
During the operation of an existing 
incentive at appropriate intervals.  
At the end of an incentive.  
Whether the proposed 
incentive is likely to be 
needed, understood and 
accepted by the population 
you want to reach. 
The extent to which an 
evaluation is possible, based 
on the goals and objectives. 
How well the incentive is 
working. 
The extent to which the 
incentive is being 
implemented as designed. 
Whether the incentive is 
accessible and acceptable to 
its target population. 
The degree to which the 
incentive is having 
an effect on the target 
population's behaviours.  
What resources are being used 
for an incentive and their costs 
(direct and indirect) compared 
to outcomes. 
The degree to which the 
incentive meets its ultimate 
goal (desired impact).  
It allows for modifications to 
be made to the plan before 
full implementation begins. 
Maximises the likelihood that 
the incentive will succeed.
Provides an early warning for 
any problems that may occur. 
Allows implementing team to 
monitor how well the 
incentive plans and activities 
are working.
Tells whether the incentive is 
being effective in meeting 
objectives. 
Provides relevant government 
agency and managers a way to 
assess cost relative to effects. 
“How much bang for your 
buck.” 
Provides evidence for use in 
policy and funding decisions. 
Adapted from source: National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (n.d.). 
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Learning 
To maximise the utility of lessons learned, the information and knowledge generated through 
the monitoring and evaluation processes should be analysed to identify any challenges 
faced, how those challenges were overcome, and whether in hindsight those challenges 
were preventable. The lessons learned about the way(s) to avoid such challenges in a similar 
future situation is important in the learning process (IIED, 2019). Sharing lessons learned is 
also important, and mechanisms should be developed for disseminating the information to 
relevant stakeholders and beyond. 
When learning is effectively incorporated into a MEL plan, such learning can help 
policymakers and technical staff inform, adjust, and improve current and future incentive 
design and implementation, and/or withdraw or discontinue an incentive. This cycle of 
monitoring, evaluating, and learning by adjusting and improving incentives is centred on an 
iterative process of making decisions based on that learning (Williams and Brown, 2014). It 
allows for and encourages adjustments to be made in response to changing circumstances, 
including politics, law, environment, socioeconomics, and so on; new information surfaced; 
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